行動主義経済学の視点からの市場のアノマリーに関するエッセイ by WANG RENHAO
Essays on Market Anomalies from a
Behavioristic Perspective
著者 WANG RENHAO
学位授与機関 Tohoku University
学位授与番号 11301甲第18251号
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10097/00123849
  
 
 
 
Essays on Market Anomalies from a  
Behavioristic Perspective 
 
A Dissertation   
Presented to 
 
Graduate School of Economics and Management, 
Tohoku University 
in particular 
fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
by 
Wang Renhao 
B5ED1502 
 
 
  
i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I would like to express my most genuine gratitude to everyone who has offered great 
contributions to this work.  
Firstly, and most sincerely, I thank Professor Jiro Akita wholeheartedly. It will be 
impossible for me to finish this dissertation without his patient and kindness help. 
Studying under Professor Akita’s guidance, my Ph.D. has been an amazing experience, 
not only for his tremendous academic support but also for the critical thinking I learned 
and benefited from him.  
   Similar, profound gratitude goes to the members of my dissertation committee: 
Professor Akiomi Kitagawa and Professor Hiroaki Chigira. They have generously 
offered their time, support, guidance, and goodwill throughout the preparation and 
review of this document. I also wish to thank my best friend, Doctor Mi Xianhua, for 
his great assistance with the mathematics deduction which is essential to this study. 
Finally, thanks go to my family and my friends for almost unbelievable support. 
Especially, for my uncle and aunt who inspired and encouraged me to pursue a high 
academic accomplishment; for my brother and my sister in law who take the 
responsibility of looking after the family, which I failed to; for my grandparents and 
parents who raised me as a man with will. They are the most important people in my 
world, and I dedicate this thesis to them. 
 
 
  
ii 
ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, we try to understand the volatility anomaly and the trading volume 
anomaly in the financial market by one of the most important behavioristic biases 
investors are facing, their extrapolation belief.  
Firstly, we use the empirical test to investigate if investor’s extrapolation belief can 
significantly impact the volatility and trading volume. According to the recent 
groundbreaking work of Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), extrapolation investors’ 
expected return is “a weighted average of past returns.”  Therefore, we construct the 
Greenwood Shleifer Index(GSI) to quantitatively represent investors’ extrapolative 
belief. Then we use this index as an explaining variable to test its relation to the 
volatility and trading volume of different financial markets. 
Chapter 1 represents our empirical test results about the relation between GSI and 
volatility. It is shown in this chapter that in most of the financial markets, GSI can 
significantly impact volatility even if we include economic factors in our regression, 
indicating the changing extrapolation belief could be a reason causing volatility to 
change, especially when individual investors dominate the market. We also find an 
asymmetric GSI-volatility relationship that volatility is more easily affected by 
individuals’ extrapolation belief during the declining market. 
In the light of previous extrapolative models, Chapter 2 builds a new model to 
explain the empirical finding of Chapter 1. In our new model, extrapolative investors 
also pay attention to information innovations, but with confirmation bias when they 
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evaluate the new arriving information. By questionnaire survey, we give direct evidence 
that confirmation bias and extrapolation bias could impact individual investors 
simultaneously. Then by analytical proportions and numerical simulation, we show our 
model can provide specific links between volatility and investors’ extrapolation belief. 
Additionally, we find our theory can also help us to explain one of the most stylized 
facts of volatility, the volatility clustering. 
Chapter 3 seeks the relation between GSI and trading volume. Using simple ARIMA 
structure regression tests, we find individuals’ extrapolation belief can significantly 
impact the trading volume, but the effect is different according to different market. 
Specifically, in the emerging stock market where short-sale constraint exists, when 
GSI<0, trading volume is negatively correlated with |GSI|, the magnitude of individuals’ 
extrapolation belief, but when GSI>0, trading volume is positively correlated with |GSI|. 
On the contrary, trading volume is positively correlated with |GSI| for both positive and 
negative GSI in the future market, where investors are free to sell short. The reason for 
this wacky relationship is in need of further discussion. 
Chapter 4 tries to explain this confusing relation between trading volume and 
individuals’ extrapolation belief. We find that with a simple modification, our model in 
Chapter 2 can efficiently explain this intriguing relation. The only modification we 
make is that extrapolators are heterogeneous with each other in the way that every 
extrapolator has his idiosyncratic bias when evaluating the information innovations. In 
this new model, their heterogeneity is amplified by their extrapolation belief. We prove 
that, in the future market where people can sell short, the trading volume grows as the 
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magnitude of individuals’ extrapolation belief grows. On the contrary, during the bear 
market, in the emerging stock market, extrapolators gradually quit the market as	|#$%| 
increases, the market is left will only fundamentalists who are homogenous with each 
other, the trading volume reduces accordingly. Moreover, using simulation, we show 
that our model can effetely explain the most two important features of financial bubbles: 
the high trading volume, and the high volatility. Volatility rises because extrapolator’s 
expectation is becoming more volatile, trading volume increases as extrapolators are 
getting more heterogeneous with their peers. 
To summarize, this thesis makes several contributions.  Firstly, this thesis is the first 
one to empirically investigate the relationship between volatility, trading volume and 
individuals’ extrapolation bias. Secondly, we confirmed some stylized facts that 
previous researches are missing, the asymmetric GSI-volatility relationship, for 
example. Thirdly, we build a new extrapolative model which not only can help us to 
understand the trading volume and volatility in financial markets but also gives a better 
explanation for the financial bubbles. We also suggest it may be a more promising way 
to study irrational individual investors’ behavior from multiple angles, like what we did 
in building the new model. 
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1. The time-varying Volatility and Extrapolation Belief 
Abstract: This paper empirically studies the relationship between the 
time-varying volatility and individual’s extrapolation belief in several 
financial markets. Based on the groundbreaking work of Greenwood and 
Shleifer (2014) that extrapolative investors’ expected return is a weighted 
average of previous returns, we construct the Greenwood Shleifer 
Index(GSI) to represent investors’ extrapolative belief. Results of our 
empirical test indicate the changing extrapolation belief could be a 
reason causing volatility to change, especially when individual investors 
dominate the market. We also find an asymmetric GSI-volatility 
relationship that volatility is more easily affected by individuals’ 
extrapolation belief during the declining market. 
1.1 Introduction 
Volatility, which is thought to be one of the most essential benchmarks of the 
financial market, changes over time (Fama (1965), Castanias (1979)). There are a lot of 
scholars attempting to understand the fluctuation in volatility from the view of 
economic factors. For example, Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) try to investigate 
the relation between the conditional volatility and macroeconomic variables, but just 
find valid results for only a small part of economic variables they are using. Other 
researchers, including Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1990), Fleming and Remolona 
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(1999), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Andersen et al. (2003), try to relate volatility 
changes in the stock market to micro-economic factors that can affect expected returns. 
Recent works like Engle and Rangel (2008), Christiansen et al. (2012), Mittnik, 
Spindler and Robinzonov (2015) try to use more sophisticated models like Spine-Garch 
to revisit how can stock market volatility be affected by macroeconomic activities. But 
they only find similar conclusions that the economic factors have limited power in 
explaining the movements in stock volatility (Mittnik, Spindler, and Robinzonov 
(2015)).  
Instead of paying attention to economic factors, this paper tries to seek the 
relationship between the time-varying volatility and one of the most important 
individual investors’ biases, their extrapolation belief. By empirical tests, this paper 
shows that volatility index is highly correlated with the extent of investors’ 
extrapolation belief in most financial markets. We believe individual investors’ 
extrapolation behavior can help us to understand the fluctuation in volatility from a new 
perspective. 
Extrapolation means investors tend to form their expectation of future returns by 
previous price trend (Barberis et al. (2016)). They believe the stock price will always 
keep its trend—the price will continue to rise if it has a positive cumulative price change, 
and vice versa. Both psychology papers and financial literature provide evidence 
proving that extrapolation bias can deeply impact people’s decision-making process 
(see, Gilovich et al. (1985); Hirshleifer (2001); Barberis and Thaler, (2003); Fuster et 
al., (2010), e.g.). Theoretical models have also demonstrated extrapolation can account 
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for many capital market phenomenon, e.g., the overreaction anomalies (Barberis et al., 
(1998)), the bubble generation (Barberis et al., (2016)), herding investment (Barberis 
and Shleifer (2003)) and so on.  
Recently, a groundbreaking development of extrapolation theory is given by 
Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). They use survey evidence from multiple resources, 
empirically prove that “investors’ extrapolative belief is a weighted average of past 
price changes, where more recent price changes are weighted more heavily.” Based on 
their work, this paper structures Greenwood and Shleifer Index (GSI) to quantitatively 
measure the extent of extrapolation belief of investors. We choose daily market data 
from several kinds of financial markets, including emerging stock markets (Chinese 
stock market), developed stock markets, the Brent crude oil future market, and the 
currency markets (JPYUSD and EURUSD), to empirical seek its impact on movements 
in volatility.  
To characterize the time varying volatility, this paper applies the Realized Volatility 
method using 5-min high frequency intraday data. Then we use a simple least squares 
regression model to investigate if volatility is related to individuals’ extrapolation belief. 
This paper also distinguishes positive GSI from negative GSI with two dummy 
variables to explore the possible asymmetric influence in raising market and in 
declining market. Besides, to eliminate possible spurious regression, we also introduce 
economic factors into our equitation, to see if the regression result will change 
significantly. 
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Strikingly, we find significant regression result that GSI, no matter positive or 
negative, and no matter with or not without economic factors, does statistically affect 
volatility index for most of the financial markets. Besides, all the regression results are 
much better when we include GSI as explaining variables than those with only 
economic factors. These regression results strongly prove that extrapolation is a reason 
causing volatility to change. 
Besides, it can also be seen from our test that when individual investors take a bigger 
fraction of the whole population, the relationship between GSI and volatility get closer. 
For example, the Chinese stock market, with its reputation for “individual investors 
dominated immature market”, has the biggest individual trading volume proportion as 
well as the best regression result. On the contrary, no significant correlation between 
GSI and volatility index can be found in the currency market where individual investors 
only trade a very small proportion of the whole amount. When individual investors’ 
proportion maintains a moderate size, like Japanese stock market, Nasdaq stock market 
and the Brent Crude future market, only weak significant regression result can be 
discovered. Besides, the significance of the estimated parameter of both positive GSI 
and negative GSI holds even if we include macroeconomic factors in our empirical test. 
These empirical results indicate that volatility is indeed influenced by individuals’ 
extrapolation belief.  
These diverse empirical test results of different markets can be explained from the 
different characters of market participators. Individual investors, also called as “retail 
investors” or “noise traders” (Kyle (1985)), is well documented to hold irrational biases 
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and make detrimental investment decisions (Barber and Odean (2011), De long et. al. 
(1990), Shefrin and Thaler (2004), Shiller (2015)). Extrapolation, of course, is one of 
the most pervasive ones. De Bondt (1998), for example, argues that “Perhaps the best-
established stylized fact is extrapolation bias...” Institutional investors, on the contrary, 
are supposed to have the ability to get all information and correctly evaluate the 
fundamental price of equity which can help them to arbitrage the mispricing away 
(Fama (1965), Black (1972), Huberman (2005)). But recent empirical and theoretical 
findings show that, when the market is filled with enthusiastic extrapolators, 
institutional investors may not trade against them, or, in some circumstances, they will 
even try to ride the bubble, buy in asset which they believe it is already over-priced and 
hoping to sell it to latter arriving irrational investors who will buy the asset in an even 
higher price (De Long et al. 1990, Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003, Brunnermeier and 
Nagel 2004). So, a higher proportion of individual trading will indicate a bigger 
influence of extrapolation belief to the price, therefore a better explanatory power of 
GSI to volatility index.  
To test the robustness of the effect that individual investors’ proportion has on the 
explanatory power of GSI to volatility index, this paper goes further to compare the 
regression results between the two indexes in different stages of the same market by 
dividing the samples of Chinese stock market into core-bubble stage and non-core stage. 
During bubbles, the extraordinary enthusiasm of individual investors keeps them 
rushing into the market and becoming more active (Shiller 2015), individual investors 
will take a bigger proportion as well as a higher influence to the market. Hence, 
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individual investors’ irrational behavior will have a more notable impact on the market, 
and volatility should also have a closer relation with GSI. As a result, our test confirms 
this conjecture. For all three samples of Chinese stock market, we do find better 
regression result in core-bubble stages than in non-bubble stages — after casting the 
bubble period, the rest of the sample only show poor fitting effect while the core-bubble 
stage samples still have highly significant regression results.  
According to these comparisons, we may cautiously get the conclusion that changes 
in extrapolation belief can be one of the reasons causing volatility to change, especially 
when individual investors take a big proportion of the market.  
Besides, our test gives clear evidence of the asymmetric relationship between GSI 
and volatility. To begin with, our empirical result shows the regression coefficients of 
the negative GSI are bigger than the coefficient of the positive GSI for all the samples. 
Also, the coefficient significance level of negative GSI is much higher. When GSI>0, 
the regression coefficient is only highly significant in Chinese stock market, which 
turns to weakly significant for other markets. Especially for Nasdaq stock market, 
where we cannot find significant relation between positive GSI and volatility. 
Contrarily, coefficient of negative GSI is still highly significant (p<0.01) across all the 
samples (except currency market). These results demonstrate the asymmetric GSI-
volatility relation that volatility is more easily affected by individuals’ extrapolation 
belief during declining market, but during bull market, this relation is weaker. 
This paper’s findings have meaningful implications. Firstly, to the author’s best 
knowledge, this paper is the first one to empirically study the dynamics of volatility 
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across time from the perspective of individuals’ extrapolation bias. Although many 
behavioral papers have documented how individuals’ irrational behaves can exaggerate 
volatility (DeLong et. al. (1990), Odean (1998), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), 
Barberis, Greenwood and Shleifer (2015)), most of these works are focusing on why 
volatility is “excess” relative to predictions of standard theory model, i.e. the “excess 
volatility puzzle” of Shiller (Shiller 1980, LeRoy and Porter 1981). Few of them try to 
study the time-varying nature of volatility from behavioral perspective (for more detail, 
see Section 1.2). This paper shows that individuals’ irrational bias can not only account 
for “excess volatility”, but can also drive volatility to change across time.   
Secondly, our finding is an important supplement to researches about the changing 
volatility. As demonstrated above, previous papers mainly try to explain the fluctuation 
in volatility with economic factors. Pitifully, according to their results, the economic 
factors can only explain small part of the movements in volatility (Bollerslev, Engle, 
and Wooldridge (1988), Schwert (1989), Christiansen et. al. (2012), Mittnik, Spindler 
and Robinzonov (2015)). But according to this paper’s result, volatility index is 
correlated with extrapolation belief in most of the markets, even for the well-developed 
stock markets such as Nasdaq stock market and Japanese stock market. Therefore, 
people’s irrational bias (extrapolation belief in our paper) can be other factors causing 
volatility to change. That is what previous paper doesn’t take into account. Thus, it is 
more suitable to understand the volatility fluctuation by combining economic factors 
and people’s irrational behave.  
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However, we cannot find satisfying theoretical explanations for this empirical result 
in previous papers. It is the only thing emphasized in previous papers that Extrapolation, 
as a bias, can affect individual’s expectation about future returns, which also becomes 
the starting point for previous papers to explain market anomalies such as the generation 
of financial bubbles, overreaction (Barberis et al. (2016), Hong and Stein (1999)). But, 
most of these papers describe extrapolation of investors is a deterministic process—it 
is only determined by past returns. Therefore, there is no fluctuation in individuals’ 
extrapolation belief in these models. Nevertheless, according to our empirical results, 
extrapolation can also influence instantaneous volatility. So, how extrapolation belief 
can lead changes in volatility still need future theoretical explanation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly reviews related 
behavioral literatures about volatility, Section 1.3 describes the data and characters of 
each financial market. Section 1.4 presents the calculation method for volatility and our 
Greenwood and Shleifer Index (GSI), then illustrates the results of our regression. 
Further implications of our findings are discussed in Section 1.5. 
1.2 Literature Review   
The "excess volatility puzzle”, which has been demonstrated in many researches, 
such as Shiller (1980), Campbell and Shiller (1987), West (1988), Gilles and LeRoy 
(1991), is focusing on the aggregate level of volatility but not about why volatility 
changes over time. Motived by this anomaly, a group of researchers have started to 
search for the relation between volatility and investors’ irrational behave. DeLong et al. 
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(1990) call individual investors “noise traders” and point out noise trader can cause 
price to depart significantly from its fundamental values, and can also cause the excess 
volatility of asset. But they don’t specify which bias noise traders are suffering. Starting 
from prospect theory, Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) study a model where 
investors make decisions according to both consumption and the fluctuations of their 
financial wealth.  They prove that their theory can illustrate excess volatility and other 
anomalies existing in the market. Overconfidence is another irrational bias individual 
investors are facing which is proved to be capable of increasing volatility (Odean, 
(1998); Scheinkman and Xiong, (2003)).  
Extrapolation bias is also proved to be capable of exaggerating volatility. For 
example, Barberis et al. (2015) study a model in which investors try to maximize their 
consumption utility according to their investment performance. In extrapolators’ belief, 
future return of the asset is determined by past price changes. When a positive cash-
flow shock drives the price to rise, extrapolators will try to buy in more asset and hence 
the stock prices will be pushed even higher. As a consequence, price will be more 
fluctuate than its fundamental value. Similar results can be found in Cutler, Poterba, 
and Summers (1990), DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990). 
But all of these models are aiming at accommodating the excess volatility puzzle, i.e., 
why the aggregate level of volatility is higher than the prediction of standard models. 
Few of them pay attention to volatility fluctuation across time. Take Barberis, 
Greenwood, Jin and Shleifer (2015) for example, they calculate the volatility over a 
fixed period predicted by their extrapolative capital asset pricing model, find it is much 
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higher than the fundamental fluctuations. But, no information about volatility 
fluctuation in this time horizon can be found in their model.  
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
To explore the relation between extrapolative belief and the time-varying volatility, 
we choose eight different indexes of different financial markets from Choice Database, 
one of the biggest financial data service enterprises in China. Specifically, the data 
covers SSEC (Shanghai Security Composite Index) and GEI (Shenzhen Growth 
Enterprise Index) of Chinese stock market. The SSEC is designed to show the overall 
performance of Shanghai Security Exchange while GEI represents Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange.  Being developed for decades, the Chinese stock market is now the world's 
5th largest stock market by market capitalization at US$3.5 trillion as of February 2016, 
and 2nd largest in Asia. This paper also chooses indexes from developed countries’ 
stock markets, N225(Japanese Nihon Keizai Shinbun Index) of Japanese stock market 
and IXIC (American Nasdaq Composite Index) of American stock market, two of the 
biggest stock market around the world. For the commodity future market, the data picks 
Brent Crude Index, for it is the most active commodity future ranked by trading volume 
(Stoll, Whaley (2010)). EURUSD (Euro to USD dollar exchange rate) Index and 
JPYUSD (Japanese Yen to USD dollar exchange rate) Index are also included on behalf 
of the currency market. Choosing EURUSD and USD not only because EURUSD and 
JPYUSD are the most popular currency pairs in the world but also for the free 
convertibility and floating exchange rate system of these economic entities. The time 
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intervals, listed in Table 1.1, are different because of data source restriction. Especially, 
for SSEC, two separated time series data are available. Also, the data manages to cover 
two distinguished bubble periods in Chinese stock market the 2005-2008 stock bubble 
and 2015-2016 stock bubble. Annualized Volatility, calculated as standard deviation of  
Table 1.1 Brief report of each market 
 Date range  
Average 
Log Return 
Annualized 
Volatility 
Individual 
trading Proportion 
EURUSD 
2015/10/15-
2016/12/9 
-0.015%	 10.21%	 <5%	
JPYUSD 
2015/10/15-
2016/12/9 
-0.009% 11.41% <5% 
Brent Crude 
Index 
2015/9/16-2016/12/9 0.002% 44.53% 25% 
N225 
2014/12/19-
2016/12/1 
0.026% 24.55% 23.5% 
IXIC 
2015/4/29-
2016/11/16 
0.029% 16.59% <30% 
SSEC 2005/2/1-2008/12/31 0.039% 29.95% 85% 
SSEC 
2013/12/23-
2016/10/31 
0.049% 32.52% 83% 
GEI 
2013/12/26-
2016/10/31 
0.072% 39.19% 85% 
Data range, average log return, annualized volatility and individual trading proportion of each market are reported.  
Annualized volatility is calculated as standard deviation of all returns, such as 
Annualized	volatility = 100 ∙ 252? (@A −CADE @)F 
where 252 represents the constant representing the approximate number of trading days in a year, n means the number 
of samples and @A is logarithm return at time t, @ is the average return.  
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returns for the whole interval is also reported in Table 1.1 as well as the average log 
return. Because extrapolative belief is usually found in individual investors, Table 1 
also gives their trading volume proportion in each market.  
As shown in this table, the currency market has the lowest level of individual 
investors activity and the lowest volatility, it is also considered as one of the most 
efficient markets (Kristoufek and Vosvrda (2016)). According to Triennial Central 
Bank Survey (2016), released by the Bank for International Settlements(BIS), daily 
retail-driven transaction volume (volume traded by individuals) is about 283 billion US 
dollars, only about 5% compared with the total amount of 5,067 billion by all 
counterparties. On the contrary, individual investors take more than 80% of the whole 
population, more than any other market. According to CSDC (China Securities 
Depository and Clearing Corporation) Report 2016, although only holding 24% of 
market capitalization, individual investors in China own about 1.2 billion trading 
accounts (99% percent of all trading accounts) and account for more than 80% of total 
trading volume.  Besides individual dominated markets, Chinese stock market is also 
depicted as “opaque, chaotic, inefficient, and rather irrational” (Eun and Huang (2007)).  
Similarly, the Wall Street Journal (August 22, 2001) use casinos to portray Chinese 
stock market: “In ten years since they were founded, China's stock markets have 
operated like casinos, driven by fast money flows in and out of stocks with little regard 
for their underlying value.” The volatility in Chinese stock market is also the highest, 
especially for GEI, which reaches 39.19% annually. 
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Compared with Chinese stock market, there are much less individual investors in 
Japanese and US stock market, volatility of 24.55% and 16.59% also indicate these two 
markets are more stable. Brent Crude Commodity future has a similar proportion of 
individual investors like Japanese or US stock market, about 25% of this future is traded 
by individual investors (Stoll, Whaley 2009). But the volatility of Brent Crude Index 
dominates with the size of 44.53%. After suffering a big collapse from about 110 USD 
to the lowest 34 USD in 2014 and 2015, the price of Brute Crude Oil has rebounded to 
about 50 USD at the end of 2016. Extremely high volatility accompanies this progress 
which surged to its highest level in seven years (seen in Appendix Figure 1.2).  
In a word, the Chinses stock market which has the biggest proportion of individual 
investors, performs the highest and most volatile volatility compared with other 
financial markets. 
1.4 Calculation Method and Result Discussion 
1.4.1 Index calculation method 
Greenwood Shleifer Index(GSI). As mentioned above, Greenwood and Shleifer 
(2014) demonstrate that extrapolators’ expectation about the risky asset’s future return 
is a “weighted average of past price changes, where more recent price changes weighted 
more heavily”. Following their research, we build the Greenwood Shleifer Index(GSI) 
as  
#$%A = @AGH ∙ IHCHDE 								,																																																						 1  
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where rL means the return at time t, λ governs the weights investors put into each 
period which is set according to empirical results of Greenwood and Shleifer (2014).  
The specification in (3) is commonly used in previous extrapolative models about 
market anomalies. For example, overreaction and under-reaction of price to information, 
momentum trading, stylized trading and so on (De Long et al. 1990, Cutler, Poterba, 
and Summers 1990, Hong and Stein 1999, Barberis and Shleifer 2003, Barberis et al. 
2015). It may be necessary to emphasize that this index can also be negative if the price 
has fallen for some time when individual investors hold pessimistic extrapolation belief 
about future.  
Volatility Index. We use Realized Volatility(RV) to measure volatility index. The 
fast-growing papers on Realized Volatility show that, when high frequency data is 
available, it is a more efficient and accurate measure than other methods such as ARCH 
or GARCH model (Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard 
(2002), Andersen et al. (2003), McAleer and Medeiros (2008)). Following these 
literature, this paper measures volatility index with 5-min high frequency intraday data 
of each market. In high-frequency theory, the realized variance is defined as 
MNA = @AOF		,				PQHDE 																																																																(2) 
where ?A means observation frequency at day t. @AO = RAO − RAOST represents the UVℎ 
intraday sub return, calculated as the difference between logarithm value of price, RAO.  
Accordingly, we can calculate the annualized realized volatility, such as 
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VA = MNA ∗ Y = Y ∗ @AOF						PQHDE 	,																																(3)	 
in which T means the total number of trading days in a year. 
Using high frequency RV gives many advantages. Firstly, studies have proved RV 
provides “an unbiased and highly efficient measurement of return volatility” (Andersen 
et al. (2001)). Further, as stressed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen et 
al. (2001), this measurement is independent of the model we use, as well as independent 
of the sampling frequency. Thirdly and most importantly, this method, unlike other 
volatility measurements, can ensure volatility index is mathematically independent 
from our Extrapolative Belief Index. As shown in Fig 1.1, other volatility index 
calculation methods, like time rolling window standard deviation or the GARCH Model, 
are using basically the same daily return data as GSI (except for the current return @A). 
 
Figure 1.1 Different volatility calculation methods   
    Although calculation methods are different, it can be proved that these volatility 
measure results are mathematically correlated with GSI. On the contrary, as 
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demonstrated by equation (3) and equation (4), Realized Volatility picks the high-
frequency information by using the intraday squared returns @AOF at time t, whereas GSI 
is calculated by low frequency daily returns @AGH, U = 1,2,3⋯, data before time t. Using 
the independent data resources makes sure no mathematical connections between 
volatility index and GSI.  
The basic statistics of calculated GSI with λ = 0.8  and volatility for different 
financial markets are reported in Appendix Table 1.2. In Greenwood and Shleifer 
(2014), for different data sources, their estimated results of λ are different, which ranges 
from 0.33 to 0.92. Of all the six samples, the empirical result for Gallup survey, which 
has the second largest sample size and the most significant result, seems to be the most 
reliable test result. So, we discuss the statistics of GSI with λ = 0.8 which approximates 
the result of the regression for Gallup survey.  
From this table, we can see that, being used to measure how volatile the market is, 
the volatility index itself is very volatile. The minimum values of the estimated 
volatility of these indexes are all approximately equal to 4% (except for volatility of 
Brent Crude Index which reaches to 18.81%). Although the maximum values vary 
across different markets, they are all far beyond the minimum values. For EURUSD 
and JPYUSD, the maximum volatility is about 40%, ten times that of its minimum value, 
but for Brent Crude Index, GEI and SSEC in 20013 and 2016, the maximum volatility 
hovers to more than 120%, about 30 times bigger than its minimum value. This huge 
difference indicates that volatility can change very intensely, especially in Brent Crude 
Oil market and in Chinese stock market. Standard deviation(SD), another signal for 
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volatility fluctuation, is also much higher in Brent Crude Oil market and Chinses stock 
market than in other markets. Besides, the mean value of estimated volatility calculated 
by high frequency approach is smaller than the standard deviation of returns used in 
Table 1.1. This result is similar to previous papers such as Liu and Tse (2012), Amsköld 
(2011), as extreme returns are more stressed in standard deviation method (Masset 
2011). Although the size is different, the order is same. Brent crude oil future market 
has the highest level of volatility, Chinese stock market is more volatile than other stock 
markets, and currency market is the most stable one. These statistics document that, 
Brent Crude Oil market and Chinese stock market present not only higher but also more 
instable volatility than other markets. 
Although the standard deviation of Extrapolation belief index, GSI, is not high, its 
value can become very extreme. For instance, the max value of GSI for Chinese GEI 
index, is 9.79%, meaning extrapolative investors is so optimistic about future that they 
believe the price can still raise for about another ten percent. On the contrary, the 
minimum value of GSI for GEI index drops to -17.52%, indicating extrapolation belief 
make investors hold extreme pessimistic opinions about future returns. Besides, these 
severe preconceptions caused by extrapolation bias most occurred during the bubble 
period when volatility was also extremely high simultaneously. 
 Appendix Figure 1.3 is a demonstration of the fluctuation of volatility (blue line) 
and the changing GSI (red line) while the black line means the GEI index. As shown in 
this picture, volatility starts to raise as the bubble grows since March 2015, and it 
continues raising even after the bubble busted. Eventually it reaches to its peak--more 
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than 120% on 9th July 2015, the most panicking time of the whole market. GSI, the 
extrapolation belief of individuals, also grows as the bubble generates like volatility 
index, showing the increasing enthusiasm of extrapolative investors. When the bubble 
begins to fall, GSI turns to negative as investors become pessimistic. It decreases to its 
minimum when the volatility reaches its peak.  It seems the evolution of investors 
extrapolation belief, positive or negative, is associated with the evolution of volatility. 
Appendix Figure 1.4, the scatterplot of volatility versus GSI for Chinese Growing 
Enterprise stock market (GEI), gives a further demonstration of the contemporaneous 
GSI--volatility relationship. We can clearly see that, no matter positive or negative, the 
development of individuals’ extrapolation belief, measured by GSI, is associated with 
growing volatility.      
Similar things happen to other two samples of Chinese stock market where 
distinguished bubble period can also be easily noticed, as shown in Appendix Figure 
1.5 and Figure 1.6. Also, high volatility is accompanied by extreme values of GSI can 
also be found in Japanese stock market, Nasdaq stock market and in Brent Crude oil 
market (seen Appendix Figure 1.7, Figure 1.8 and Figure 1.9).  
From these figures, we could assume that volatility can be affected by the magnitude 
of GSI. Individuals’ extrapolative belief, positive and negative, can both lead volatility 
to increase. To empirically investigate this, we use the following regression form   N^_`VU_UVaA = ` + cE#$%AdE #$%A > 0 + cF|#$%A|dF #$%A ≤ 0 + gA       (4) 
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where dE and dF are two dummy variables aiming to distinguish positive or negative 
regions of GSI. Results are shown in the following section. 
1.4.3 Empirical Test Result and Comparison of different markets 
       Firstly, as we don’t know exactly the weight that individual investors put into each 
past period, we calculate GSI with different values of λ ranging from 0.3 to 0.9, as 
suggested by Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). The results for different markets are 
listed in Appendix from Table 1.3 to Table 1.10. 
      As we see from these tables, the changing value of λ  has little impact on the 
empirical test result. For example, for the currency market, for all the value of λ, all the 
empirical results for  cE and cF are all insignificant. But for three samples of Chinese 
stock market, although the size of estimated cE and cF are different with different value 
of λ, they are all highly significant. Besides, the R-squared value also changes limitedly. 
Similar things can also be found in Brent crude oil markets, the Japanese stock market 
as well as the Nasdaq stock market. Although the estimated cE  for Japanese stock 
market changes from weakly significant to insignificant as λ increases from 0.3 to 0.9, 
and the estimated cE for Nasdaq stock is only insignificant when λ = 0.9, the estimated 
results don’t have a major difference with each other, as the significance of cF insists 
for different λ, the R-squared value only has small changes. The estimated results don’t 
have major difference with each other. 
Therefore, for the convenience of comparison, the empirical results for different 
financial markets with λ = 0.8  are summarized in Appendix Table 1.11. Because 
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previous papers already show economic factors can partly explain the changes in 
volatility, we also introduce macro-economic factors into our regression to eliminate 
possible spurious regression as: 
VolatilityL = a + βE ∙ GSIL ∙ DE GSIL > 0 + βF ∙ GSIL ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + βn ∙ oA + uL										(5) 
where oA means macro-economic factors. As we use daily data in our empirical test, 
the daily macro-economic factors are limited. Specifically, we use the Domestic 
Interbank Offered Interest Rate for the stock markets, and we use both countries’ 
Interbank Offered Rate for the currency market (although we only show the regression 
result with US. Interbank Offered Interest Rate). Because the Crude Oil Future is traded 
world-widely, we introduce the US Dollar Index as the explaining economic factor. All 
the empirical test results of regression form (5) for different financial markets are listed 
in Table 1.11 too.  
Some meaningful conclusions can be established. Firstly, according to our empirical 
test result, GSI can significantly impact volatility in most of the financial markets. 
Moreover, it has much higher explaining power than economic factors. Particularly, as 
summarized in Table 1.11,  cF is highly significant (P<0.01) for almost all the samples 
(except for the currency markets).  cE is also highly significant for Chinses stock market 
samples. When we only use the economic factors as the explaining variable, the MF is 
quite small, which is consist with previous researcher’s’ finding that economic factors 
have little ability to explain the time varying volatility. On the contrary, if we use GSI 
as the explaining variable, MF  increases significantly, indicating a much better 
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regression result. More importantly, even if we include the macroeconomic factors in 
the regression, there is no significant change in the regression results. Taking Chinese 
GEI market for example, although the coefficient of Shibor is strictly positive, the R-
squared value is only 0.12 when we only use Shibor as the explaining variable. But it 
increases to as much as 0.48 when we introduce GSI into the regression. Furthermore, 
if we introduce economic factors into equation (4), the significance of cE and cF insists, 
the R-squared value is similar as before. These significant results verify our assumption 
that volatility can be caused by individuals’ extrapolation belief.  
Secondly, the significance level for different markets is different. For instance, 
Chinese stock market, where individual investors’ trading volume takes the biggest 
proportion, has the most significant regression results--both cEand cF are significant at 
the 1% significance level. R-squared values also indicate GSI has the biggest 
explanatory power for volatility in Chinese stock market. With a size of 0.51, R-squared 
value for the second Chinese stock market sample (SSEC index from 2013/12/23 to 
2016/10/13) implies a well-fitting regression. For other two Chinese stock market 
samples, R-squared values are both above 0.3, still bigger than other financial markets. 
As for Japan Stock market, Nasdaq stock market and Brent oil commodity future 
market, we only find less significant empirical regression results or a weaker 
explanatory power of GSI for volatility. Although cF, the coefficient of the negative 
GSI, is highly significant (at the 1% significance level) for all these three markets,  cE, 
the coefficient for the positive GSI, performs much worse. It is only significant at the 
5% significance level for Brent crude oil market and at the 10% significance level for 
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Japanese stock market while non-significant for Nasdaq stock market. Besides, R-
squared values for these three markets are only about 0.1, which also suggest a weaker 
relation between GSI and volatility. For the currency markets, where individual 
investors take the minimum trading volume proportion, no significant regression result 
can be found. In a word, GSI has different ability to explain volatility in different 
financial markets. 
Besides the diverse significant levels among different financial markets, the 
asymmetric GSI-Volatility relation is also proved. Our empirical results indicate cF >cE  for all samples which have significant regression result. Besides magnitude, 
significant levels for these two coefficients are also different. For Japan Stock market, 
Brent oil commodity future market and Nasdaq stock market, cF  are all more 
significant than its counterpart, especially for the Nasdaq stock market, where the 
positive GSI cannot significantly affect volatility according to our empirical test.  
Moreover, to formally test the asymmetric GSI-Volatility relation, we use the 
following regression form: 
                 N^_`VU_UVaA = ` + cn #$%A + cp ∙ #$%A ∙ dF #$%A ≤ 0 + gA												(3.1.4) 
in which we take cF = cE = cn  and cp  is insignificant as the null hypotheses.  But 
according to our test result of 3.13 (represented in Table 1.12),  cp are significant for 
all the financial markets (except for the currency market). Also, for all the samples with 
the significant cp, we can find cp + cn = cF, and cE = cn,which officially reject the 
   
 23 
null hypotheses—there does exist an asymmetric GSI-Volatility relation in these 
financial markets.  
This inequality reveals that negative GSI has stronger explanatory power to volatility 
than positive GSI. In other words, volatility is more easily affected by extrapolation 
belief in a declining market. 
1.4.3 Result comparison of different stages 
From the regression results of Table 1.11, we can find that when there is a bigger 
proportion of individual investors, there will be a more significant regression result. So, 
we could make the assumption that the effect extrapolation belief has on volatility is 
determined by the proportion of individual investors or the influence of individual 
investors to pricing. To further verify this assumption, this paper also compares 
different stages of the same market: bubble stages and other stages.   
From Figure 1.3, Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6 we can easily notice two bubble stages 
in Chinese stock market, the 2005-2008 stock bubble and 2015-2016 stock bubble. A 
financial bubble is often portrayed as the asset price rushes abnormally high compared 
with its fundamental value (Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2012). As displayed in these 
figures, from 2013 to 2016, the SSEC index hovered to 5178 point followed by a big 
collapse of 50% within three months, while GEI index performs similarly by losing 
more than 56% in the same short time after its rising from around 1300 to a maximum 
of 4037 point. In both figures, volatility grows and fluctuates with bubble’s generation, 
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and become even higher and more fluctuant during bubble’ collapse. Similar things 
happen to SSEC index during 2005 and 2008.  
Inexperienced individual investors are continually attracted to “gamble” in the market 
during the bubble periods. Kindleberger and Aliber (2005, p. 25) suggest that people 
who are indifferent to such investment are brought into the market. “Even chimney-
sweeps and old clothes women dabbled in tulips.” as described by Mackay (1841).  
“Youth had taken over Wall Street.”  happened during the stock market boom of the 
late 1960s (Brooks’ (1973, p. 211)). The same thing happens to Chinses stock market. 
Appendix Figure 1.10 shows the development of monthly new individual investors 
(blue line) and proportion of active account (red line) according to monthly reports of 
CSDC (China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation) from 2014 Jan. to 2016 
Nov., the second bubble period of Chinese stock market. Because individual investor’ 
accounts occupy about 99% of total accounts in Chinese stock market, the ups or downs 
of active account can be regards as the return or leave of individual investors who have 
already own a stock account. In this picture, we can feel the enthusiasm of new 
individual investors and the newfound interest of “old” individual investors when the 
price rises (black line in Figure 1.10), or the depression of individual investors as price 
falling. In a word, individual investors are much more active during bubbles. Hence, 
the correlation between volatility index and GSI should be bigger during bubbles.  
To compare the different influence of extrapolation belief to volatility during 
different periods (bubbles period or non-bubble periods), each of the samples drawn 
from Chinese stock market is divided into two stages based on the price level, the core 
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bubble stage and the non-core stage.  The core-bubble stage is selected according to:(1) 
it should contain the most distinguished part of the bubble, i.e., the stage when the price 
reaches a very high level. (2) To avoid reliable test issues, the sample interval should 
not be too short. The rest time is the non-core stage. Even if we cannot calculate the 
fundamental value of each index, but based on the price level, we can at least distinguish 
when is bubble more severe. The core-bubble stage of each sample is represented by 
the green box in Figure 1.3, Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6. The comparison result is 
reported in Appendix Table 1.13. 
As represented in Table 1.13, empirical test result varies significantly across different 
stages. For all three samples, the least squares regression does perform better in core-
bubble stages than in non-core stages. Especially for the latter two samples (from 2013 
to 2016), after casting the most distinguished bubble stage, cE , which is highly 
significant for the core-bubble stage and for the whole sample (see Table 2), only shows 
weak significance (at 10% level). R-squared value also drops to less than 0.1, which 
means the non-core stage of these two samples only have the similar performance with 
developed stock market and the Brent crude oil future market. Non-core stage of the 
third sample (SSEC 2005-2008) have a better regression result but it is still 
incomparable with the core-bubble stage. Besides the different regression significance 
between core-bubble stage and non-core stage, the asymmetric explanatory power of 
positive and negative GSI to volatility index is also reflected as  cF > cE still holds for 
all the stages. 
   
 26 
These significant differences verify the conjecture that when the market has a bigger 
proportion of individual investors, the correlation between volatility index and 
individuals’ extrapolation belief should be higher. So, we may cautiously get the 
conclusion that individuals’ trading proportion is critical of explanatory power of GSI 
to volatility index. Therefore, extrapolation belief can be a reason that drives volatility 
to change, especially when individual investors have a large influence on pricing, like 
in Chinese stock market. 
1.5 Further Discussion 
To the author’s best knowledge, our paper is the first to use empirical test to 
investigate how individuals’ extrapolation belief can affect volatility across time. 
According to this paper’s result, extrapolation beliefs can not only cause the "excess 
volatility puzzle" as show in the existing papers, but also can drive volatility to vary 
over time. As discussed above, micro and macroeconomic variables can only partly 
explain why volatility changes across time (Bollerslev, Engle, and Wooldridge (1988), 
Schwert (1989)), so this approach offers a new method to study the variation of 
volatility.     
Now the challenge is that existing theories about extrapolation are not enough for us 
to fully understand this relation between GSI and volatility. To further illustrator this, 
let’s assume the price follows the stochastic process as: qRA = rAqA + sAqtA																																																														(6)       
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where RA  is the log value of current price, rA  stands for drift component of this 
process, i.e. the instantaneous conditional mean of return at time t, t is a standard 
Brownian motion while sA represents a stochastic process independent of tA , it also 
signifies the instantaneous volatility. Therefore, we can calculate the return as  @AO = RAO − RAOST = rAqAAOAOST + sAqtAAOAOST                                      (7) 
and its quadratic variation QV(VH, VHGE) is 
              QV(VH, VHGE) =	 sAFqVAOAOST                                                          (8) 
Equation (8) shows that according to quadratic variation theory, innovations of the 
mean component rA	 cannot change the variation of the return @AO. Further, by semi-
martingale theory, when the observation number increases, realized volatility will 
eventually become equivalent to the return quadratic variation QV (Protter 1990) :  MNA = @A,HF 		PQHDE → 	xNA = 	 sAFqAAAGE = 	sAF      as ?A → ∞                           (9) 
Equation (9) proves the unbiasedness and accuracy of using Realized Volatility to 
estimate the instantaneous volatility. It also shows that rA won’t affect instantaneous 
volatility estimated by high frequency Realized Volatility approach. But, the existing 
extrapolation theories all emphasize it is investor’s expectation of future returns that 
can be affected by past price changes. In most of these models, the equilibrium price is 
determined through the interaction between rational inverters’ expectation (which is 
determined by the stochastic information process), and extrapolative investors’ 
expectation which is only about past price changes. Therefore, according to previous 
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studies, we cannot connect the instantaneous volatility sA  with individuals’ 
extrapolation belief. Hence, why extrapolation belief can affect instantaneous volatility 
still needs theoretical explanations. 
Although extrapolation is one of the most important biases individual are facing, it is 
not all of them. Overconfidence, for example, is another irrational belief individual may 
suffer. Overconfident means irrational traders are too “confident” about the accuracy 
of their private information signals (Gervais and Odean (2001)). Therefore, they usually 
ignore other investors’ trading behave when they make investment decisions. This bias 
can also generate several market anomalies, like the “excess volatility” puzzle and high 
trading volume (Odean 1998, Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal 2009), or even a sustainable 
bubble (Scheinkman and Wei Xiong 2003). Nevertheless, there is no foundational work 
as Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) about overconfidence, which can help to calculate 
how “overconfidence” individuals are. 
 Therefore, we currently may not be able to empirically study the effect of other 
individuals’ irrational beliefs on the fluctuation in volatility.  We are hoping related 
works based on survey evidence or experimental evidence can emerge to help us with 
this dilemma. After all, it is not enough to study the aggregate market phenomenon with 
only one individual’s irrational bias. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Figure 1.2 Realized volatility of Brent Crude oil index 
Calculation method: 30 days rolling windows of historical realized volatility Source: Yahoo finance 
 
Figure 1.3 GSI and volatility index in Shenzhen Growth Enterprise stock market 
We present its absolute value of GSI, which is computed according to Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), with red line (red axis) 
while red-dot line shows its negative values.  The blue line denotes volatility index estimated by high frequency realized volatility 
approach (blue axis). Black line (black axis) represents IXIC, the index of Nasdaq stock market. 
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Figure 1.4 Scatterplot of GSI versus volatility index for GEI 
 
Figure 1.5 GSI and volatility index in Shanghai mainboard stock market (2005 -2008) 
We present its absolute value of GSI, which is computed according to Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), with red line (red axis) 
while red-dot line shows its negative values.  The blue line denotes volatility index estimated by high frequency realized volatility 
approach (blue axis). Black line (black axis) represents IXIC, the index of Nasdaq stock market. 
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Figure 1.6 GSI and volatility index in Shanghai mainboard stock market (2013-2016) 
We present its absolute value of GSI, which is computed according to Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), with red line (red axis) 
while red-dot line shows its negative values.  The blue line denotes volatility index estimated by high frequency realized volatility 
approach (blue axis). Black line (black axis) represents IXIC, the index of Nasdaq stock market. 
 
Figure 1.7 GSI and volatility index in Brent Crude future market 
We present its absolute value of GSI, which is computed according to Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), with red line (red axis) 
while red-dot line shows its negative values.  The blue line denotes volatility index estimated by high frequency realized volatility 
approach (blue axis). Black line (black axis) represents IXIC, the index of Nasdaq stock market. 
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Figure 1.8 GSI and volatility index in Japanese stock market 
We present its absolute value of GSI, which is computed according to Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), with red line (red axis) 
while red-dot line shows its negative values.  The blue line denotes volatility index estimated by high frequency realized volatility 
approach (blue axis). Black line (black axis) represents IXIC, the index of Nasdaq stock market. 
 
Figure 1.9 GSI and volatility index in Nasdaq stock market 
We present its absolute value of GSI, which is computed according to Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), with red line (red axis) 
while red-dot line shows its negative values.  The blue line denotes volatility index estimated by high frequency realized volatility 
approach (blue axis). Black line (black axis) represents IXIC, the index of Nasdaq stock market. 
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Figure 1.10 New individual investors and active account in Chinese stock market 
The red line denotes the monthly increase of new individual investors (thousands). The red line denotes expectations the proportion 
of active accounts. Black line (black axis) represents the close index of Shanghai Stock market. 
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Table 1.2 Summary statistics of GSI and Volatility 
Index Date range 
Volatility GSI 
min Mean Max SD min Mean Max SD 
EURUSD 2015/10/15-2016/12/9 3.99% 8.82% 40.9% 4.04% 
-
1.99 % 
-
0.074% 2.41% 0.718% 
JPYUSD 2015/10/15-2016/12/9 3.41% 7.93% 43.2% 4.64% -2.82% 0.072% 2.55% 0.97% 
Brent 
Crude 
Index 
2015/9/16-
2016/12/9 18.81% 44.31% 132.60% 17.02% -9.42% 0.067% 9.11% 3.63% 
N225 2014/12/19-2016/12/1 3.86% 13.56% 67.13% 8.51% -8.75% 0.043% 4.04% 1.82% 
IXIC 2015/4/29-2016/11/16 3.76% 15.57% 82.75% 8.67% -7.24% 0.036% 2.88% 1.39% 
SSEC 2005/2/1-2008/12/31 4.43% 18.25% 58.64% 11.24% 
-
10.92% 0.170% 8.13% 2.89% 
SSEC 2013/12/23-2016/10/31 4.52% 22.06% 121.50% 17.05% 
-
16.22% 0.224% 7.57% 2.59% 
GEI 2013/12/26-2016/10/31 6.57% 25.58% 122.56% 16.32% 
-
17.52% 0.313% 9.79% 3.61% 
Mean, standard deviation(SD), extreme values and correlation between Volatility and GSI are reported. Volatility are 
calculated in the approaches of realized volatility with 5-min intraday data. GSI is calculated by  zA = @AGH ∙ IHCHDE , 
where @Ameans the return at time t, I  governs the weights investors put into each period which is set as I = 0.8 
according to Greenwood and Shleifer (2014).  
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Table 1.3 Summary of empirical results with difference value of { for SSEC (2005-2008)    
Index λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
a 0.11** [23.8] 
0.11*** 
[13.60] 
0.11*** 
[9.82] 
0.10*** 
[11.0] 
0.10*** 
[33.8] 
0.10*** 
[20.23] 
0.10*** 
[30.94] 
~ 5.9** [11.16] 4.31*** [9.59] 3.38*** [7.97] 2.70*** [8.46] 2.12*** [11.6] 1.56*** [9.51] 0.92*** [10.67] 
~Ä   9.66*** [18.64] 7.14*** [11.73] 5.59*** [11.53] 4.45*** [11.889] 3.48*** [20.3] 2.49*** [11.88] 1.60*** [19.17] 
ÅÄ 0.271 0.277 0.289 0.300 0.307 0.302 0.281 
N 548 
Data 2005/01/02~2008/12/31 
We estimate time-series regressions of the form 
VolatilityL = a + βE ∙ GSIL ∙ DE GSIL > 0 + βF ∙ |GSIL| ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + uL 
where DE and DF are two dummy variables. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% level 
respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brackets.  
Table 1.4 Summary of empirical results with difference value of { for SSEC (2014-2016)    
Index λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
a 0.24** [33.8] 
0.24*** 
[32.60] 
0.24*** 
[29.82] 
0.24*** 
[31.01] 
0.25*** 
[33.74] 
0.25*** 
[31.23] 
0.25*** 
[30.94] 
~ 5.9** [11.16] 4.31*** [9.59] 3.38*** [7.97] 2.70*** [8.46] 2.12*** [11.6] 1.54*** [11.37] 0.92*** [10.67] 
~Ä   9.66*** [18.64] 7.14*** [11.73] 5.59*** [11.53] 4.45*** [11.889] 3.48*** [20.3] 2.54*** [20.12] 1.60*** [19.17] 
ÅÄ 0.271 0.277 0.289 0.300 0.307 0.52 0.281 
N 951 
Data 2005/01/02~2008/12/31 
We estimate time-series regressions of the form 
VolatilityL = a + βE ∙ GSIL ∙ DE GSIL > 0 + βF ∙ |GSIL| ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + uL 
where DE and DF are two dummy variables. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% level 
respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brackets.  
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Table 1.5 Summary of empirical results with difference value of { for GEI  
Index λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
a 0.17*** [8.28] 
0.18*** 
[22.24] 
0.17*** 
[22.36] 
0.17*** 
[21.13] 
0.17*** 
[21.24] 
0.17*** 
[20.23] 
0.15*** 
[16.31] 
~ 5.9** [11.16] 4.31*** [9.59] 3.38*** [7.97] 2.70*** [8.46] 2.12*** [11.6] 2.64*** [9.51] 0.92*** [10.67] 
~Ä   9.66*** [18.64] 7.14*** [11.73] 5.59*** [11.53] 4.45*** [11.889] 3.48*** [20.3] 4.12*** [11.88] 1.60*** [19.17] 
ÅÄ 0.271 0.277 0.289 0.300 0.307 0.302 0.281 
N 951 
Data 2005/01/02~2008/12/31 
We estimate time-series regressions of the form 
VolatilityL = a + βE ∙ GSIL ∙ DE GSIL > 0 + βF ∙ |GSIL| ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + uL 
where DE and DF are two dummy variables. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% level 
respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brackets.  
Table 1.6 Summary of empirical results with difference value of { for Brent Crude Oil  
Index λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
a 0.34***  [21.20] 
0.35*** 
 [22.19] 
0.35*** 
 [22.74] 
0.35*** 
 [22.83] 
0.35*** 
 [21.31] 
0.35*** 
[21.07] 
0.37*** 
[21.94] 
~ 5.9** [4.08] 7.53*** [3.93] 5.4*** [3.67] 3.70*** [4.20] 2.54*** [3.33] 1.47*** [2.68] 0.40 [1.10] 
~Ä   9.66*** [4.26] 9.70*** [4.35] 7.21*** [4.33] 5.35*** [5.61] 4.01*** [4.37] 2.97*** [4.33] 1.90*** [3.77] 
ÅÄ 0.117 0.117 0.110 0.100 0.098 0.095 0.086 
N 292 
data 2015/9/16-2016/12/9 
We estimate time-series regressions of the form 
VolatilityL = a + βE ∙ GSIL ∙ DE GSIL > 0 + βF ∙ |GSIL| ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + uL 
where DE and DF are two dummy variables. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% level 
respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brackets.  
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Table 1.7 Summary of empirical results with difference value of { for Nasdaq 
Index λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
 a 0.14** [22.28] 
0.14*** 
[22.24] 
0.14*** 
[22.36] 
0.14*** 
[21.31] 
0.14*** 
[21.24] 
0.15*** 
[20.23] 
0.15*** 
[22.41] ~ 3.3 [1.41]  2.1 [1.20] 1.08 [0.79] 0.30 [0.22] 0.49 [0.45] 0.63 [0.55] 0.65 [1.14] ~Ä   11.0*** [5.47] 7.14*** [5.53] 6.02*** [5.69] 4.58*** [4.01] 3.44*** [4.01] 2.27*** [4.60] 1.92*** [4.48] ÅÄ 0.067 0.073 0.075 0.079 0.082 0.084 0.11 
N 394 
Data 2015/04/29~2016/1/16 
We estimate time-series regressions of the form 
VolatilityL = a + βE ∙ GSIL ∙ DE GSIL > 0 + βF ∙ |GSIL| ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + uL 
where DE and DF are two dummy variables. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% level 
respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brackets.  
Table 1.8 Summary of empirical results with difference value of { for N225 
Index { = Ç. É { = Ç. Ñ { = Ç. Ö { = Ç. Ü { = Ç. á { = Ç. à { = Ç. â 
a 0.59** [5.84] 
0.59*** 
[5.60] 
0.60*** 
[5.07] 
0.64*** 
     [5.23] 
0.69*** 
[5.58] 
0.74*** 
[5.37] 
0.71*** 
[4.74] 
~ 0.57* [1.91] 0.39* [1.89] 0.26* [1.85]  0.14 [1.36]  0.06 [0.06] 0.07 [0.99] 0.06 [0.96] 
~Ä 1.96*** [4.37] 1.43*** [4.60] 1.10*** [4.85] 0.86*** [4.95] 0.65*** [4.89] 0.50*** [4.88] 0.38*** [5.51] 
ÅÄ 0. 11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.17 
N 951 
Data 2014/12/19~2016/11/30 
We estimate time-series regressions of the form 
VolatilityL = a + βE ∙ GSIL ∙ DE GSIL > 0 + βF ∙ |GSIL| ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + uL 
where DE and DF are two dummy variables. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% level 
respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brackets.  
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Table 1.9 Summary of empirical results with difference value of { for EURUSD 
Index λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
 a 0.17*** [8.28] 
0.18*** 
[22.24] 
0.17*** 
[22.36] 
0.17*** 
[22.11] 
0.17*** 
[21.24] 
0.17*** 
[20.23] 
0.15*** 
[16.31] 
~ 0.56 [1.08] 0.40 [1.30] 0.29 [0.79] 0.21 [1.26] 0.13 [1.13] 0.07 [0.82] 0.65 [0.53] 
~Ä   1.89 [0.68] 0.14 [0.69] 0.10 [0.62] 0.06 [0.59] 0.02 [0.31] 0.04 [0.23] 1.92 [0.14] 
ÅÄ 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.001 
N 302 
Data 2015/10/10~2016/09/12 
We estimate time-series regressions of the form 
VolatilityL = a + βE ∙ GSIL ∙ DE GSIL > 0 + βF ∙ |GSIL| ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + uL 
where DE and DF are two dummy variables. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% level 
respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brackets.  
Table 1.10 Summary of empirical results with difference value of { for JPYUSD 
Index λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
 a 0.45*** [3.81] 
0.45*** 
[3.76] 
0.45*** 
[3.76] 
0.45*** 
[3.71] 
0.45*** 
[3.74] 
0.45*** 
[3.78] 
0.45*** 
[3.81] ~ 0.56 [1.08] 0.40 [1.30] 0.29 [0.79] 0.21 [1.26] 0.13 [1.13] 0.07 [0.82] 0.65 [0.53] ~Ä   1.89 [0.68] 0.14 [0.69] 0.10 [0.62] 0.06 [0.59] 0.02 [0.31] 0.04 [0.23] 1.92 [0.14] ÅÄ 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.001 
N 302 
Data 2015/10/10~2016/09/12 
We estimate time-series regressions of the form 
VolatilityL = a + βE ∙ GSIL ∙ DE GSIL > 0 + βF ∙ |GSIL| ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + uL 
where DE and DF are two dummy variables. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% level 
respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brackets.  
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Table 1.11 Summary of empirical results in different financial markets 
Index Date range N a ~ ~Ä ~É ÅÄ 
EURUSD 2015/10/15-2016/12/9 302 0.17** [23.03] 
2.64 
[0.82] 
4.12 
[0.03]  0.003 
   0.17** [23.22]     
-0.29 
[-0.75] 0.002 
    302 0.17** [23.23] 
2.64 
[0.82] 
4.12 
[0.03] 
-0.36 
[-1.05] 0.003 
JPYUSD 2015/10/15-2016/12/9 320 0.45** [3.92] 
14.64 
[0.71] 
9.12 
[0.95]  0.008 
   0.44** [3.78]   
0.43 
[-0.82] 0.007 
    320 0.45** [3.96] 
14.64 
[0.71] 
9.12 
[0.95] 
-0.41 
[-0.74] 0.008 
Brent Crude Index 2015/9/16-2016/12/9 292 0.36*** [21.07] 
1.47** 
[2.68] 
2.97*** 
[4.44]  0.10 
   -1.24*** [-2.54]   
0.02*** 
[3.42] 0.03 
    292 -0.93*** [-1.95] 
1.52*** 
[2.80] 
2.74*** 
[5.19] 
0.013*** 
[2.70] 0.11 
N225 2014/12/19-2016/12/1 474 0. 74*** [6.21] 
0.07* 
[0.99] 
0.50*** 
[8.86]  0.15 
    1.92*** [12.53]   
-3.58** 
[-2.16] 0.007 
      0.76*** [6.43] 
-0.09 
[-0.95] 
0.49*** 
[7.68] 
-3.5** 
[-2.27] 0.16 
IXIC 2015/4/29-2016/11/16 394 0.15*** [20.69] 
0.63 
[0.55] 
2.27*** 
[4.60]  0.08 
   0.20*** [19.48]     
-0.13*** 
[-6.31] 0.04 
     0.19*** [17.40] 
0.63 
[0.55] 
2.12*** 
[4.67] 
-0.14*** 
[-4.49] 0.11 
SSEC 2005/2/1-2008/12/31 548 0.11*** [32.53] 
1.56*** 
[9.47] 
2.49*** 
[11.89]  0.31 
   0.18*** [18.32]   
-0.13*** 
[-15.29] 0.10 
    951 0.11*** [32.53] 
1.56*** 
[9.47] 
2.49*** 
[11.89] 
-0.02 
[-1.38] 0.38 
SSEC 2013/12/23-2016/10/31 696 0.25*** [21.20] 
4.85*** 
[9.23] 
6.95*** 
[10.49]  0.51 
   0.44*** [20.43]   
-0.10*** 
[-10.73] 0.14 
     0.25*** [14.23] 
4.76*** 
[14.11] 
  6.46*** 
[24.99] 
0.06*** 
[-8.72] 
0.56 
GEI 2013/12/26-2016/10/31 694 0.17*** [21.23] 
2.64*** 
[7.05] 
4.12*** 
[8.90]  0.36 
   0.54*** [27.53]   
-0.12*** 
[-15.08] 0.25 
    694 0.39*** [14.78] 
2.28*** 
[7.03] 
3.46*** 
[7.90] 
-0.09*** 
[-7.24] 0.48 
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We estimate time-series regressions of the three forms 
	VolatilityL = a + βE ∙ GSIL ∙ DE GSIL > 0 + βF ∙ GSIL ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + uL 
                                   VolatilityL = a +	βn ∙ oA + uL 
                                   VolatilityL = a + βE ∙ GSIL ∙ DE GSIL > 0 + βF ∙ GSIL ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + βn ∙ oA + uL 
where ä  and äÄ  are two dummy variables, ãå indicates the economic factor that may influence the volatility. For 
different markets, we use different economic factors.  ***	**	* denote statistical significance at the 1%	5%	10% 
level respectively.  Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brackets.    
Table 1.12 Volatility-GSI asymmetric relation test 
Index Date range a ~É ~Ñ N ÅÄ 
EURUSD 2015/10/15-2016/12/9 0.17** [23.03] 
2.64 
[0.82] 
4.12 
[0.03] 302 0.003 
JPYUSD 2015/10/15-2016/12/9 0.45** [3.96] 
14.64 
[0.71] 
9.12 
[0.95] 320 0.008 
Brent Crude Index 2015/9/16-2016/12/9 0.36*** [21.04] 
1.47*** 
[2.67] 
1.50*** 
[2.77] 292 0.10 
N225 2014/12/19-2016/12/1 0.71*** [4.43] 
1.65* 
[1.71] 
4.06*** 
[4.46] 474 0.15 
IXIC 2015/4/29-2016/11/16 0.15*** [20.69] 
0.63 
[1.03] 
1.64*** 
[4.32] 394 0.08 
SSEC 2005/2/1-2008/12/31 0.11*** [32.53] 
1.56*** 
[11.25] 
0.93*** 
[6.89] 951 0.31 
SSEC 2013/12/23-2016/10/31 0.24*** [20.41] 
4.85*** 
[13.65] 
2.10*** 
[5.72] 696 0.51 
GEI 2013/12/26-2016/10/31 0.17*** [23.04] 
2.64*** 
[9.25] 
1.48*** 
[5.11] 694 0.36 
We test the volatility-GSI asymmetric relation with the time-series regressions of the form 
VolatilityL = a + βn|GSIL| + βp ∙ |GSIL| ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + uL 
where DF are the dummy variable to distinguish negative GSI. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%
5%10% level respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brackets.  
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Table 1.13 Summary of empirical results in different stages 
 
Core bubble Stage Non-core stage 
Date range a ~ ~Ä N ÅÄ a ~ ~Ä N ÅÄ 
SSEC 2007/03/20-2008/06/11 
0.16*** 
[25.23] 
0.61*** 
[3.27] 
1.73*** 
[7.72] 532 0.223 
0.08*** 
[21.22] 
1.17*** 
[3.61] 
1.39*** 
[-6.05] 419 0.18 
SSEC 2014/11/03-2016/1/04 
0.16*** 
[12.15] 
0.61*** 
[8.29] 
1.73*** 
[4.08] 347 0.47 
0.11*** 
[12.15] 
0.38* 
[1.21] 
1. 
93*** 
[4.72] 
349 0.064 
GEI 2014/12/29-2016/2/06 
0.24*** 
[13.32] 
1.56*** 
[3.35] 
3.49*** 
[6.50] 352 0.311 
0.14*** 
[24.03] 
0.639* 
[1.64] 
2.02*** 
[4.45] 344 0.097 
We estimate time-series regressions of the form 
VolatilityL = a + βE ∙ GSIL ∙ DE GSIL > 0 + βF ∙ |GSIL| ∙ DF GSIL ≤ 0 + uL 
where DE and DF are two dummy variables. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% level 
respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brackets.  
Core bubble stage is marked by green box be in Figure 3, Figure 5 and Figure 6. The rest is classified as non-core stage. 
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2. Extrapolation, Confirmation Bias and Volatility 
Abstract: To explain the empirical findings that volatility is affected by 
individual investors’ extrapolation belief, we propose a new model in 
which extrapolative investors also care about information innovations, 
but with confirmation bias when they evaluate the new arriving 
information. By questionnaire survey, we give direct evidence that 
confirmation bias and extrapolation bias could impact individual 
investors simultaneously. Then by analytical proportions and numerical 
simulations, we show our model can provide specific links between 
volatility and investors’ extrapolation belief. Additionally, we find our 
theory can help to explain one of the most important stylized facts of 
volatility, the volatility clustering. 
Keywords: extrapolation, confirmation bias, volatility clustering 
2.1 Introduction 
In the first chapter, we empirically demonstrate that volatility index is affected by 
individuals’ extrapolation belief in most financial markets, and when there is a bigger 
proportion of individual investors, the connection between them is stronger. Also, it is 
shown in the first chapter that there is no satisfying theory or model in previous papers 
that can help us to explain this phenomenon. To address this question, we propose a 
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new extrapolative model with two significant modifications with previous models. 
Firstly, in our model, extrapolative individual investors also pay attention to 
information innovations. Secondly, because of the confirmation bias, their evaluation 
of information innovations is influenced by their extrapolation belief.   
Information need of individuals is what the most extrapolative models don’t take into 
account. The most common assumption of existing extrapolation models is that 
individual investors only care about past price changes instead of paying attention to 
information innovations. Although this concise framework does successfully explain 
some market anomalies, it is too simple to be realistic. As illustrated by Barker and 
Haslem (1973), individual investors appear to have “a strong demand for information 
about product safety and quality, and about the company′s environmental activities”. 
They also find individual investors will try to use many different methods to get 
information. Their finds are future supported by lots of following research, such as 
Chenhall and Juchau (1977), Epstein and Freedman (1994), Lawrence (2013), Xiong et 
al. (2013). With the fast-growing impact on the internet, information is much easier to 
access for individual investors. Li and Liu (2017), using in-depth interview results 
conducted in China, show that the internet has turned to be the principal information 
channel for individual investors—they will seek different types of information online, 
such as economic information, individual stock information, economic information, 
policy information and so on. They also argue the abundant information sources online 
can help individual investors to improve their investment.  
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Nevertheless, even if individual investors are eager for seeking information, they 
exhibit many biases when evaluating information as well as making decisions, for 
example, excessive optimism (Meinert, 1991; Golden, Miliewicz, and Herbig, 1994; 
Brown and Cliff, 2005), overconfidence (Cooper, Folta, and Woo, 1995; Hirshleifer, 
2001; Barber and Odean, 2002), familiarity heuristic (Ashcraft, 2006; Shefrin, 2007). 
Confirmation bias is one of the most important biases commonly found among 
individuals. 
Confirmation bias is a cognitive bias which makes people be more willing to accept 
information which coordinates their previous beliefs. But they are reluctant to receive 
information that is contradictory to their pervious views (Shefrin, 2007). Attitude 
polarization can also be a consequence of this bias which means people with different 
prior beliefs can renew their belief in entirely different ways for the same information. 
Been firstly established by Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979), it has been widely 
demonstrated by psychological researchers like Rabin and Schrag (1999) and 
Bodenhausen (1998). Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, and Wright (1992) use data from 
the Iowa Political Stock Market and find that after the third running debate, people 
become more confident that the candidate they supported before is more likely to win 
the election.  
There is clear evidence indicating confirmation bias is common within investment 
decision process too. Using an experimental market, Forsythe et al. (1992) show that 
confirmation bias will make investors perform worse than other investors who are not 
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suffered from this bias. Duong, Pescetto and Santamaria (2014) build a well-defined 
framework to empirically test the Confirmation bias in UK stock market. Their 
empirical result shows that pessimistic investors tend to underreact to good financial 
news while optimistic traders often fail to update their expectation for bad innovations. 
However, all the investors will even overreact to information which is constant with 
their prior beliefs—a clear evidence of Confirmation bias. Similarly, using field 
experimental data of 502 investor responses from South Korea, Park, Konana and 
Kumar (2010) find investors would like to seek information which can support their 
prior prediction from the virtual communication, and this propensity of investors would 
lead investors to make detrimental decisions. Even more sophisticated experts will 
commit this bias. By analyzing the Syntex Corporation case, Shefrin (2007) 
demonstrates the managers of big companies will sometime make unreasonable choices 
because of this bias.   
To test more directly whether individual investors are affected by confirmation bias 
as well as extrapolation bias, we use online questionnaire survey to learn individual 
investors’ behaviors when facing real investment questions. In our survey, we first 
investigate what our respondents will take into account when evaluating a stock. After 
that, respondents are shown with two symmetric stock charts, a price-rising one and a 
price-declining one. Then, they are asked which news will have a bigger impact on 
stocks’ future returns, namely “net profit will increase 5% than that in pre-disclosure” 
or “net profit will decrease 5% than that in pre-disclosure” (for detail, see Appendix 
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3). The price charts are used to test if respondents are impacted by extrapolation bias 
while the symmetry of two charts ensures their extrapolation belief will have the same 
magnitude. Additionally, according to the classic Discounted Cash Flow model (DCF 
model), two news should have the same impact on stock’s future return. If investors 
can evaluate two news with no bias, they will be neutral with them.  
On the contrary, our survey results show that they are holding biases when choosing 
two options, as only about 30% of the respondents believe two news will have the same 
impact on the stocks. On the contrary, more than 42% of our respondents choose the 
positive news for the price-rising stock while more than 46% of them believe the 
negative news will have a bigger impact on the price-declining stock. As we 
demonstrated above, extrapolation bias makes investors believe the price will continue 
its trend, and the confirmation bias causes them to overreact to information which is 
consisted of their prior belief. Therefore, this gives us solid evidence that most of the 
individual investors are affected by confirmation bias and extrapolation bias at the 
same time. Additionally, our survey also suggests that despair of their background, 
respondents tend to be more easily affected by those two bias during the bear market, 
as more respondents choose negative news for the price-declining stock. 
Based on our questionnaire survey findings and in the light of the previous works by 
De Long et al. (1990), Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Barberis et al. (2015) and Barberis 
et al. (2016), we build a new extrapolative model in which two types of investors try to 
allocate their wealth between two assets, a risk-free one and a risky one. Like in 
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previous models, the first type investors are called fundamentalists, who will try to 
arbitrage against the mispricing, buying in devalued assets and selling out overpriced 
ones. The second type is also called extrapolator as in previous models, whose 
expectations about future returns of the risky asset are affected by their extrapolation 
bias, believing the risky asset’ price will keep its previous trends. The fundamental 
value of the risky asset is determined by exogenous cash-flow innovations while the 
actual price is the equilibrium result of two types of investors’ expectations. 
The first departure of our model from earlier ones is that, extrapolator’s expectations 
are also affected by cash-flow innovations. Existing researches like Epstein and 
Freedman (1994), Lawrence (2013), Xiong et al. (2013), and our survey results all stress 
the information needs of individual investors. Hence it is more reasonable to formulate 
individuals’ expectations with the impact of information innovations. The second 
modification is that extrapolators are also suffered from the confirmation bias in the 
way that extrapolator would be more willing to receive the information which is 
consistent with their extrapolation beliefs, but will underreact to those which are not. 
In other words, extrapolative investors will enforce their expectation by new arriving 
information if the new information is consistent with their prior extrapolation belief. 
When contradictive information comes, they may also update their expectation but to a 
much less extent. Nevertheless, in both circumstances, extrapolator’s expectation about 
the future returns are the combination of extrapolation belief and the biased update 
caused by information innovations. In our model, it is this update that makes individual 
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investors’ expectations be a fluctuating process instead of a deterministic one as in most 
earlier works.    
By proposition analyses and high-frequency simulations, we show directly how our 
framework explains why individuals’ extrapolation belief can affect volatility. As the 
price is endogenously determined by two types of investors’ decisions, the volatility 
comes from two resources: the volatility of fundamentalists’ expectations which is 
determined by the exogenous process of information innovations, and the volatility of 
extrapolators’ expectations which is determined by both the information innovations as 
well as their extrapolation belief. Hence, the volatility is affected by extrapolators’ 
extrapolation belief through their irrational trading behavior. Naturally, if the 
proportion of extrapolators is bigger, the volatility will be more determined by 
extrapolators’ extrapolation belief. We confirm this conjecture by proposition analyses 
and high-frequency simulations. This coordinates with our empirical conclusion in 
Chapter 1 that the explanatory power of extrapolation belief to volatility is determined 
by the proportion of extrapolators.  
Besides, as found in our questionnaire survey, respondents are more easily be affected 
by their confirmation bias during the bear market. In section 1.3, we show this 
phenomenon can explain the asymmetric GSI-volatility relation that volatility is more 
easily affected by individuals’ extrapolation belief during declining market (negative 
GSI), another important empirical finding of Chapter 1.  
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Our model also shows that the determinant power of extrapolation belief to volatility 
is affected by the magnitude of extrapolation belief itself. Because when the magnitude 
of extrapolation belief is bigger, extrapolators will trade more aggressively. Thus, the 
price will be more affected by their expectations, and the volatility is more determined 
by their extrapolation belief. To prove this finding, we empirically test it using the same 
data of Chapter 1 by the regressions of the form 
N^_`VU_UVaA = ` + cE ∙ |#$%A| ∙ dE(#$%A ≥ 0) + cF ∙ |#$%A| ∙ dF(#$%A < 0) + cn ∙ (#$%A)F + gA (1) 
As a result (see Appendix Table 2.7), the parameter of |#$%A|F  is significant for 
several markets, which partly proves our prediction. 
Additionally, we find our model can help to explain volatility clustering, a well-
known distinguished fact of volatility. Volatility clustering means high volatilities tend 
to appear at the same short period but low volatility is always accompanied by low 
volatility (Wang et.al. 2016). This phenomenon is extensively discovered in most of 
the financial markets. It is also wildly recycled in statistical models such as ARCH and 
GARCH models. Pitifully, little theoretical papers try to explain why volatility 
clustering occurs. On the contrary, our model offers a natural explanation about 
volatility clustering. In our model, the volatility is proportional with individuals’ 
extrapolation belief which decays quite slow. In other words, the clustering 
Extrapolation Belief drives volatility to cluster. Our model predicts the volatility 
clustering will be more significant when individual investors dominate the market. By 
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comparison of the real financial markets and our simulation result, we show our model 
can greatly reveal the volatility clustering in the real world.  
In summary, our analysis shows that, by combining individual investors’ 
confirmation bias and extrapolate bias, our model not only can give theoretical 
explanations of the empirical conclusion of Chapter 1, but also can lead us to get new 
findings. To our best knowledge, our model is the first to combine two individual 
investors’ biases together. Earlier models based on just one bias may be able to explain 
some market phenomenon, our model seems more fruitful. Therefore, our model 
provides a new method to study investors’ behavior.  
In section 2.2, we illustrate our questionnaire survey in detail. The new model is 
presented in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 introduces the high-frequency simulation method 
and our simulated results. Section 2.5 concludes.  
2.2 Questionnaire Survey 
To learn more directly about how individual investors are affected by extrapolation 
bias and confirmation bias, we use questionnaire survey mothed to investigate investors’ 
behavior. In our survey, we ask investors to choose which news will have a bigger 
impact on the stock which has an obvious trend. The trend will make investors have a 
significant extrapolation belief if they are affected by the extrapolation bias. The 
positive news and negative news are designed to have the same size of impacts on 
stock’s future return according to classical pricing theory. Using this question, we can 
test if respondents are influenced by behavioral biases. 
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To conduct this survey, we post our questionnaire on www.xueqiu.com, one of the 
most active social platform used by Chinese investors, and ask investors (users of 
www.xueqiu.com) to answer our questionnaire. Our questionnaire and survey result are 
also available at https://www.wjx.cn/report/18183893.aspx where just questionnaire in 
Chinese is provided as we only conduct our survey among Chinese investors. In the 
end, 233 valid samples are received. For the detail of our questionnaire, please see 
Appendix 3. 
As shown in Appendix 3, our questionnaire consists of two parts, namely 
Background Survey and Behavior Survey. To verify whether our sample is as good 
represent of the whole population, we investigate participators’ background and 
compare the survey result to official data drawn from China Securities Investor Survey 
Report (2012) by China Securities Investor Protection Fund Corporation (SIPF), an 
official organization established by China Securities Regulatory Commission. In the 
first part, we ask respondents’ education level (Question 1), their investment value 
(Question 2) and investment experience (how long have they invested in the stock 
market, Question 3). Survey result and official data are summarized in Table 2.2 for 
comparison. As shown in this table, the distribution of the results for all three questions 
are in line with official investigation data, showing that our samples are a qualified 
representation for all Chinese stock market investors. Especially, for the second 
question, namely investment value, about 42.49% of participators invest less than 100 
thousand Chinese Yuan (about 15K USD dollars) in the market, and more than 75% 
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participators’ investment is under 500 thousand Chinese Yuan (about 77K USD dollars). 
In other words, most of the investors in Chinese are small investors or retail investors.           
For the next part of our survey, we formally collet data to test our assumption. 
Question 4 asks investors what they will take into account when evaluating a stock. In 
this question, we use the phrase “technical analysis” which means “to identify trend 
changes at an early stage and to maintain an investment posture until the weight of the 
evidence indicates that the trend has reversed” (Pring 2002). As Allen and Taylor (1990) 
describe “…those traders who employ chart analysis - i.e., those who base their 
strategies on the analysis and extrapolation of past price movements alone”. 
Extrapolation bias is thought to be the most important psychological reason for 
individual investors to seek patterns where there are not (De Bondt 1998). As a result, 
only 4.7% investors claim they just use technical analysis (price trends) to select stocks 
and pay no attention to the fundamental value (information releasement). Likewise, 
about 10% percent of our samples only care about the fundamental value. On the 
contrary, although with different importance, the majority of the investors care both the 
trend of price and information innovations. These results suggest that when modeling 
individuals’ behavior, it is more reasonable to consider the impact of both the 
information innovations and the price trends analysis (extrapolation belief).  
Question 5 investigates how investors seek information. The underlying assumption 
of this question is that if investors try to estimate the fundamental value of a stock, the 
correct way should be collecting all the available information instead of just paying 
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attention to the recent news. Nevertheless, even if more than 85% respondents assert 
they pay attention to information releasement, only about 32% respondents choose to 
seek all the available information. Thus, we may get the conclusion that, most of our 
respondents cannot correctly evaluate the fundamental value of a stock and the most 
crucial signal for individual investors is the trend signal. This conclusion is consistent 
with the survey result of China Securities Investor Protection Fund Corporation. In their 
annual China Securities Investor Survey Report (2011), they find more than 55.35% of 
investors rely on technical analysis when evaluating stocks, and 44.8% of investors 
claim they value fundamental analysis more, but still they will take technical analysis 
as a reference.  
Question 6 and Question 7 test if confirmation bias and extrapolation bias can affect 
investors when they evaluate the news. In Question 6, the chart of a stock which 
displays an apparent positive (rising) price trend is first showed to respondents, and 
then we ask them to choose which news will have a bigger impact, or they will have 
the same impact. Question 7 changes the chart into one with a symmetric but declining 
price trend and asks respondents to choose with same options. Two news, net profit 
rising 5% or declining 5%, should have the same impact according to traditional pricing 
theory. However, according to our survey result which is reported in Appendix Table 
2.3, only 32% respondents perform as traditional pricing theories predict. On the 
contrary, more than 40% respondents will choose the positive news for a price-rising 
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stock while more than 46% respondents believe the negative news will have a bigger 
impact on the price-declining stock.  
This result gives us clear proof of confirmation bias and extrapolation bias. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 1 and above, extrapolation bias makes investors believe the 
price trend will continue. An upward price trend makes extrapolative investors 
optimistic while a downward trend frustrates them. In Question 6, optimistic investors 
are more declined on the positive news while in Question 7, pessimistic investors 
believe the negative news will have a bigger impact. This survey suggests that when 
answering Question 6 and Question 7, extrapolation bias and confirmation bias affect 
most of the individual investors at the same time. Therefore, when studying individual 
investors’ behavior, it is reasonable to combine their extrapolation bias and 
confirmation bias. 
We also compare the performance of different investors with different backgrounds. 
As a result, we find unsophisticated investors are more likely to be affected by their 
bias. Like in Table 2.3, respondents are divided according to their investment 
experience. For the respondents with only one-year investment experience, more than 
60% of investors will choose the news which coordinates with the price trend, but only 
about 20% of these inexperienced investors can correctly estimate two options. 
Similarly, for the respondents who only started investing stock three years ago, about 
24% investors using the right mothed while 42% people choose positive news for 
Question 5 and 46% people choose negative news for Question 6, still bigger for the 
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whole population. This situation gets better for next two group of more experienced 
investors, as more than 36% of them believe the two news have the same impact while 
much less proportion of them will choose the news consisting with the price trend.  
Similarly, Table 2.4 compares investors with different education levels. As shown in 
this table, although the proportion of respondents who choose the third option is almost 
the same for different groups, the investors without undergraduate education are more 
likely to choose the news consisting with the price trend while the post-graduate 
respondents are unlikeliest affected by confirmation bias. These comparisons indicate 
that extrapolation bias and confirmation bias are more significant for unsophisticated 
investors.   
Another noticeable phenomenon is that our respondents appear to be more affected 
by confirmation bias when the stock price declines. As shown in Table 2.3 and Table 
2.4, about 40% of the whole samples choose the positive news for a price-rising stock, 
but more than 45% of them believe the negative news will have a bigger impact on a 
price-declining stock. And, this phenomenon holds true for almost all the groups of 
respondents. Additionally, more people choose the third option (the right option 
according to classical pricing theory) when facing an upward valued stock, despite their 
different background. The reason lying behind may be that investors are more easily 
panicked during the bear market and hence be affected by irrational beliefs.  
     As a conclusion of our questionnaire survey, at least several findings can be 
established: 
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   1) Like price trend (technical analysis), information (news) is also important for 
individual investors to make investment decisions. 
   2) Price trend impacts individual investors when they try to evaluate the 
information, which means  
   3) Individual investors are affected by extrapolation bias and confirmation bias at 
the same time, especially for unsophisticated individual investors.  
   4) It seems that, in the bear market, individual investors are more likely to be 
affected by this two bias.  
By these findings and in light of previous works, we build a new extrapolative model 
which is presented in next section. 
2.3 The model  
Based on our survey findings and in the light of earlier works (Hong and Stein 1999, 
Barberis and Shleifer 2003, Barberis et al. 2016), we build a new extrapolative discrete 
time model with the modification that extrapolators are also suffered from confirmation 
bias. Then we use analytical proportions to show how our model can explain the 
empirical findings of our first chapter.  
2.3.1 Model Introduction  
There are two assets in our new model: one risk-free asset which is in perfectly elastic 
and one risky asset which has a fixed amount of x. The risk-free asset earns a constant 
return which is normalized to zero while the dividend of the risky asset is announced at 
    
 64 
each period but will only be paid at the last period. The logarithm evolution of dè is 
given by 
dè = dê + ëE + ⋯+ ëA + ⋯+ ëè		`?q	ëA~ì 0, sîF	 		U. U. q.                     (2) 
where	ëA	is the information released to all investors at period t. Actual price of the 
risky asset in our model is determined by the interaction of two kinds of investors, 
fundamental traders (fundamentalists) and extrapolators. All of the investors exhibit the 
same CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) risk γ, and choose to maximize his utility  
determined by his investment performance in next period. Assume at time t, he owns a 
risk-free wealth tA, when he chooses to invest the risky asset which will pay back at 
the next time t+1. His wealth will follow 
tA → tA + ìA ∙ MAïE = tA + ìA(ñAïE − ñA)                            (3) 
where 	ìA  is his share demand at time t, MAïE	 is his expected return of the 
asset,	ñA	denotes the current logarithm price when ñAïE means his expected logarithm 
price at time t+1. Then his utility objective will be 
óA = maxôö oA(−õGú(ùöïôöûöüT))		^@		 maxôö oA(−õGú(ùöïôö(†öüTG†ö))   (4) 
Assume MAïE is norm-distributed which indicates his utility objective óA is logarithm 
distributed. Then  
                 o óA = −õGú ùöïôöûöüT ïT°¢£§(Gú ùöïôöûöüT )                       (5) 
denote    
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           Ω = −¶ tA + ìAMAïE + EF N`@(−¶ tA + ìAMAïE )                     (6) 
To maximize õßR óA  equals to minimize Ω. From the first-order condition that 
                      ®©®ôö = −¶MAïE + ¶FìAN`@(MAïE)                                                         (7) 
then, we can get the time t per-capita optimal demand as 
ìA = ™ö ûöüTú∙¢£§(	ûöüT) = ™ö †öüT G†öú∙¢£§(	†öüTG†ö)                                        (8) 
Equation (6) means the demand of every trader is determined by the gap between his 
Acceptable Price in time t+1 and the current price. When he expects the price at time 
t+1 will surpass the current price, he will decide to buy in shares and increase his 
demand of the risky asset. On the contrary, if he has a pessimistic expectation of the 
price changing, he will reduce his demand and sell his shareholdings to other 
counterparts.      
2.3.1.1 Optimal Demand of Fundamentalists 
Fundamentalists, which make up a fraction of r´, are capable of correctly processing 
all available information and observing the fundamental value. Their demand is 
determined by the differences between the current price and the fundamental value. 
Assume the fundamentalists are bounded rational investors in the way that even though 
they understand the gap between the two prices is caused by other investors whose 
belief are different with themselves, they do not trade on the likeliness of the price gap 
may grow bigger but even and rather choose to believe the mispricing will disappear in 
the next period.  
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In the light of Barberis et al. (2016), we use a backward induction method to get their 
time t optimal demand as follows. At the final period, date T, the price of the risky asset ñA must equal the cash flow realized on that date, so that ñA = dè. At time T−1, the 
fundamental trader’s first-order condition implies that his share demand is  
ìèGE´ = ™¨ST †¨≠ G†¨STú∙¢£§(	†¨≠G†¨ST) = ™¨ST Æ¨ G†¨STú∙¢£§(	™ö Æ¨ G†¨ST) = Æ¨STG†¨STú∙Ø∞°                    (10)  
where we have used the fact that oèGE dè = dèGE , and have also assumed, for 
simplicity, that the fundamentalists set the conditional variance of price changes equal 
to the variance of cash-flow shocks. When there are only fundamentalists in the market, 
market clearing implies  
ìèGE´ = Q                                                  (11) 
Which means            
  ñèGE´ = dèGE − ¶ ∙ sîF ∙ x                                     (12) 
The superscript F in (9) means the price is solely determined by fundamentalists, i.e., 
the fundamental value of the risky asset. As to the time T−2 demand of fundamentalists, 
it also follows the equation 
        ìèGF´ = ™¨S° ±¨ST≠ G±¨S°ú∙¢£§(	±¨ST≠ G±¨S°)                                       (13) 
As we have demonstrated that fundamentalists hold bounded rationality belief that 
they ignore other traders’ impact to the market and simply believe the price will convert 
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to the fundamental value at the next time. In other words, in their mind, oèGF ñèGE´ =
ñèGE´ , then 
   ìèGF´ = ™¨S° †¨ ST≠ G†¨S°ú∙¢£§ 	†¨ ST≠ G†¨S° = ™¨S° Æ¨STGú∙Ø∞°∙≤ G†¨S°ú∙¢£§(	™ö Æ¨STGú∙Ø∞°∙≤ G†¨S°) = Æ¨S°Gú∙Ø∞°∙≤G†¨S°ú∙Ø∞°       (14) 
In equation (13), we also suppose he will take conditional variance of price changes 
as sîF  in the same pattern. Similarly, when market is full of fundamentalists, the 
equilibrium price will be 
 ñèGF´ = dèGF − 2 ∙ ¶ ∙ sîF ∙ x                                     (15) 
With this process continues, we can easily get the low frequency optimal demand of 
fundamentalists at time t as 
ìA´ = ÆöG(èGAGE)ú∙Ø∞°∙≤G†öú∙Ø∞°                                        (16) 
then, the risky asset’s fundamental value will be determined when only 
fundamentalist exist in the market (ìA´ = x), then   
ñA´ = dA − (Y − V) ∙ ¶sîFx                                 (17) 
So, in this situation, the expected return at time t will be 
                  MA´ = ñAïE´ − ñA´ = ëA + ¶ ∙ sîF ∙ 	x                             (18) 
and  
                  o MA´ = ¶sîFx  and ≥`@ MA´ = sîF                            (19)  
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Equation (14) means, if the risky asset price follows the fundamental value, investors 
(fundamentalists) will earn an expected return of ¶sîFx for his risk tolerance. And the 
return volatility of this risky asset just equals the variance of cash-flow shocks. For the 
common situation when extrapolators are also participating, Equation 11 can be rewrite 
as 
ìA´ = †ö≠ïú∙Ø∞°∙≤G†öú∙Ø∞°                                              (20) 
which describes the fact that fundamentals’ demand is determined by the gap between 
the fundamental value and the current price, as well as the risk compensate ¶sîFx.    
2.3.1.2 Optimal demand for extrapolators 
Like fundamental investors, the optimal demand of extrapolators is also determined 
by  
ìA™ = ™ö ûöüT¥ú∙¢£§(	™ö ûöüT¥ ) = 		 ™ö †öüT¥ G†öú∙¢£§(	™ö ûöüT¥ )										                     (21) 
where oA MAïE™  means extrapolators’ expected return for the next trading period. As 
we have demonstrated above, there are two sources where extrapolators’ expectation 
return comes from. The first one is their extrapolation belief. Following previous 
researches, we formulate this extrapolation belief as 
  XL = λ∂cLGE∂DE PLG∂ − PLG∂GE                                    (22) 
where 0 < λ < 1.	c means extrapolation coefficient, λ is the memory effect which is 
well documented by Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) that extrapolative investors’ 
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expected return is “a weighted average of past price changes with more recent price 
changes weighted more heavily”. This specification in (17) is widely used to reveal 
how individuals’ extrapolation belief can cause many market anomalies such as 
overreaction and under-reaction of price to information, momentum trading, stylized 
trading and other market anomalies (De Long et al. 1990, Hong and Stein 1999, 
Barberis and Shleifer 2003, Barberis et al. 2015, Barberis et al. 2016). Also, it is similar 
to that used in Chapter 1. But because in our model setting, there is a constant expected 
return õßR MA´ = ¶sîFx  for the risk tolerance, and we assume extrapolators 
understand this. Accordingly, we modify (17) as 
  zA = I∏C∏DE c ñAG∏ − ñAG∏GE − π = IzAGE + IMA∫                        (23) ζ denotes extrapolators’ initial enthusiasm which is set as ζ = 2γσæFQ, where	η =γσæFQ means extrapolators only care about the extra price changes MA∫. For the necessity 
of this modification, see Appendix 2.1.  
The second factor impacting extrapolators’ expectation is the information 
innovations. As we have already demonstrated, information innovations are essential 
to individual investors when they make decisions. Extrapolators will update their 
expectations by observing the information process. Also, as we have proved, because 
of the confirmation bias, their expectation evaluation is a biased process in the way that 
extrapolative investor will enforce their expectation by new arriving information when 
it is consistent with their prior extrapolation belief. Nevertheless, when contradictive 
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information comes, they also update their expectation but to a much less extent. 
Therefore, the expected price change of extrapolators is modified as 
XL = XL ∙ eæQ												XA ≥ 0XL ∙ eGæQ										XL < 0	                                       (24) 
This equation illustrates the two recourses of extrapolators expectation, the 
extrapolation belief XL , and the impact XL ∙ (e±æQ − 1)	coming from the information 
innovations and their confirmation bias.  
As shown in Figure 2.3, at time	V − 1, with an existing price changing process Pê →PLGE, extrapolators will believe the price will continue to change by XL. Because of the 
information innovation, they will adapt this price change into XL. For simplicity, we 
assume they believe this price change can be realized in one single trading period. 
Therefore, in their expectation   
                     oA MAïE™ = XL     NL¬ = 	√Qƒ≈∆°	                                        (25) 
Hence, their optimal demand will be NL¬ = 	Xtƒ≈∆°		 , if they only care about their 
extrapolation belief (where we suppose that extrapolators set the conditional variance 
of oA MAïE™  equals to the information innovation variance σæF.). But, as we show in our 
survey, a great proportion of individual investors claim they also care about the 
fundamental value, although it seems they use incorrect methods. So, we assume 
extrapolators in our model pay limited attention to the fundamental value, which causes 
their demand become 
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NL¬ = φ †ö≠ïú∙Ø∞°∙≤G†öú∙Ø∞° + » √Qïƒ≈∆°ƒ≈∆°                              (26) 
where we keep the weight that they put in fundamental value be a minute value (0.1 in 
this paper). With a large size of », this equation ensures extrapolators’ demand 
is mainly determined by their extrapolation belief.  
2.3.2 Equilibrium Price and implications 
In a market described above, the equilibrium price emerges when the sum of all 
participators’ demand equals the fixed supply of the risky asset, such that  
 r´ ∙ ìA´ +	r™ ∙ ìA™ = x																																														 27  
where  r´  and  r™  represent the proportion of fundamentalists and extrapolators 
respectively, r´ + r™ = 1. Thus, the equilibrium price would be 
ñA = ñV… + » ¥ ≠ïφ ¥ zA		                                          (28) 
The very concise Equation (28) indicates that, in our economy, the actual price will 
depart from the fundamental value just because extrapolators’ irrational bias. 
Accordingly, the actual return would be 
     MA = ñA − ñAGE = ëA + ¶së2x + À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥ (zA − zAGE)                  (29) 
        MA = ëA + ¶së2x + À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥ zA õîö − EÕ õîöGE + À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥ MAGE∫ õîöGE           (30) 
The proposition below lays out why our model can explain the empirical findings of 
the first chapter. 
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Proposition 1. In the economy described above, volatility is partially determined by 
individuals’ extrapolation belief. 
At the beginning of time interval V − 1 → V , with an unknown ëA  and all other 
variables value known in (31), the expected volatility of MA will be 
  o[N`@ MA|œAGE ] = o[N`@ ëA|œAGE ] + 		o[N`@ À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥ ∙ zA|œAGE ]	 
                   +	o[N`@ À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥ ∙ zAGE|œAGE ]	                                                  (31) 
where ΠLGE means all the known information set at time t-1. At this circumstance, zAGE is a just known value, instead of a changing variable. Hence, when zA ≥ 0,	 
o[N`@ MA|œAGE ] = sîF + ( À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥)Fo N`@ zA ∙ õîö|œAGE      
                                +2o[“^≥ ëA, À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥ zAõîö|œAGE ] 
                                = sîF + ( À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥)FzAFsîF + 2	r´ À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥ zA“^≥ ëA, õîö 																			(32) 
and when zA < 0 
o[N`@ MA|œAGE ] = sîF + ( À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥)Fo N`@ zA ∙ õGîö|œAGE      
                                +2o[“^≥ ëA, À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥ zAõGîö|œAGE ] 
                      = sîF + À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥ F zAFsîF − 2	r… »ror…+φro zV“^≥ ëA, õîö 																			(33) 
Equation (32) and (33) can be integrated as 
o[N`@ MA|œAGE ] = sîF + »ror…+φro 2 |zV|2së2 + 2	r… »ror…+φro 2 |zV|“^≥ ëV, õëV   (34) 
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Based on equation (32), (33)  and (34), the relation between the expected 
volatility	N`@ MA  and	zA can be shown by the following figure 
 
Figure 2.1   Relation between expected volatility and Extrapolation belief  
The solid line reveals what happens between volatility and extrapolation belief. The blue line denotes zA ≥ 0 while red line means zA < 0.      
Thus, volatility in our economy is just a quadratic function of the magnitude of 
individual’s extrapolation belief. When |zA| grows, the expected value of volatility will 
increase accordingly. Also, we can see that this determinant power of extrapolation 
belief to volatility is also affected by the magnitude of zA itself, for 
® ™[¢£§ ûö|”öST ]®|‘ö| = 2|zA| À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥ F sîF + 2	r´ À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥ F “^≥ ëA, õîö     (35) 
Then we can get our second proposition that 
Proposition 2. The determinant power of extrapolation belief to volatility is affected 
by the magnitude of extrapolation belief itself. 
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The reason behind Proposition 2 is very intuitively. As zA or #$% of the first chapter 
measures extrapolators’ expectation of future returns, so a large magnitude of zA	(or #$% ) will indicate extrapolators are extraordinary optimistic (or extraordinary 
pessimistic when zA < 0) about the future when they will trade more aggressively. 
Thus, the price will be more affected by extrapolators’ irrational belief, and therefore, 
the volatility will be more determined by zA.To test this proposition, we modify the 
regression equation used in 3.1, Chapter 1 as 
N^_`VU_UVaA = ` + cE ∙ |#$%A| ∙ dE(#$%A ≥ 0) + cF ∙ |#$%A| ∙ dF(#$%A < 0) + cn ∙ (#$%A)F + gA (36) 
Table 2.6 summarizes the new empirical test result which gives us evidence of 
Proposition 2. As shown in this table, for three market samples, the Brent Crude Oil 
market, the Japanese stock market, and the SSEC index (2005-2008) of Chinese stock, 
the parameter of #$%AF are all significant, which indicates that the magnitude of 
extrapolation belief significantly affects its connection with volatility index for these 
samples. The insignificant regression result for GEI index and SSEC index (2014-2016) 
may be caused by fact that individuals’ trading has already largely impact the market 
since their trading proportion is more than 80%.  Then, the increasing GSI may not help 
to continue increasing their impact to the market. Naturally, for the currency market, 
where individual investors only have minimum impact to the market, no significant test 
result can be found.  
Proposition 1 shows why our model can theoretically explain the empirical finding 
of our first chapter that the changing extrapolation belief could be a reason causing 
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volatility to change. But Proposition 2 extend this conclusion that the connection 
between extrapolation belief and volatility may be also affected by its magnitude.   
Like the magnitude of zA, other parameters can also affect extrapolators’ impact to 
the market, r™, for example. From equation (29), we can easily get  ’ o[N`@ MA|œAGE ] ’|zA|’r™ > 0                        (37) 
which means when there is a bigger proportion of individual investors, there will be 
a closer correlation between the volatility and extrapolation belief, also an empirical 
finding in Chapter 1.  
Proposition 3. In the economy described above, where there is bigger proportion of 
individual investors, there will be a bigger correlation between zA and the volatility 
index. 
Besides, it can be easily noticed that     
                                                      ® ™[¢£§ ûö|”öST ]®|‘ö|®÷ > 0                                          (38) 
which is strictly positive. Therefore, we can get the following proposition that 
Proposition 4. Besides the proportion of individual investors r™ , individuals’ 
memory effect coefficient I can also impact the correlation between volatility and zA. 
This proposition is quite straightforward. Since λ measures the extent individuals are 
affected by past price changes. For the fixed price changes, when λ  is bigger, 
individuals will be more impressed and have a more noticeable extrapolation belief. 
Accordingly, they will have a higher impact on the price and volatility.  
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In a word, our model provides explicit links between individuals’ extrapolation belief 
and the instantaneous volatility. Also, as individuals’ impact on price is determined 
both by the size of extrapolation belief and by the proportion of individual investors, 
we can also get the conclusion that the relation between volatility and zA is affected 
both by individuals’ proportion r™  and individuals’ enthusiasm about past price 
changes λ.  
2.3.3 Volatility Clustering 
Proposition 5.  Volatility in our economic tend to “cluster”, and, the bigger the 
extrapolators’ proportion is, the more significant volatility clustering will be. 
Proof: Denote À ¥ ≠ï◊ ¥ = ÿ, then from equation (29), we can get 
			N`@ MA|œAGE = N`@ ëA|œAGE 	+ ÿFN`@ zA|œAGE + ÿFN`@ zAGE|œAGE −									2ÿF“^≥ zA, zAGE œAGE + 2ÿ“^≥ ëA, zA|œAGE − 2ÿ“^≥ ëA, zAGE|œAGE 				(39)          
since ëA is independent identically distributed, then  
     “^≥ zA, zAGE|œAGE = 0 and “^≥ ëA, zAGE|œAGE = 0               (40)    
and 
  N`@ MA|œAGE = N`@ ëA|œAGE + ÿFN`@ zA|œAGE + ÿFN`@ zAGE|œAGE  
                 2ÿ“^≥ ëA, zA|œAGE                                                  (41) 
It can easily get that           
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         MAïE = ñAïE − ñA = ëAïE + ¶së2x + À ¥ ≠ïÃ ¥ (zAïE − zA)                           (42)  
So,  
  N`@ MAïE|œAGE = N`@ ëAïE|œAGE + ÿFN`@ zAïE|œAGE + ÿFN`@ zA|œAGE  
                 2ÿ“^≥ ëAïE, zAïE|œAGE                                                  (43) 
Apparently, 
            “^N N`@ MAïE|œAGE , N`@ MA|œAGE = ÿpN`@(N`@ zA|œAGE )           (44)   
and  
       “^@ N`@ MAïE|œAGE , N`@ MA|œAGE = Ÿ⁄¢(¢£§ ‘ö|”öST )¢£§ ûö|”öST ¢£§ ûöüT|”öST                          
                          = ÿp ¢£§(¢£§ ‘ö |”öST)¢£§ ûö|”öST ¢£§ ûöüT|”öST                         (45) 
 which proves Proposition 5. 
   The reason of volatility clustering in our model is very intuitive. As we demonstrate, 
volatility in our economy has two sources the exogenous information innovation and 
the endogenous product of information and Extrapolation Belief. Extrapolation belief 
is persistent as it is the weighted average of past returns—a large size extrapolation 
belief is likely followed by another large one. So, when volatility is more determined 
by extrapolation belief ( |zA|  is large), volatility is more likely to cluster. In the 
simulation part, we show our model can efficiently reveal the real financial market.  
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2.3.4 Asymmetric Relation between Extrapolation Belief and Volatility 
In (19), we assume extrapolators will be symmetrically affected by confirmation bias, 
however, according to our questionnaire survey result, they would be more easily 
influenced during the bear market. Therefore, we can modify (24) as 
XL = XL ∙ eæQ												XA ≥ 0		XL ∙ ρeGæQ										XL < 0	                                (46) 
where ρ > 1 which indicates, the declining price makes individual investors be more 
affected by their confirmation bias. Thus (26) will become  
  	o[N`@ MV+1|œV−1 ] = r…2 ∙ së2 + ρ2 »ror…+φro 2 zV2së2 + 2	ρ2r…( »ror…+φro)2zV“^≥ ëV, õëV 					(47) 
Accordingly, Figure 2.1 should be changed into  
 
Figure 2.2 Relation between expected volatility and Extrapolation belief  
The solid line reveals what happens between volatility and extrapolation belief. The blue line denotes zA ≥ 0 while red line means zA < 0.   
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Figure 2.2 indicates if individual investors are more influenced by confirmation bias 
in the bear market, the slope of the curve in the fourth dimension should be bigger than 
in the first dimension. In other words, volatility will be more affected by extrapolation 
belief when zA < 0. This asymmetric relation between volatility and extrapolation belief 
is coordinate with the symmetric GSI-volatility relation that empirically demonstrated 
in the first chapter.  
2.4 High-frequency simulation  
 
Figure 2.3 High-frequency Price Process   
Using the new model built in Section 2.3, we continue to simulate it with high-
frequency method to coordinate the volatility calculating method in Chapter 1. In the 
first chapter, volatility is estimated by RV (Realized Volatility) which requires high-
frequency data, but our model introduced in section 3 is designed as a low-frequency 
model in which investors only trade once for each period. Therefore, we discretize the 
basic model into a high-frequency discrete time version.  
    
 80 
2.4.1 Simulation mothed 
Firstly, we divide each trading period into n sub-periods. For consistency, we specify 
as follows: as shown in Figure 2.3, for each time interval,	the beginning	time V − 1 is 
also named as (V − 1)ê, and the ending point of this time	V can be seen as (V − 1)C.	
Then the low frequency price ñAGE will become the starting high frequency price RAGE‹ 
of time interval	 t-1→t,	 or the ending high frequency price	RAGFﬁ  for previous time 
interval	t-1→t. Such that ñA = RA‹ = RAGEﬁ                                                 (48) 
Then, we discretize the information ëA	of each period into an information set     which 
consists of a number of temporally even distributed innovations ﬂAO, such as ëA = {ﬂAT, ﬂA°, ﬂA· ⋯ ﬂAﬁ}    where  ﬂAO~ì(0, s„F), i.i.d. over time            (49) 
Then ëA~ì(0, sîF),	i.i.d.	over	time where   sîF = ? ∙ s„F               (50) 
Based on this modification, we can simply deduct the fundamentalists’ demand of 
every high-frequency time VH using the same backward induction method. As in our 
basic model, fundamentalists also choose to maximize their utility objective 
maxôöO oAO(−õGú(ùöOïôö(±ö‰üTG±O))                                 (51) 
In this high-frequency process, we use the lowercase RAO to distinguish it with the 
low-frequency price ñA . Accordingly, using backward induction, fundamentalists’ 
optimal demand is also determined by  
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	ìAO´ = oAO RAOüT´ − RAO¶ ∙ N`@ 	oAO RAOüT´ − RAO 																																							(52) 
Similarly, we can find the fundamental value of risky asset at VH would be 
RAO´ = dAO − Y − V ∙ ¶sîFx + U ∙ ¶s„Fx																																(53)	 
(38) can simply be rewritten as 
                                                            ìAO´ = ±öO≠ïúØÂ°≤	G±öOú	ØÂ°                                          (54) 
by simple calculation, we can get  
                              	@AO´ = RAOüT´ − RAO´ = ﬂAO + ¶s„Fx				 
                  o @AO´ = ¶s„Fx = EC MA´ 							≥`@ @AO´ = s„F = EC ≥`@ MA´       
        when      U = 0							RA‹´ = ñA´ = dA − Y − V ∙ ¶sîFx                            	
                 U = ?					RAﬁ´ = ñAïE´ = dAïE − Y − V − 1 ∙ ¶sîFx																																				(55)  
As shown above, when all the investors were fundamentalists, expected return of the 
fundamental value for every sub-period VH becomes EC MA´ , just because the risk premium 
of every sub-period is just one-nth of the whole period. Return volatility of the sub-
period also changes accordingly. In brief, after dividing the discrete low frequency cash 
flow shock ëA into a set of high frequency innovations, the fundamentalists will also 
adapt their demand according to the high-frequency innovation process. In this way, 
our model manages to derivative an inner-consistent fundamental value evolution 
process (both in high frequency and low frequency) by characterizing investors’ 
optimal demand.    
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With respect to high-frequency evolution process of optimal demand for 
extrapolators, it can also be denoted as  
ìAO™ = ™öO ±ö‰üT¥ G±öOú∙¢£§(	™öO §öﬁ¥ ) = Êö‰ú	ØÂ°                                          (56) 
which also most the same with equation (28). Lowercase ßA‰  is also used to 
distinguish with low frequency expected changes. Like that in the basic model, it also 
has two recourses, the extrapolation belief ßAO, and his adaptation for the sub-period 
information innovation, such that ßA‰ = e„öO ∙ ßAO												ßAO > 0ßA‰ = eG„öO ∙ ßAO											ßAO < 0	                                   (57) 
When calculating ßAO, it should be noticed that the already happened price change  ñA(RA‹) → RAOST  would also cause investors to extrapolate just as other past price 
changes (say ñAGE → ñA ) do. Therefore, the price change  ñA(RA‹) → RAOSTshould be 
considered. Because investors are more used to judge the trend according to low 
frequency returns (daily price changes, mostly). Besides, it is hard for investors to 
acquire high-frequency price process data sometimes. We also assume extrapolators 
only care about the whole price change of the current period, instead of the high-
frequency price changing process, such that ßAO = λ∂ïEP∂DE c PLG∂ − PLG∂GE − η + I[RAOST − ñA − U − 1 πÁ] + ËÁ        (58) 
where ηÁ = ¶	s„F  means the due return of every sub-period, and ζÁ = 2¶	s„F .  
Equation (54) means, because trade happens multiple times in each trading period, 
extrapolators need to adapt their judgement according to the already happened price 
    
 83 
change in the current period RAOST − ñA  and in previous periods. Then we can get 
another concise price equation of the high-frequency equilibrium process 
                   RA = RVU… + » ¥ ≠ïφ ¥ ßA‰		                                             (59) 
2.4.2 Numerical Simulation result 
Figure 2.5 of Appendix 2 plots the simulation result using the parameter value listed 
in Table 2.1. Especially, I, the parameter of memory effect is set to be 0.8, just the 
same value we used to calculate individuals’ extrapolative belief for the empirical test 
in Chapter 1. It is also one of the empirical test results of Greenwood and Shleifer 
(2014). The proportion of extrapolative investors is set to be 80% to mimic the Chinese 
stock market, where the most significant empirical test result in Chapter 1 can be found.  
Table 2.1   Numerical benchmark parameters 
I 0.8 Memory effect 
c 0.2 Extrapolation coefficient 
r´  20% Proportion of Fundamentalists 
r™  80% Proportion of Extrapolators 
¶ 0. 1 Coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
s„  0. 2 Volatility of high frequency information innovations 
s„  2 Volatility of low frequency information innovations 
                  n 50 Number of sub-period of one time interval 
φ 0.1 Extrapolators’ expectation Weight on fundamental value 
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ϕ 0.9 Extrapolators’ expectation Weight on extrapolation bias 
The fist picture in Figure 2.5 gives the high-frequency price process while the 
corresponding low-frequency price is plotted in second picture. Apparently, the high 
frequency picture contains more price information than the other one, which makes us 
be able to calculate the volatility using RV method. By the same method used in 
Chapter 1, Volatility and GSI (Greenwood and Shleifer Index, the indexes of 
individuals’ extrapolation belief) are calculated and represented in Figure 2.6.  
Interesting implications can be found from our simulation. Mispricing, for instance.  
The actual price, plotted by the red line in Figure 2.5, departs from the fundamental 
value (black line) for most of the time. This departure, which reflects the influence of 
extrapolators’ expectation to the price, can grow enormously. In the beginning, with an 
initial price decline, extrapolators expect the price will continue to fall and begin to sell 
their shares, which makes the price decline even lower than the fundamental value. This 
devaluation grows severe as their extrapolation belief increases. Also, the equity can be 
overvalued when the extrapolators are optimistic about future price. Like that happens 
from T = 60, the increasing price makes extrapolator believe the price will continue 
rising and buy in more shares, the actual price surpasses the fundamental value 
accordingly. In a word, what happens in our economy is similar to the old analogy about 
the likeness between the stock market and a man walking his dog. The man’s course 
(the fundamental value) is steady but the dog (the actual price) is easily distracted and 
excited. Although they may reach the same goal together as the man holding the leash, 
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the dog’ course is hard to predict as it may “lunge at a pigeon or scurry backward in 
fear of a speeding bicycle” (Jorgensen, 1994). 
The following several figures illustrate how our simulation can explain several 
stylized facts of volatility.  
2.4.2.1 excess volatility  
As we have analyzed, if all investors were fundamentalists, the expected value of 
volatility should just be the volatility of information sî, displayed by the black line in 
Figure 2.6. Nonetheless, things change when extrapolators emerge in the market. In 
this figure, the green line represents the actual volatility index, calculated by Realized 
Volatility mothed used in Chapter 1. For most of the time, the actual volatility is larger 
than the information volatility sî, showing that extrapolators’ irrational behavior will 
cause volatility to increase. Therefore, our model, like many previous models based on 
individuals’ extrapolation belief (Cutler, Poterba, and Summers, 1990, DeLong, 
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1990, Barberis et.al. 2015), can explain the famous 
“excess volatility puzzle” which is firstly argued by Shiller that the volatility in actual 
price is much higher than the volatility of the cash flow innovations.  
 2.4.2.2 Volatility and Extrapolation Belief  
 More importantly, our model can explain why extrapolation belief can affect the 
instantaneous volatility. For simplicity, we use Î^@ #$% , N^_`VU_UVa  as an indicator 
of the explanatory power of extrapolation belief to the instantaneous volatility. The 
absolute value of Greenwood and Shleifer Index (the index of extrapolation belief) is 
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also plotted by the red line in Figure 2.6. Apparently, it is positively correlated with 
the volatility index (green line). By our simulation, if the parameters are set as Table 
2.1, Î^@ #$% , N^_`VU_UVa = 0.535, a similar result as that in Chinese stock market. 
As demonstrated by Proposition 3 and 4, our model also predicts the proportion of 
extrapolators r™ as well as the memory effect I can affect the explanatory power of 
extrapolation belief to volatility. We now use simulation to prove this two propositions.   
Figure 2.7 shows the impact of changing I  which follows the prediction of 
Proposition 3, that with a bigger I, the correlation between volatility and absolute GSI 
should be higher. Figure 2.8 shows the effect of changing r™ when other parameters 
hold. As shown in these two figures, there is a monotone increasing relationship 
between the proportion of individual investors with the correlation between volatility 
and absolute GSI.  
To show our simulation can reveal what happens in the actual market, we also list the 
correlation test result between volatility index and #$%  for all the real markets as well 
as our simulation results in Appendix 2, Table 2.6. For example, when the 
extrapolators proportion is about 80%, the correlation between #$%  and volatility is 
0.53, almost the same as its value in Chinese stock market where about 85% of investors 
are individual invests. When extrapolators’ proportion drops to 25%, the similar value 
with the proportion of individual investors in the developed stock markets, Î^@ #$% , N^_`VU_UVa  drops to 0.27, also similar to its value in the developed stock 
market. When extrapolators only take just 5% of the population, 
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Î^@ #$% , N^_`VU_UVa  only equals 0.067, just like what happens in the currency 
market. 
Additionally, by Proposition 2, we suggest, the relation between volatility and 
individuals’ extrapolation belief is a quadratic function, and the size of extrapolation 
belief itself can influence its  
2.4.2.3 Volatility clustering  
Figure 2.9 plots the Volatility Clustering (characterized by autocorrelation of 
volatility index) of our simulation result and in the real markets. Figure 2.9.a compares 
different financial markets. For the IXIC (Index of Nasdaq Stock Market) and the N225 
(index of Japanese stock market), represented by gray line and black line respectively, 
or for the market where individual investors have limited impact, volatility displays 
certain degree of clustering—the correlation decays from about 0.26 at lag 1 to about 
0.1 at lag 20. As a contrast, three indexes (represented by the red, pink and purple line) 
of Chinese stock market, exhibit a much higher level of clustering. As can be seen in 
this picture, the volatility correlation at lag 1 is as high as 0.8 which reduces much 
slower to 0.5 at lag 20. Apparently, when the proportion of individual investors is higher, 
the more significant clustering volatility exhibit.   
Figure 2.9.b displays our simulation result which shows how well our model can fit 
the real market. The red line plots the volatility autocorrelation when extrapolators take 
a proportion of 80%, while the black line shows when only 20% investors are 
extrapolators. As what happens in Chinese stock market, the correlation also decays 
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from around 0.8 at lag 1 to about 0.4 at lag 20. And, just like in the developed market, 
the simulated volatility autocorrelation also decreases from 0.25 to about 0.1. This well 
fitted simulation result pictorially explains our models’ ability to explain the volatility 
clustering.      
  To summarize, our simulation results prove our propositions in Section 2.3. 
Combining these propositions and our high-frequency simulation results, our model 
shows a great ability to explain the empirical findings of Chapter 1. Additionally, our 
model can also help to understand volatility clustering, another most important stylized 
fact of volatility.   
2.5 Conclusion  
Using the questionnaire survey, we emphasize the information needs of individual 
investors. We also prove individual investors tend to be influenced by confirmation 
bias and extrapolative bias at the same time. By these findings and in the light of earlier 
extrapolative models, we build a new extrapolative model in which extrapolators are 
also affected by confirmation bias when they evaluate new arriving information. In our 
model, extrapolators’ expectation of future returns is a production of their extrapolation 
belief and the biased update for the information innovations. Using proposition analysis 
and high-frequency simulations, we show that our model can efficiently explain our 
findings in Chapter 1 as well as the real world. Furthermore, we show that the slowing 
decay Extrapolation Belief can also drive volatility to cluster. By simulation we show 
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how well our simulation fits the real financial markets, which makes our model be more 
convincing.    
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Appendix 2.1 
To explain the necessity of this modification, assume the finance market is in an 
absolute stable situation (by “absolute stable situation”, we mean all the information 
innovation equals zero, ëA = 0, dè = dê = dA ). Then according to (12), the 
fundamental price evaluation process will become a straight line like Figure 1. 
Although no innovation is released, fundamental investors won’t confirm this situation 
in advance until the last period T, so they will also require a risk compensation õßR MA´ = ¶sîFx for every investment period.   
  
    
 94 
Figure 2.4 Fundamental Price process in “absolute stable” situation. 
In this picture, fundamental price is denoted by the black line. “Absolute stable” situation means ëH = 0, dê = dA = 100,	¶ =0.01, sîF = 2, x = 1, ¶sîFx = 0.2.  
Assume extrapolators are aware of this risk compensation return and observe this 
price change process, they will not speculate in the equity because they understand this 
constant price increase ¶sîFx doesn’t means the price gains “extra” increase, but just 
means a “due” rise. Accordingly, to describe their only care about the “extra increment”, 
we modify the equation (27) into (28).     
Appendix 2.2 
 
a. High-frequency price of Numerical simulation result 
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b. Low-frequency price of Numerical simulation result 
Figure 2.5 Numerical simulation result 
This figure plots the price process when the parameter value is set by Table 1. The black line plots the fundamental value of the 
asset for the same cash-flow sequence while the red line reveals the actual price. 
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Figure 2.6 Volatility and GSI of Numerical simulation result 
Volatility is measured by RV method, the same method used in Chapter 1. Extrapolation belief is also calculated by the same 
method in Chapter 1. 
 
Figure 2.7 Correlation and Changing Memory effect  
This picture shows the change of Î^@(N^_`VU_UVaA, #$%A ) when the memory effect λ is gradually changed from 0 while other 
parameters are set according Table 1. 
 
Figure 2.8 Correlation and Changing proportion of extrapolators 
This picture shows the change of Î^@(N^_`VU_UVaA, #$%A ) when the proportion of extrapolators r™  is gradually changed from 0 
while other parameters are set according Table 1. 
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Figure 2.9 volatility clustering in real financial markets and by our simulation result 
Autocorrelation of volatility is shown in this figure. The fist picture shows autocorrelation of volatility in Chinese stock market, 
Japanese stock market as well as Nasdaq stock market, while the second picture displays our simulation result. 
Table 2.2 Background survey statistics  
 Survey Sample Official Data 
Question 1: Education level 
Junior High School 2.58% (6) 4.51% 
High School 12.02% (28) 17.52% 
Undergraduate 67.38% (157) 72.56% 
Post graduated and above  18.03% (42) 5. 40% 
Question 2: Investment value 
Smaller than 100 thousand 42.49% (99) 52.27% 
(100 thousand,500 thousand) 33.48% (78)  32.93% 
(500 thousand,1million) 15.02% (35) 8.61% 
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Bigger than1million 9.01% (21) 6.83% 
Question 3: Years of investment 
Less than 1 year 10.3% (24) 4.31% 
(1 year, 3 years) 26.61% (62) 24.37% 
(3 year, 5 years) 20.6%(48) 27.51% 
Over 5 years 42.49%(99) 42.82% 
Total  100% (233) 100% 
The second column reports statistics of our survey result about participators’ background with distributions as well as 
the actual number (reported in brackets). Official Data comes from China Securities Investor Survey Report (2012) by 
China Securities Investor Protection Fund Corporation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 Investors’ behavior survey statistics  
 Survey Sample 
Question 4: Technical Analysis VS. Fundamental Value Analysis 
Only rely on Technical Analysis 4.72% (11)  
Only rely on Fundamental Value Analysis 10.3% (24) 
Rely on both, but on Technical Analysis more 25.75% (60) 
Rely on both, but on Fundamental Value Analysis more 21.46% (50) 
Rely on both with the same importance 37.77% (88) 
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Question 5: Horizon of information seeking 
Several days 12.4% (29) 
Several Months 54.94% (128)  
All the times 32.62% (76) 
Total  100% (233) 
Statistics of our survey result about participators’ investment behavior. The actual number is reported in brackets. 
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Table 2.4 Investors’ behavior survey statistics   
Years of investment  Whole Sample 
Less than 1 
year 
(1year, 3years) (3 years,5years) 
More than 5 
years 
Question 6: Rising trend and information innovation 
Increase 5% 42.92% (95) 60% (15) 43.55% (27) 36.73% (17) 35.42% (34) 
Decrease 5% 27.04% (63) 16% (4) 33.87% (22) 26.53% (13) 28.13% (27) 
Same impact 32.76% (75) 24% (6) 23.44% (15) 36.73%(18) 36.46% (35) 
Question 7: Declining trend and information innovation 
Increase 5% 23.61% (54) 16% (4) 33.87% (22) 20.41% (12) 25% (24) 
Decrease 5% 47.64% (109) 64% (16) 44. 61% (28) 42.86% (19) 40.63% (39) 
Same impact 30.04%(67) 20% (5) 22.58% (14) 36.73%(17) 34.38% (33) 
Total 233 25 64 49 99 
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Table 2.5 Investors’ behavior survey statistics   
Education Level Whole Sample Middle school Under-graduated Postgraduate 
Question 5: Rising trend and information innovation 
Increase 5% 42.92% (95) 44.11% (15) 40.51%(64) 39.02%(16) 
Decrease 5% 27.04% (63) 23.52% (8) 29.75%(47) 29.27%(12) 
Same impact 32.76% (75) 32.35% (11) 29.75%(47) 31.71%(13) 
Question 3: Declining trend and information innovation 
Increase 5% 23.61% (54) 17.64% (6) 25.95%(41) 29.27%(12) 
Decrease 5% 47.64% (109) 52.94%(18) 45.57%(72) 36.59%(15) 
Same impact 30.04%(67) 29.41% (10) 28.48%(45) 34.15%(14) 
Total 233 34 158 41 
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Table 2.6 Summary of empirical results in different financial market 
Index Date range a !" !# !$ N %# 
EURUSD 
2015/10/15-
2016/12/9 
0.39** 
[5.75] 
-0.89 
[-0.40] 
-15.44 
[0.46] 
967.9 
[0.43] 
302 0.005 
JPYUSD 
2015/10/15-
2016/12/9 
0.36*** 
[2.26] 
52.05 
[1.43] 
37.8 
[1.02] 
-1244.5 
[-0.83] 
320 0.01 
Brent 
Crude Index 
2015/9/16- 
2016/12/9 
0.41*** 
[14.61] 
-2.61*  
[-1.62] 
-1.39 
[-0.86] 
57.0*** 
[2.95] 
292 0.13 
N225 
2014/12/19-
2016/12/1 
0.83*** 
[5.76] 
-1.79 
[-1.27] 
0.91 
[0.58] 
8.63*** 
[3.33] 
474 0.16 
IXIC 
2015/4/29-
2016/11/16 
0.15*** 
[20.69] 
-0.8 
[-0.86] 
2.46*** 
[2.15] 
3.08 
[0.13] 
394 0.10 
SSEC 
2005/2/1- 
2008/12/31 
0.11*** 
[25.19] 
1.06*** 
[3.46] 
1.93*** 
[5.82] 
7.94** 
[1.82] 
951 0.32 
SSEC 
2013/12/23-
2016/10/31 
0.11*** 
[14.63] 
5.29*** 
[6.09] 
7.63*** 
[5.38] 
-7.06 
[0.38] 
696 0.52 
GEI 
2013/11/26-
2016/10/31 
0.18*** 
[15.16] 
2.42*** 
[4.58] 
3.79*** 
[4.98] 
2.74 
[0.43] 
694 0.36 
Table 2 summarize estimate results of the regressions form &'()*+(+*,- = ) + 01 ∙ |456-| ∙ 71(456- ≥ 0) + 0< ∙ |456-| ∙ 7<(456-< 0) + 0> ∙ (456-)< + ?- 
****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% level respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are 
in brackets.  
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Table 2.7 Comparison of Correlations between |GSI| and Volatility 
 We use the same method to calculate volatility and GSI index for all real markets and our simulated economy. Volatility 
is calculated in the approaches of realized volatility with 5-min intraday data. GSI is calculated by  |GSI-| =C-DE ∙ FEGEH1 , where C-means the return at time t, F governs the weights investors put into each period which is set as F = 0.8 according to Greenwood and Shleifer (2014).
Real markets Simulated economy 
Index Date range 
Correlation 
Between |GSI| 
and Volatility 
Individual 
trading 
Proportion 
Correlation 
Between |GSI| 
and Volatility 
Proportion 
of 
extrapolators 
EURUSD 
2015/10/15-
2016/12/9 
0.09 <5%	
0.068 5% 
JPYUSD 
2015/10/15-
2016/12/9 
0.06 <5% 
Brent 
Crude Index 
2015/9/16-
2016/12/9 
0.26 25% 
0.27 25% N225 
2014/12/19-
2016/12/1 
0.27 23.5% 
IXIC 
2015/4/29-
2016/11/16 
0.20 <30% 
SSEC 
2005/2/1-
2008/12/31 
0.52 85% 
0.53 80% SSEC 
2013/12/23-
2016/10/31 
0.65 83% 
GEI 
2013/11/26-
2016/10/31 
0.56 85% 
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Appendix 2.3 Questionnaire  
Background survey 
1. Your graduation 
A: Below undergraduate   B: Undergraduate   C: Postgraduate   
2. The total value of your investment in stock market. 
A: <10K    B: 10k< <100K.  C:100k< <500K.  D:500K<<1000K.  E:>1000K 
3. How long since you first invested in the stock market 
A: Less than 2 years   B: more than 2 years but less than 5   C: >5 
Behavior survey  
1. Which one will you choose to evaluation a stock 
A: I only care about the trend (Technical Analysis) 
B: I only care about the information (Fundamental Value). 
C: I pay attention to both trend and information, but I think trend (Technical Analysis) 
is more important 
D: I pay attention to both trend and information, but I think information (Fundamental 
Value) is more important. 
E: I pay attention to both trend and information, and they have the same importance. 
3. When you seek information, what will you do 
A. I only pay attention to the latest information (only in resent several days). 
B. I pay attention to the information in resent several months. 
   C. I will try my best to search for all the information for all the time even since IPO. 
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4. A stock has the following trend.  
 
For this stock, which news will have the bigger impact? 
A. Net profit will be 5% more than pre-disclosure 
B. Net profit will be 5% less than pre-disclosure 
C. A and B will have same impact 
5. The same with Question 3, say a stock has following trend, 
 
For this stock, which news will have the bigger impact? 
A.  Net profit will be 5% more than pre-disclosure 
B.  Net profit will be 5% less than pre-disclosure 
C.  A and B will have same impact 
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3. Extrapolation Belief and the Trading Volume 
Abstract: Using empirical regression tests, we find individuals’ 
extrapolation belief can significantly impact the trading volume, but the 
effect is different according to different markets. Specifically, in the 
emerging stock market where short-sale constraint exists, when GSI<0, 
trading volume is negatively correlated with |GSI|, the magnitude of 
individuals’ extrapolation belief. But when GSI>0, trading volume is 
positively correlated with |GSI|. On the contrary, in the market where 
short-sale is available for investors, trading volume is positively 
correlated with |GSI| for both positive and negative GSI.  
3.1 Introduction  
Like volatility, the high trading volume is also an anomaly to prove market inefficient, 
for there should be minimal trading as rational models of investing predict. 
Nevertheless, real equity markets perform much higher trading volume that can hardly 
be explained by traditional theories (Thaler and Barberis 2003). Figure 3.1 plots the 
annual turnover ratio of domestic shares of several stock markets which directly 
illustrates the unreasonable high trading volume. As shown in this figure, the average 
ratio of all stock markets in the world (red line) is higher than 100% for the whole time, 
while the turnover ratio of Chinese stock market, as a representative of the emerging 
market, is more than 200% at the same time. 
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Besides enormous amount, trading volume also changes across time. As shown in 
Figure 3.1, the turnover rate of United States market doubles its size, reaching about 
400% in 2008 when the World Financial Crisis happens. Figure 3.2 describes the daily 
changing hands of Shanghai Stock Market in detail. The trading volume is relatively 
moderate during the bear market, about 100M hands in 2010~2014. But it hovers to 
more than 800M hands in the 2015 bubble. Besides, the high trading volume is a 
distinguished feature of financial bubbles. Like Cochrane (2011) demonstrated: “Every 
asset price “bubble” . . . has coincided with a similar trading frenzy, from Dutch tulips 
in 1620 to Miami condos in 2006…” 
However, claimed by many researchers, it is harmful for investors to trade in such a 
high amount (Odean 1988, Biais et al., 2005). For example, Barber and Odean (2000) 
investigate a large group of investors’ investment records obtained from a national 
brokerage company and confirm that, because of the transaction costs, the more an 
investor trade, the lower return he may earn. So, as Cochrane (2011) asks, “why do 
investors trade such enormous quantities?” And, what makes them trade more during 
certain periods, financial bubbles for example, than during other periods? 
To find the reason for investors’ irrational trading behavior, we try to understand the 
trading volume by investors extrapolation bias. By empirical test, we find individual’s 
extrapolation belief can significantly impact the trading volume in most of the markets. 
Firstly, to test if individuals’ extrapolation belief and trading volume are related, we 
collect data from several types of financial markets, including the developed stock 
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markets, the future markets, the emerging stock markets and the Bitcoin market. The 
key difference to be noticed between these markets is the short-sale constraint.  
Short-sale constraint, as a sign of market incompleteness, can impact stock market 
enormously. The influence of short-sale constraint on the market is well demonstrated 
by many scholars. Miller (1977) demonstrates short-sale constraints can prevent 
pessimistic investors to trade against the optimistic opponents that lead the stocks to be 
overpriced. And this conclusion is proved by Lamont and Thaler (2003), who find some 
technology IPOs, which require a higher cost for people to short, are easily to be 
overvalued. Although short-sale is crucial to build an efficient market as it ensures 
arbitragers be able to get profit when they believe the equity is overvalued (Miller 1977), 
in many emerging stock markets (and in the Bitcoin market), the ability to short sell is 
nonexistent (Kraus and Rubin 2003). But unlike the emerging stock market, in the 
future market, investors are free to choose long-position (buying in the contract) or 
short-position (selling out contract). “Free to sell short” is always a distinguished 
feature of the future market compared with other financial markets. Short-sale is also 
not difficult for investors in the developed stock market. As in these markets, most of 
the investors are institutional investors who have more financial tools and opportunities 
than individual investors when they want to sell short.  The better market environment 
can also provide hedging tools for them to cover potential losses.  Therefore, we can 
divide financial markets into two groups, markets with short-sale constraint (like the 
emerging stock markets) and markets without the short-sale constraint (developed stock 
markets and future markets). 
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Then, using the same method of Chapter 1, we construct the GSI (Greenwood and 
Shleifer Index) to quantitatively represent investors’ extrapolation belief and test its 
relationship with trading volume. Strikingly, several interesting findings appear from 
our simple ARIMA regression.  
First of all, trading volume is significantly affected by GSI in all of the financial 
markets. According to our empirical test, in the emerging stock market and the future 
market, both positive and negative GSI can significantly affect trading volume 
Specially, for the developed stock market, we can only find significant regression result 
for positive GSI in the Hong Kong stock market. But the trading volume are all 
significantly affected by negative GSI in the developed stock markets. These different 
significances of positive GSI and negative GSI are consistent with our finding in 
previous chapters that, investors tend to be more easily affected by their extrapolation 
belief in the bear market. 
The more interesting finding is the different relation between the negative GSI and 
trading volume in different financial markets. As we show in Appendix Table 3.4, in 
the emerging stock market or in the Bitcoin market, where short-sale is difficult for 
investors, trading volume is positively related to |GSI| when GSI>0, but negatively 
related to |GSI| when GSI<0, which indicates, in these markets, individuals’ positive 
extrapolation belief increases trading volume while their negative extrapolation belief 
decreases the trading volume. This finding is consistent with some previous researches 
that trading volume is positively correlated with past returns (Statman, Tholey, and 
Vorikink (2006), Glaser and Weber (2007), Zaiane and Abaoub (2009)). Although they 
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employ lagged returns instead of the cumulative weighted average of past returns this 
paper use.   
But our finding about the relation between GSI and trading volume in the future 
market and in the developed stock market distinguishes our research with previous ones. 
According to our regression results, when GSI<0, the relation between |GSI| and trading 
volume is always positive in these markets. In other words, in the market where selling 
short is available to investors, individuals’ negative extrapolation belief can also 
increase the trading volume, which is just the opposite to the emerging stock markets 
and the Bitcoin market. 
These empirical findings raise at least two questions. Firstly, why trading volume can 
be impacted by individual investors’ extrapolation belief. Secondly, how can short-sale 
constraint plays such an important role in determining the relation between trading 
volume and individual’s extrapolation belief?  
To the best of my knowledge, there are only two papers directly discuss the 
relationship between trading volume and individuals’ extrapolation belief, Barberies et 
al. (2016) and Defusco, Nathanson, and Zwick (2017). Barberies and his coauthors 
build a model about financial bubbles in which extrapolators “waver” between two 
conflictive signals, the fundamental value and their extrapolation belief. When the 
extrapolation belief grows, the trading volume introduced by extrapolators’ wavering 
increases too. Their theory can explain the positive relation between Extrapolation 
belief and the trading volume during the bubble period. Also focusing on bubbles, 
Defusco, Nathanson, and Zwick (2017) present a model with two type of investors: 
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short-term investors who are also extrapolators and long-term investors. The trading 
volume is amplified by short-term investors who trade more aggressively as they 
disturb the price by their extrapolative self-contribute trading. However, neither of this 
two papers pays attention to the situations when GSI is negative, or what happens to 
the bear markets. Nor do they care about the future market, where the relation between 
negative GSI and trading volume is totally different. In a word, the relation between 
GSI and trading volume still need further discussion.   
In the following section, we briefly review related researches about trading volume 
and behavioristic explanations. Empirical test is represented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 
concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review 
  The first attempt to understand changes of trading volume is through the 
simultaneous positive return-volume relation. This is a well-established empirical 
finding supported by many studies (Karpoff 1987). Crouch (1970) suggests that 
positive correlations between the variance of daily price changes and volumes not only 
can be found for individual stocks, but can also be found for aggregate market indexes. 
Using daily and monthly data, Morgan (1976) also proved that the positive relationship 
between absolute price changes and trading volume is pervasive in the market. These 
studies are followed by the finding of the asymmetric volume–price relationship that 
volume is more closely connected with positive price changes than negative ones. This 
asymmetric relation is firstly found by Ying (1966), and supported by other researchers, 
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such as Epps (1975, 1977), Smirlock and Starks (1985), and AlDeehani (2007). 
Several authors who attempt to explain this simultaneous volume-price relation have 
offered some theoretical explanations, like the “different attitude to risk hypothesis” by 
Epps (1975), the “mixture of distribution hypothesis” by Harris (1983), and the 
“asymmetric information theory” which can introduce trading among investors (Wang, 
1994; Campbell and Kyle, 1993; Heaton and Lucas, 1993). 
 But these theories have little ability to explain the following finding that trading 
volume is also influenced by past price changes. This is also well supported by many 
researchers. The positive cross-autocorrelation relationship between trading volume 
and past returns is supported by Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) by empirical test. 
Using vector auto-regressions and associated impulse response functions, Statman, 
Thorley, and Vorkink (2004) find a bi-directional positive impact of past trading 
volume on the returns and past returns on the trading volume. By the same method, 
Zaiane and Abaoub (2009) find similar evidence indicating a positive trading volume-
past return relationship in Tunisian stock market. 
Behavior theories, unlike traditional ones, can offer great help to explain this volume-
past return correlation. Firstly, the “disposition effect” theory, which means traders tend 
to realize the paper gains of their successful investment. On the contrary, they would 
avoid selling out the stocks that are defective (Odean (1998)). Hence, when past returns 
are good, trading volume will increase as people try to realize their gains, and vice versa 
(Shefrin and Statman (1985)). Many researchers verified this theory by empirical tests, 
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such as Lakonishok and Smidt (1986), Ferris, Haugen and Makhija (1988), and Heath, 
Huddart and Lang (1999). 
Another common behavioristic explanation is overconfidence, which means “people 
believe that they have information strong enough to justify a trade, whereas in fact the 
information is too weak to warrant any action” (Barberis 2003). It is theoretically 
proved by Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Odean (1998) that if 
investors are “overconfidence” about their own trading signals, they would trade with 
others more frequently. Trading volume rises accordingly. Following development is 
given by Gervais and Odean (2001) who suggest investors will become more 
“overconfidence” if they experienced positive investment profits although those profits 
may also be experienced by most of other investors. Therefore, the positive past returns 
will increase the trading volume. 
This overconfidence theory is empirically tested by Statman, Tholey, and Vorikink 
(2006), who use monthly trading volume data of both individual stacks and the 
aggregate stock market to investigate the relationship between trading volume and past 
price changes. According to their empirical result, the positive volume-past return 
relationship can be found both in the aggregate index and in individual stocks. They 
also prove when more stock shares are held by individuals, this volume-past return 
relationship become more significant. Their research and following similar works, such 
as Glaser and Weber (2007), Zaiane and Abaoub (2009), Chiang and Zheng (2010), 
make overconfidence theory be a convicting theory to explain the relationship between 
the volume-past return relation.      
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Being similar to researches like Statman, Tholey, and Vorikink (2006), this paper 
also tries to seek if trading volume is influenced by past returns. But this paper is 
distinguished from previous works by several profound aspects. Firstly, in our paper, 
to coordinate with the Extrapolation Belief, we calculate GSI as a weighted average of 
lagged returns, instead of just the original lagged returns. Secondly, we distinct the 
positive and the negative GSI, to seek the possible asymmetric relation between trading 
volume and GSI. Thirdly and most importantly, we extend this empirical test to future 
markets, where overconfidence theory doesn’t fit. As in the future markets, the past 
positive returns cannot indicate individuals are becoming more overconfidence—they 
are free to the choose short position or the long position just as institutional investors 
do. Besides, we get a new finding which previous papers are missing that in the future 
markets, the negative GSI, will increase the trading volume, instead of reducing it as in 
the emerging stock market. 
In short, previous theories cannot help us to fully understand this GSI-trading volume 
relationship, especially for the GSI-trading volume relationship in the market where 
people can freely sell short. Further research is needed.  
3.3 Empirical test 
3.2.1 Data description and Empirical methodology  
As has been done in the first chapter, we first conduct the empirical test for several 
types of different financial markets. Our data includes the daily changing hands (as the 
estimation of trading volume) and indexes of these markets which are drawn from the 
  115 
Choice Database. Specifically, these markets include the Brent Oil Future Index, 
Chinese Gold Future Index, Chinese Silver Future Index, and the Chinese Copper 
Future Index from the future market. We also cover Dow Jones 500 index, S&P index, 
IXIC (Nasdaq stock market index), N225, CAC 40 (France stock market index), HSI 
index (Hong Kong stock market index) on behalf of the developed stock market. For 
the emerging stock market, this paper chooses three chinses stock market indexes, 
SSEC, SZI and GEI, as well as TWII, the index of Taiwan stock market. Bitcoin index 
is also included as another representative of individual investor dominated, irrational 
market.  
As we have demonstrated in Chapter 1, individual investors take much higher 
proportion in Chinese stock market than in other markets. Similar things happen to 
Chinese Future market. As summarized by Wang et al. (2015), individuals trading 
proportion in Copper Future market, Gold Future market and the Silver Future market 
is about 86%, 87%, 92% respectively, compared with about 30% individual investor in 
the Brent Crude Oil future market.  Bitcoin Market is another market which is 
dominated by individual investors, as the institutional investors are reported to enter 
this market since 2017 (ESTEVES ,2018). 
Trading volume patterns are also different between these markets. Figure 3.1 and 
Figure 3.2 not only show the turnover rate in Chinese stock market is much higher than 
in other markets, but also show a positive correlation between the trading volume and 
the price level. But, trading volume of Chinese Gold Future market, as shown in Figure 
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3.3, doesn’t seem related to the price level. So, to answer what drives trading volume 
to change, we empirically test its relation with individuals’ extrapolation belief.    
To do that, taking the same vein like Chapter 1, we contrast Greenwood Shleifer 
Index (GSI) to measure individual’s extrapolation belief, as 
456- = K-DE ∙ FEGEH1 																																																												 1  
where rOmeans the return at time t, λ is the memory effect that governs the weights 
investors put into each period. n is set to be 20.  For the trading volume (changing 
hands), we take its logarithm value to eliminate the influence of scales. Then following 
Ajinkya and Jain (1989), Girard and Biswas (2007), we estimate the relation between 
log trading volume and GSI using ARIMA (p, d, q) models. 
As ARIMA model requires the time series to be stationary, we use ADF-GLS test as 
well as KPSS test to check the stationary of the logarithm trading volume for every 
market. ADF-GLS test is developed by Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996), which is 
a modification of ADF test aiming at employing the detrending transformation to 
improve the test power. KPSS test which is proposed by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, 
Schmidt and Shin (1992), whose null-hypothesis is that the time series is stationary.  It 
is suggested that KPSS unit root test eliminates a possible low power against stationary 
unit root that occurs in the ADF (Katircioglu , Feridun , & Kilinc , 2014; Jafari , Othman, 
& Nor, 2012). Therefore, KPSS unit root test results yield more robust results. Test 
results are shown in Table 3.1. 
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 According to our test result, the log trading volume data from the developed stock 
markets, the Brent crude oil future market and the Shanghai Copper future market all 
pass the DF-GLS test and KPSS test, indicating stationary time series. On the contrary, 
the log value of trading volume from TWII, SZI and GEI are all failed. Although the 
log trading volume from SSEC, Shanghai Silver Future market and Shanghai Gold 
Future Market pass the DF-GLS test, it failed in the KPSS test. Therefore, we also treat 
trading volume from these markets as non-stationary. 
Following Chase (2013), we apply the first order of differencing to these markets 
with non-stationary logarithm trading volume. Then, by AIC and BIC criterion, we 
choose different ARIMA structures for different financial markets in our empirical tests. 
Specifically, for the market with stationary logarithm trading volume, we use  
log	(&'(-) = ) + 01 ∙ 456- ∙ 71 456- > 0 + 0< ∙ 456- ∙ 7< 456- ≤ 0  
                             + VEWEH1 log	(&'(-DE) + XEYEH1 ?-D1 + ?-                                  2  
where D1 and D< are two dummy variables aiming to distinguish positive or negative 
regions of GSI. &'(- repent the trading volume at time t. And when log	(&'(-) is not 
stationary, we use  
    DvO = a + β1 ∙ GSIO ∙ D1 GSIO > 0 + β< ∙ GSIO ∙ D< GSIO ≤ 0 +																															 φ`a`H1 DvODE + XEYEH1 ?-DE + uO                                                  3  
   where        7d- = log	(&'(?ef-) − log	(&'(?ef-D1)                                           4                           
Detailed empirical test result is demonstrated in the following section. 
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3.2.2 Empirical test result  
From Table 3.2 to Table 3.7, we show the specific regression equation and the 
empirical test result for different value of F  for several markets (Due to space 
limitations, we only list empirical test result of several markets). As we illustrate above, 
we use different ARIMA structure for different markets. For example, for IXIC, we 
apply ARIMA (1,0,1) model while for the SSEC, we use ARIMA (1,1,1). Although the 
regression equation is different, the meaning of 01and 0< is similar. A positive value 
always indicates |GSI| can increase the trading volume and vice versa.  
From Table 3.2 to Table 3.7, we can see, like the empirical test between GSI and 
volatility, changes in the value of λ  cannot make fundamental differences to the 
empirical test results. When λ changes, the empirical test results are almost the same. 
For example, for the Nasdaq stock market, when λ increases from 0.3 to 0.9,	* value of  0<, the coefficient of the negative GSI, varies from 2.2 to 3.5 which ensure  0< be most 
significant across all the regressions. Similarly, 01, the coefficient of the positive GSI 
maintains insignificant for all regression results. Besides, the C<values are very similar 
in all these regressions. Similar things happen to other markets that not only 01 and 0< 
are all significant for all regression results, but also the C< changes very slightly. In a 
word, the relation between trading volume and individuals’ extrapolation belief is 
robust no matter what value we choose for λ to calculate GSI. 
For the convenience of comparison, Table 3.8 summarizes the ARIMA structure we 
use for different financial markets as well as the empirical test results for 01and 0< 
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when	F = 0.8. Several profound conclusions can be established from our empirical 
tests and the comparison of all these results.     
Firstly, Extrapolation belief, as the most common bias that individual investors are 
suffering, does impact the trading volume. As shown in Table 3.4, 0<, the coefficient 
of the negative GSI, is significant for all the markets, whiles 01, the coefficient of the 
positive GSI, is significant for most of the emerging markets. In some developed stock 
markets, positive GSI can still significantly affect trading volume. This suggests that 
we should pay attention to investors’ extrapolation belief when researching trading 
volume. 
What is more interesting is the asymmetric relation between GSI and trading volume. 
As shown in this table, the coefficient of the positive GSI, 01, is always positive for all 
the markets when it is significant. This positive correlation indicates that when 
individual investors are optimistic, their extrapolation belief will increase the trading 
volume. On the contrary, the coefficient of the negative GSI, 01, is only positive for the 
future market and the developed stock market, but it is significantly negative for all the 
emerging stock markets and the Bitcoin market. That means, for the future markets and 
the developed stock markets, during the bear market, when investors are pessimistic 
because of cumulative negative price changes, extrapolation belief can also increase the 
trading volume just as in the bull market. On the contrary, negative extrapolation belief 
of individual investors actually reduces trading volume in the emerging stock market.  
As illustrated above, the key that distinguishes the emerging stock markets (and 
Bitcoin market) with other financial markets is the short-sale constraint. It seems short-
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sale constraint is crucial for the relationship between GSI and trading volume. More 
specifically, when selling short-sale is totally available to every investor, an increasing 
magnitude of the negative GSI indicates a rise in the trading volume. Nevertheless, in 
the emerging stock market or in the Bitcoin market, where selling short is quite difficult 
for investors, trading volume reduces as extrapolators are more suffered from their 
negative extrapolation belief during the bear market. 
At first sight, it may be straightforward to explain the relationship between trading 
volume and individuals’ extrapolation bias in the future market, but, it is very confusing 
for the stock market where short-sale constraint exists. A bigger magnitude of |GSI| 
may indicate a bigger difference between extrapolators’ opinion and fundamentalists’ 
belief. In the future market, with no short-sale constraint, individuals’ extrapolation 
bias will lead them to trade with the fundamentalists who try to arbitrage the mispricing 
away. Then when |GSI| rises, trading between extrapolators and fundamentalists will 
also increase. But, why, in the stock markets or in the Bitcoin market, trading volume 
reduces as the magnitude of negative GSI increases. If the reason lies in the fact that 
short sale constraint will keep the extrapolators who are pessimistic about future return 
out of the market, which also makes the market with only identical fundamentalists and 
hence little trading volume, then, why, on the contrary, in the bull market, positive GSI 
makes trading volume increase? As during the bull market, especially during the bubble 
period, fundamentalists gradually quit the market because of the short-sale constrain, if 
extrapolators are all optimistic about future returns, no trade will happen among them. 
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In a word, the relation between trading volume and individuals’ extrapolation belief 
still needs theoretical explanations. 
3.4 Conclusion and Discussion 
To conclude, using daily data from several kinds of markets, this paper empirically 
demonstrates individuals’ extrapolation belief can significantly impact the trading 
volume. More importantly, we also find the short-sale constraint is crucial in 
determining this relationship. In the future market and developed stock market, where 
selling short-sale is available, both the negative GSI and the positive GSI can raise the 
trading volume. On the contrary, in the emerging stock market or in the Bitcoin market, 
where investors are facing short-sale constraint, the negative GSI reduces the trading 
volume, just being the opposite to what happens in the future market. Positive GSI can 
also increase trading volume in the emerging market. 
 As we illustrated above, existing theories cannot explain our findings. For instance, 
previous theories about extrapolation belief only discuss the bull market situations (or 
financial bubbles).  “Overconfidence” theory and “disposition effect” theory cannot 
deal with what happens in the future market. So, new theories about extrapolation belief 
and trading volume is needed.  
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Appendix 3 
 
Figure 3.1 Stock traded, turnover ratio of domestic shares  
Turnover ratio is the value of domestic shares traded divided by their market capitalization. The value is annualized by multiplying 
the monthly average by 12. Source: World Federation of Exchanges database.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Changing Hands of Shanghai Stock Market 
This figure displays the daily Changing Hands of Shanghai Stock Market with brow line. The index (SSEC) is represented by the 
blue line.   Source: Choice Database.  
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Figure 3.3 Changing Hands of Chinese Gold Future Market 
This figure displays the daily Changing Hands of Chinese Gold Future Market with brow line. The index is represented by the blue 
line.   Source: Choice Database.  
Table 3.1 Stationary test for logarithm value of trading volume (ijk	(lmnopqr)) 
Market 
ADF-DLS test KPSS test 
t-Statistic LM-Statistic 
Dow Jones 500 -8.79*** 0.61** 
S&P -10.53*** 0.53** 
IXIC -9.75*** 0.12*** 
N225 -3.52*** 0.25*** 
France -6.57*** 0.34*** 
HSI -3.93** 0.19*** 
TWII -1.79 1.02 
SSEC -2.18** 2.18 
SZI -1.50 4.08 
GEI -0.46 1.67 
Brent Oil -7.60*** 0.53* 
Bit Coin 0.19 3.89 
Shanghai Silver Future -2.24* 0.87 
Shanghai Gold Future -2.17* 1.19 
Shanghai Copper Future -6.64*** 0.36** 
This table reports the unit test results for the logarithm value from different financial markets by ADF-GLS test and 
KPSS test. ***, **, * means the non-hypothesis is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level for ADF-GLS test.   
For KPSS test, ***, **, * means the time series is stationary at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level. 
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  Table 3.2 Empirical results for IXIC with ARIMA (1,0,1) structure for 
different s 
  λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
 a 21.34*** [1662] 
21.34*** 
[1648] 
21.34*** 
[1624] 
21.35*** 
[1593] 
21.34*** 
[1543] 
21.34*** 
[1483] 
21.34*** 
[1404] 
!" 2.19 [0.66] 0.95 [0.39] -0.17 [-0.09] -0.85 [-0.54] -1.20 [-0.85] -0.95 [0.39] -0.44 [-0.39] 
!# -8.69** [-2.54] -6.15** [-2.46] -4.36** [-2.28] -3.37** [-2.21] -2.85** [-2.28] -2.79** [-2.89]    -2.72*** [-3.51] 
xy(") 0.71*** [14.43] 0.71*** [14.35] 0.71*** [14.30] 0.70*** [14.15] 0.69*** [13.73] 0.66*** [12.39] 0.65*** [11.54] 
zx(") -0.33*** [-5.71] -0.33*** [-5.66] -0.32*** [-5.60] -0.33*** [-5.53] -0.32*** [-5.40] -0.31*** [-4.79] -0.29*** [-4.51] 
%# 0.244 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.245    0.246 0.249 
N 987 
Data 2015/10/15 -- 2016/12/9 
This table reports empirical results of the form  
log	(&'(?ef-) = ) + 01 ∙ 456- ∙ 71 456- > 0 + 0< ∙ |456-| ∙ 7< 456- ≤ 0 + V1log	(&'(?ef-D1) + X1?-D1 + ?- 
where GSI is calculated with different value of λ. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% 
level respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brace 
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Table 3.3 Empirical results for GEI with ARIMA (1,1,1) structure for different s 
  λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
 a -0.01* [-1.86] 
-0.01* 
[-1.82] 
-0.01* 
[-1.79] 
-0.01* 
[-1.76] 
-0.01 
[-1.52] 
-0.00 
[-1.04] 
-0.00 
[-0.54] 
!"  6.09*** [6.19] 3.91*** [5.63] 2.60*** [5.03] 1.72*** [4.42] 1.03*** [3.65] 0.51*** [2.68] 0.17* [1.69] 
!# -3.60*** [-8.95] -2.18*** [-7.69] -1.32*** [-6.42] -0.76*** [-5.08] -0.41*** [-3.82] -0.19*** [-2.63] -0.04** [-1.98] 
xy(") 0.40*** [11.55] 0.41*** [11.71] 0.42*** [11.88] 0.44*** [12.07] 046*** [12.33] 0.48*** [12.52] 0.49*** [12.49] 
zx(") -0.80*** [-28.59] -0.80*** [-29.03] -0.81*** [-29.37] -0.82*** [-29.38] -0.82*** [-29.01] -083*** [-27.90] -0.83*** [-26.32] 
%# 0.195 0.186 0.177 0.167 0.155 0.143 0.132 
N 1619 
Data 2010/12/23--2016/11/31 
This table reports empirical results of the form  
7d- = ) + 01 ∙ 456- ∙ 71 456- > 0 + 0< ∙ |456-| ∙ 7< 456- ≤ 0 + V17d-D1 + X?-D1 + ?- 
where 
7d- = log	(&'(?ef-) − log	(&'(?ef-D1) 
where GSI is calculated with different value of λ. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% 
level respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brace 
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Table 3.4 Empirical results for SSEC with ARIMA (3,1,1) structure for different s 
  λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
 a -0.001 [-0.36] 
-0.001 
[-0.26] 
-0.001 
[-0.18] 
-0.001 
[-0.16] 
0.001 
[0.16] 
0.001 
[0.84] 
0.001 
[0.16] 
!" 8.07*** [6.97] 5.08*** [6.39] 3.28*** [5.77] 2.07*** [5.05] 1.25*** [4.27] 0.62*** [3.85] 0.26*** [3.11] 
!# -7.28** [-13.28] -4.63** [-11.64] -3.04** [-9.92] -1.99** [-8.28] -1.25** [-6.62] -0.76*** [-6.41] -0.39*** [-5.85] 
xy(") 0.46*** [14.01] 0.46*** [14.56] 0.49*** [15.24] 0.51*** [16.12] 0.53*** [17.40] 0.59*** [25.84] 0.62*** [29.36] 
xy(#) 0.03 [1.01] 0.03 [0.98] 0.03 [1.04] 0.03 [1.19] 0.04 [1.47] 0.06** [2.35] 0.04*** [2.70] 
xy($) 0.06* [1.93] 0.06* [1.95] 0.06** [1.99] 0.07** [2.11] 0.07** [2.37] 0.11*** [3.20] 0.12** [4.50] 
zx(") -0.88*** [-34.28] -0.89*** [-35.28] -0.89*** [-36.30] -0.89*** [-37.80] -0.89*** [-40.46] -0.88*** [-81.41] -0.88*** [-105.64] 
%# 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 
N 1619 
Data 2010/12/23--2016/11/31 
This table reports empirical results of the form  
7d- = ) + 01 ∙ 456- ∙ 71 456- > 0 + 0< ∙ |456-| ∙ 7< 456- ≤ 0 + VE>EH1 7d-D1 + X?-D1 + ?- 
where 
7d- = log	(&'(?ef-) − log	(&'(?ef-D1) 
where GSI is calculated with different value of λ. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% 
level respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brace 
XE<EH1 ?-D1 VE
>
EH1 7d-D1 
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Table 3.5 Empirical results for Shanghai Silver Future with ARIMA (1,1,1) 
structure for different s 
  λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
 a -0.01** [-2.49] 
-0.02*** 
[-2.92] 
-0.02*** 
[-3.25] 
-0.02*** 
[-3.37] 
-0.02*** 
[-3.18] 
-0.01*** 
[-2.85] 
-0.01*** 
[-2.71] 
!" 5.12* [1.88] 4.25** [2.28] 3.52*** [2.64] 2.72*** [2.82] 1.89*** [2.72] 1.13** [2.40] 0.55** [2.02] 
!# 5.09*** [3.35] 4.02*** [3.79] 3.17*** [4.08] 2.41*** [4.14] 1.70*** [3.96] 1.15*** [3.75] 0.74*** [4.04] 
xy(") 0.29*** [7.40] 0.29*** [7.52] 0.30*** [7.68] 0.30*** [7.88] 0.31*** [8.07] 0.31*** [8.20] 0.32*** [8.40] 
zx(") -0.78*** [-28.88] -0.79*** [-29.53] -0.80*** [-30.26] -0.80*** [-30.98] -0.80*** [-31.42] -0.80*** [-31.53] -0.80*** [-32.09] 
%# 0.202 0.203 0.204 0.205 0.204 0.204 0.205 
N 2278 
Data 2009/01/05 -- 2018/05/23 
This table reports empirical results of the form  
7d- = ) + 01 ∙ 456- ∙ 71 456- > 0 + 0< ∙ |456-| ∙ 7< 456- ≤ 0 + φ17d-D1 + X1?-D1 + ?- 
where 
7d- = log	(&'(?ef-) − log	(&'(?ef-D1) 
where GSI is calculated with different value of λ. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% 
level respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brace 
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Table 3.6 Empirical results for Shanghai Gold Future with ARIMA (1,1,1) 
structure for different s 
  λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
 a -0.02*** [-2.79] 
-0.03*** 
[-4.92] 
-0.03*** 
[-4.90] 
-0.03*** 
[-4.83] 
-0.04*** 
[-4.64] 
-0.02 
[-0.95] 
-0.02* 
[-1.82] 
!" -1.09*** [-6.54] -0.86*** [-7.81] -0.74*** [-8.48] -0.66*** [-8.91] -0.58*** [-8.69] -1.07*** [-3.19] -0.08* [-1.84] 
!# 1.66*** [8.98] 1.45*** [11.42] 1.24*** [12.32] 1.10*** [13.31] 1.00*** [14.29] 1.28*** [3.91] 0.25*** [2.83] 
xy(") 0.79*** [25.82] 0.84*** [35.91] 0.87*** [40.40] 0.89*** [46.56] 0.92*** [55.48] 0.28** [2.36] 0.11 [1.14] 
zx(") -0.98*** [-118.65] -1.00 [-0.17] -1.00 [-0.15] -1.00 [-0.14] -1.00 [-0.13] 0.07 [0.20] -0.56*** [-3.80] 
%# 0.277 0.288 0.293 0.297 0.299 0.279 0.274 
N 2278 
Data 2009/01/05 -- 2018/05/23 
This table reports empirical results of the form  
7d- = ) + 01 ∙ 456- ∙ 71 456- > 0 + 0< ∙ |456-| ∙ 7< 456- ≤ 0 + φ17d-D1 + X1?-D1 + ?- 
where 
7d- = log	(&'(?ef-) − log	(&'(?ef-D1) 
where GSI is calculated with different value of λ. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% 
level respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brace 
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Table 3.7 Empirical results for Brent Crude Oil Future with ARIMA (1,0,2) 
structure for different s 
  λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.9 
 a 12.42** [253.41] 
12.42*** 
[251.81] 
12.42*** 
[249.11] 
12.42*** 
[245.73] 
12.42*** 
[241.15] 
12.43*** 
[234.60] 
12.44*** 
[232.00] 
!" -0.19 [-0.07] -0.57 [-0.30] -0.76 [-0.49] -0.91 [-0.70] -1.09 [-0.92] -1.20 [-1.10] -1.10 [-1.19] 
!# 7.17** [2.35] 5.61** [2.39] 4.67** [2.45] 3.91** [2.46] 3.11** [2.31] 2.24** [2.05] 1.23* [1.89] 
xy(") 0.88*** [28.81] 0.88*** [29.08] 0.88*** [29.48] 0.89*** [29.95] 0.89*** [30.33] 0.89*** [30.55] 0.89*** [30.29] 
zx(") -0.33*** [-7.64] -0.34*** [-7.76] -0.34*** [-7.90] -0.34*** [8.05] -0.35*** [-8.13] -0.34*** [-8.11] -0.34*** [-7.98] 
zx(#) -0.18*** [-4.14] -0.18*** [-4.18] -0.19*** [-4.23] -0.19*** [-4.26] -0.19*** [-4.25] -0.09*** [28.66] -0.18*** [-4.04] 
%# 0.415 0.416 0.416 0.417 0.417 0.416 0.414 
N 2278 
Data 2009/01/05 -- 2018/05/23 
This table reports empirical results of the form  
log	(&'(?ef-) = ) + 01 ∙ 456- ∙ 71 456- > 0 + 0< ∙ |456-| ∙ 7< 456- ≤ 0 + φ1log	(&'(?ef-DE) + XE<EH1 ?-D1 + ?- 
where GSI is calculated with different value of λ. ****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% 
level respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are in brace 
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Table 3.8 Summary of empirical results in different financial market 
 Index Date range a !" !# ARIMA Structure %# 
Developed 
stock 
market 
Dow Jones 
500 
2014/01/30 
2016/11/14 
18.8*** 
[304.5] 
-3.68 
[-1.57] 
7.27*** 
[3.91] ARIMA (1,0,1) 0.27 
S&P 2014/01/04 2017/12/29 
21.99*** 
[1110] 
-2.02 
[-1.60] 
2.17* 
[1.86] ARIMA (1,0,1) 0.41 
IXIC 2015/10/15 2016/12/9 
21.34*** 
[1668] 
-1.01 
[0.95] 
1.67** 
[2.07] ARIMA (1,0,1) 0.20 
N225 2016/12/19 2016/12/1 
11.5*** 
[61.1] 
-0.78 
[-1.10] 
1.22** 
[2.37] ARIMA (1,0,2) 0.41 
France 2014/1/29 2017/12/29 
18.47*** 
[378] 
-1.97 
[-1.25] 
3. 78*** 
[2.97] ARIMA (2,0,2) 0.39 
HSI 2014/1/29 2016/12/15 
21.25*** 
[763] 
3.18*** 
[2.73] 
3.39*** 
[2.88] ARIMA (1,0,1) 0.33 
Emerging 
Stock 
market 
And 
Bitcoin 
market 
TWII 2013/11/26 2016/10/31 
0.01 
[0.98] 
0.20 
[0.35] 
-1.32***  
[-3.59] ARIMA (2,1,2) 0.19 
Bit Coin 2014/3/30 2018/01/31 
-0.01 
[-0.99] 
0.16 
[0.57] 
-0.86*** 
[-2.69] ARIMA (2,1,0) 0.11 
SSEC 2010/1/01 2016/11/03 
0.001 
[0.28] 
0.62*** 
[3.81] 
-0.76*** 
[-6.36] ARIMA (3,1,1) 0.14 
SZI 2010/12/23 2016/11/31 
0.02 
[-0.97] 
0.47*** 
[2.71] 
-0.19*** 
[2.73] ARIMA (3,1,1) 0.14 
GEI 2010/12/23 2016/11/31 
    0.001 
[0.25] 
0.51*** 
[2.99] 
-0.32*** 
[3.63] ARIMA (1,1,1) 0.13 
Future 
market 
Brent Oil 2012/1/23 2016/1/13 
12.43*** 
[240] 
-1.30 
[-1.24] 
2.13** 
[1.98] ARIMA (1,0,2) 0.41 
Shanghai 
Silver Future 
2008/1/14 
2018/2/22 
-0.01*** 
[-3.20] 
1.68*** 
[2.59] 
1.21*** 
[3.93] ARIMA (1,1,1) 0.20 
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Shanghai 
Gold Future 
2009/01/05 
2018/05/23 
-0.02 
[-1.01] 
1.14* 
[1.82] 
0.51 
[0.84] ARIMA (1,1,1) 0.28 
Shanghai 
Copper Future 
2012/1/24 
2018/02/22 
13.06*** 
[207.22] 
1.19** 
[2.01] 
3.3*** 
[3.88] ARIMA (4,0,0) 0.61 
This table compares the empirical test results of different financial markets with the regression form  
log	(&'(?ef-) = ) + 01 ∙ 456- ∙ 71 456- > 0 + 0< ∙ |456-| ∙ 7< 456- ≤ 0 + )K 1 + e)(1) + ?- 
****** denote statistical significance at the 1%5%10% level respectively. Newey-West-based t-statistics are 
in brace 
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4. Extrapolation Belief, Trading Volume and Bubbles  
Abstract: To explain the confusing relationship between trading volume 
and individuals’ extrapolation belief that we confirmed in Chapter 3, we 
modify our model in Chapter 2 by assuming extrapolators are 
heterogeneous in the way that every extrapolator has his idiosyncratic 
bias when evaluating the information innovations. We prove that our new 
model not only can efficiently explain the relation between extrapolation 
belief and trading volume in different financial markets, but also can 
explain the two most distinguished features of financial bubbles: high 
trading volume and high volatility which other models are struggling to 
explain. 
4.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 3, we empirically prove that individual investors’ extrapolation belief can 
significantly impact the trading volume, especially for the market with a high 
proportion of individual investors. Specifically, during the bear market, individuals’ 
negative extrapolation belief increases the trading volume in the future markets but 
decreases the trading volume in the stock market. Nevertheless, during the bull market, 
their positive extrapolation always increases the trading volume for all the markets. We 
also show that previous behavioristic theories, like “overconfidence theory”, 
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“disposition effect” theory, or existing extrapolative models cannot fully explain our 
findings.  
Fortunately, this paper finds, with a simple modification on our model in Chapter 2, 
we can effectively address these rubs. And we prove our new model built on 
heterogeneous extrapolators not only can explain why trading volume is related with 
extrapolation belief in these financial markets, but also can help to understand the two 
most distinguished features of bubbles that other theories are struggling with: the 
coexistent of high trading volume and the high volatility. 
The only modification we made, with other model settings being the same, is that 
extrapolators are heterogeneous with each other. Their heterogeneity lies in the sense 
that, at every time, each extrapolator has his own idiosyncratic bias when evaluating 
the news about the risky asset’s cash flow. This modification is well evidenced by many 
facts that can generate differences among investors, like “Gradual Information Flow” 
(Hong and Stein 2007), “Limited attention” (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003, Peng and 
Xiong 2006, Corwin and Coughenour 2008), “Heterogeneous Prior” (Harris and Raviv 
1993, Kandel and Pearson 1995), and so on.  
This modification is crucial to our new model, because this makes extrapolators not 
only trade with fundamentalists but also trade with other extrapolators. This is because, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, news innovations can affect extrapolators by enhancing their 
expectation when the news is consistent with their prior extrapolation belief or by 
weakening it when the news is contradictive. Since extrapolator has his idiosyncratic 
bias about the news innovation, his expectation will also be heterogeneous with other 
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extrapolators’ expectations. In other words, some extrapolators will be more optimistic 
than others even if they observe the same price trend and hold the same extrapolation 
bias, just because the news they are receiving is better than others. Or, they may be 
pessimistic compared to others because their “biased” news is not as good as others. 
Therefore, optimistic extrapolators will buy shares from those who are pessimistic. 
Additionally, the difference between extrapolators’ expectation grows as their 
extrapolation belief increases, as in our model, extrapolators’ difference about the news 
innovation is amplified by their previous extrapolation belief. The stronger 
extrapolation belief they are holding, the more diffuse their expectation will be. 
We discuss our model’s prediction in two situations, “no short-sale constraint” and 
“short-sale constraint”. When investors can sell short, like in the future market, the 
positive correlation between |GSI| and high trading volume is a natural prediction of 
our model. As in our model, when individuals’ extrapolation belief (|XO|) increases, the 
difference between extrapolators and fundamentalists, and the differences between 
different extrapolators all become more significant. Their demand changes more 
significantly too. Consequently, trading volume of the whole market increases as the 
magnitude of individuals’ extrapolation belief grows, like what happens in the future 
market. Trading volume is accounted for all investors.  
In the second situation, when investors are facing short sale constraint, things are 
different. During the bull market, the cumulative positive price changes strike 
extrapolator’ enthusiasm. In the beginning, they try to increase their demand, buying 
from the rational fundamental traders. Their enthusiasm pushes the price even higher 
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and maybe gradually drive fundamental traders away from the market. But trading 
volume wouldn’t reduce even when fundamentalists quit the market. As we 
demonstrated above, when the price continues rising, individuals’ extrapolation belief 
will become stronger, and accordingly, the difference between them will grow bigger. 
Therefore, the same bias which introduces only little volume in the beginning, can 
eventual bring in enormous volume. Because the difference caused by the news 
adjustment on their expectation is now so large in magnitude. In this situation, the 
trading volume mainly happens among heterogeneous extrapolators. 
Nevertheless, during the bear market, where extrapolators are too pessimistic than 
they should be, they will first try to sell their own shares out. But because of the short-
sale constraint, extrapolators are forced to leave the market just as the fundamentalists 
do when the asset is too overvalued. Market are only left with fundamentalists. Trading 
volume will now be caused by the difference among fundamentalists instead of by the 
difference between extrapolators. As fundamentalists are much more homogenous 
compared with extrapolators, the trading volume would become smaller when 
individual’s extrapolation bias grows stronger, which just explains the negative relation 
between |GSI| (GSI<0) and trading volume as our empirical test finds. 
Further, by simulation, we show our model can help us to get a better understanding 
of financial bubbles.  
Financial bubbles seem to be a chronic disease of the financial market when the price 
of equities surges extremely high compared with its fundamental value (Xiong 2013). 
Although these bubbles are distributed in different financial markets and in different 
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periods, high trading volume and high volatility can always be found at the same time 
in these torrential stages (Xiong and Scheinkman 2003). Nevertheless, despite all the 
efforts scholars have devoted to financial bubbles, we still cannot fully understand them. 
As Appendix Table 4.1 shows, traditional models of financial bubbles could address 
why bubble occurs, but not the fact of the co-occurrence of high trading volume and 
the high volatility. The same holds true for the first generation of behavioral theories. 
Although, more recent models like Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Barberis et al. 
(2016), can partly explain the two features, they all have their own shortages. Unlike 
previous theories, we believe our model can efficiently explain the origination of 
financial bubbles, as well as their most important features.  
By our theory, the bubble occurs as follow: in the initial stage, some positive news 
innovation push price up, causing individuals to extrapolate, leading price to rise even 
higher, which will make the individual extrapolate more in return. At certain 
circumstance, as this process continues, a bubble will be generated by their 
extrapolation belief. As demonstrated in our second chapter, individual investors are 
affected both by their confirmation bias as well as their extrapolation bias. The volatility 
of their expectations, and consequently the volatility of the asset price, will grow 
endogenously with their extrapolation belief as a result of the adjustment of 
confirmation bias about the news innovation. And by the heterogeneous extrapolators 
modification, we prove that, in the bull market, the trading volume also increases as 
extrapolation belief grows. Therefore, volatility and trading volume will grow 
endogenously as they are positively correlated with individual investors’ extrapolation 
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belief. With simulation, we show how powerful of our model to explain the financial 
bubbles.  
To summarize, this paper makes at least two contributions. Firstly, we develop a new 
model by a simple modification of our model in Chapter 2 which can help us to 
understand why irrational investors’ extrapolation belief can affect trading volume. 
Secondly, by simulation this paper proves our new model is especially useful to 
understand two distinguished features of financial bubbles, the high trading volume and 
the high volatility. 
In the next section, we review related researches about financial bubbles. Section 4.3 
presents our model and discusses its implications. Sections 4.4 describe the simulation 
of an experimental bubble which reveals the two features of financial bubbles. Section 
4.5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix. 
4.2 Literature Review 
High trading volume and high volatility are believed to be the most two distinguished 
features of bubbles (Ofek and Richardson 2001, Cochrane 2002).   
The high trading volume, which is the positive correlated with the high price, is 
thought to be the first characteristic feature of the financial bubbles (Galbraith 1954, 
Carlos, Neal, and Wandschneider 2006). Ofek and Richardson (2001) demonstrate that 
“between early 1998 and February 2000, pure internet firms represented as much as 20% 
of the dollar volume in the public equity market, even though their market capitalization 
never exceeded 6%.”  But after the internet bubble busted, the turnover rate of Nasdaq 
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stock market declined quickly to average size. Barberis et al. (2016) confirm that the 
high trading volume is also positively correlated with the price level during the bubble 
periods, such as the stock market boom of 1928-1929 and the 2004-2005 real estate 
market.  
High volatility is also an obvious character of bubble periods (Scheinkman and Wei 
Xiong 2003). Cochrane (2002) refers to the much-discussed Palm case: “Palm stock 
was tremendously volatile during this period, with 15.4% standard deviation of 5-day 
returns, which is about the same as the volatility of the S&P 500 index over an entire 
year”. Using different calculation methods, Lowry and Schwert (2002) estimate the 
volatility of internet stocks, finds that during the tech-bubble, the volatilities of 
technical stocks are extremely high according to other periods and according to non-
technic stocks, also he points out that this phenomenon deserves more study.  
To my best knowledge, there are two models directly illustrate the characters of 
financial bubbles, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Barberis et al. (2016).  
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) build a model in which investors are “overconfidence” 
about their private signals which lead them to hold different opinions about the equity’s 
price with each other. They assume that, when investors are facing short-sale 
constraints, investors can choose to buy in assets in order to resale more optimistic ones 
in the future.  The “resale option” can generate a sustainable bubble as people value 
this option too much. High volume and high price volatility can also be created by 
investors irrational trading behavior as their enthusiasm on the “resale” option.  
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Barberis et al. (2016) present a multiple-generation heterogeneous model where 
many investors are extrapolative investors. Extrapolative investors form their 
expectation of future return according to their extrapolative signals—they would 
purchase assets just because of the past positive cumulative return. But in their model, 
extrapolative investors are also affected by another signal—the asset’s fundamental 
value. They assume extrapolators also “waver” independently between these two 
conflictive signals. Heterogeneity between extrapolators generates because of their 
independent wavering.  By a consumption-based equilibrium model, they show that, 
bubble will be generated by extrapolators’ irrational behavior. Also in this process, the 
heterogeneity also increases as the gap between two signals grows.  Then the trading 
volume will be endogenously exaggerated by the price level. 
But these models still cannot help us fully understand why bubbles are companied 
with both high trading volume and volatilities.  In Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), the 
disagreement between investors which governs the trading volume is exogenous. As a 
consequence, the trading volume is exogenous to the price level. This is confirmed by 
Barberis et al. (2016) who use simulations to test the trading volume pattern in the 
model of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). Therefore, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) 
cannot explain why during bubbles, trading volume is positively correlated with the 
price level. 
In Barberis et al. (2016), the positive relation between trading volume and the price 
level is a natural prediction of their model. But, because they build the model with the 
irrational bias, extrapolation, which requires the future price changes be smaller than 
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past price changes, their model cannot explain high volatilities during bubbles. Even, 
their model may predict contradict result: the absolute return scales of each generation 
will become smaller when bubble grows, hence the volatility, if there is any, will be 
smaller as bubble growing. 
In a word, given the characters of financial bubbles, previous models don’t give us a 
satisfactory explanation especially why volatility is always extremely high during 
bubbles. 
4.3 A New Model with Heterogeneous Extrapolators 
To address why trading volume is correlated with investors’ extrapolation, this paper 
introduces heterogeneous extrapolators into our model while other model settings are 
similar. 
In this new economy, there are also two assets: a risk-free asset and a risky asset. 
Risk-free is in perfectly elastic supply and earns a constant return which is normalized 
to zero, while the risky asset is in fixed supply of amount |. The logarithm evolution 
of its dividend 7},which is paid in the last term, is given by 
7} = 7~ + 1 + ⋯+ - + ⋯+ } 
                                                      -~Ç(0, ÑÖ<) i.i.d. over time.                                 (1) 
where	-	is the information released to all investors at period t. As in original model, 
only two kinds of investors trade in the market: fundamentalists and extrapolators. 
Fundamentalists, who just try to arbitrage the miss pricing, is identical with each other 
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and make up a fraction of Üá  of all the investors. As shown in Chapter 2, the 
fundamental value will be  
                                           à-á = 7- − (â − *) ∙ äÑÖ<|                                            (2) 
The other type investor is extrapolators, whose expectation is affected by past price 
changes. Following Chapter 2, their extrapolation belief can be expressed as 
                                          XO = λã0OD1ãH1 PODã − PODãD1 − ç                                  (3) 
where 0 < λ < 1.	0 means extrapolation coefficient, λ is the memory effect, ç is the 
risk compensation. And as demonstrated in Chapter 2, they are also suffered with 
confirmation bias in the way that extrapolative investor will enforce their expectation 
by new arriving information if it is consistent with their prior extrapolation belief. 
Nevertheless, when contradictive information comes, they also update their expectation 
but to a much less extent. 
But, unlike previous model, we assume extrapolators are heterogeneous when 
evaluating the new arriving news. Every time news is announced to the public, unlike 
fundamentalists who can receive immediately and correctly, extrapolator hold his 
idiosyncratic bias in the process of evaluating the arrival news.  
The idiosyncratic bias of individual investors on information processing has solid 
proofs. For example, the “Gradual Information Flow” mechanism which refers to the 
fact that some investors will receive certain important news earlier than other investors 
(Hong and Stein, 1999). This fact draws many researchers’ attention such as Huberman 
and Regev (2001), Menzly and Ozbas (2006). Cohen and Frazzini (2006) gives a 
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specific paradigm that changes in a company performance will be easily detected by its 
customers or suppliers who will take this advantage to trade with uninformed investors.  
“Limited Attention” which means investors can only focus on a subsection of all the 
overwhelming publicly information (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003, Peng and Xiong, 2006). 
This shortage of individual investors is more important in current financial market for 
the high-complexity of these market and the accelerating speed of world changing. 
Besides, Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) suggest that 
“Heterogeneous Priors” can also generate difference among investors even if they 
receive all the valuable information at the same time, because the priority of different 
news is heterogeneous to different investors. Besides, investors heterogeneousness of 
information processing can also be generated by other mechanisms, such as Distorted 
Transmission (Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong, 2008, Malmendier and Shantikumar, 
2007), representativeness and conservatism (Hirshleifer (2001), Barberis and Thaler 
(2003)), and so on. 
Therefore, this paper introduces heterogeneous investors into our model in the way 
that extrapolative investors have their own bias when evaluating the information 
innovation -. Assume their bias are norm distributed, such that  
                                                -E = - + é-E   where é-E~Ç 0, Ñè<  i.i.d.                     (4) 
where é-E  means extrapolator i’s bias about the information innovation - . For 
simplicity, we assume it is independent and identically distributed. Then   
                                                              	-E~Ç(-, Ñè<)                                                (5) 
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Assume there are n types of extrapolators, indexed by	+	 ∈ 	 {1,2,3… , ì},	and each 
type takes up the fraction Üï,E, such that:	
                                                               Üá + Üï,E = 1                                           (6) More	simply,	we	assume	each	type	of	extrapolator	take	the	same	fraction	of	the	whole	population.	Then,		
																																																																Ü = Üï,E = Üï,¶ = 1D	ß®©                                       (7) 
Following our model setting in Chapter 2, extrapolator i’s expected price changes of 
next period should be, 
™-E = ™- ∙ fÖ´¨												™- ≥ 0™- ∙ fDÖ´¨										™- < 0	                                   	(8) 
Therefore, extrapolators’ irrational belief ™-E is a log-normal distributed, such that 
                                    E(™-E) = ™- ∗ fÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ 												™- ≥ 0™- ∗ fDÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ 												™- < 0	                            (9)  
On basis on above model settings, we discuss the prediction of our model in two 
situations, “no short-sale constraint” and “short-sale constraint”. 
4.3.1 No short-sale constraint 
When investors are free to sale short, like in the future market, they can borrow shares 
form others to arbitrage as long as they think the asset is overpriced, even if they don’t 
currently have any in their hands. In this situation, investors can freely adjust their 
  149 
demand by choosing long position (positive demand) or short position (negative 
demand). Therefore, similar with Chapter 2, demand of fundamentalists should be 
                                       Ç-á = ≥´D(}D-D1)¥∙µ∂≤∙∑D∏´¥∙µ∂≤ = ∏´®Ø¥µ∂≤∙∑D∏´¥∙µ∂≤                             (10) 
This means the demand of fundamentalist will become negative as long as the actual 
price surpasses the fundamental value by äÑÖ<|. Similarly, we assume extrapolators 
also pay attention to fundamental value, then, the demand of the ith extrapolator should 
be  
                                      Ç-ï,E = V ≥´D }D-D1 ¥∙µ∂≤∙∑D∏´¥∙µ∂≤ + π ∫´¨Ø¥∑µ∂≤¥µ∂≤ 	                          (11) or	
																																																		Ç-ï,` = VÇ-á + π ∫´¨Øª∑ºΩ≤ªºΩ≤ 	                                              (12) V and é denote the weight extrapolator puts in the two signals, fundamental value 
signal and irrational signal, respectively. Then the equilibrium price will be determined 
when the sum of all investors’ demand equals the fixed supply	|, as 
                                                     ÜáÇ-á + Üï,E Ç-ï,` = |                                      (13) 
Therefore, the equilibrium price would be  
                                           à- = à-á + π™-fÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ 											™- ≥ 0à-á + π™-fDÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ 										™- < 0	                           (14) 
Then, when ™- ≥ 0, from period * − 1 to	*, the demand change of fundamentalists, 
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                              æ-á = Ç-á − Ç-D1á = 1¥∙µ∂≤ [ à-á − à-D1á − (à- − à-D1)] 
                                                    = 1¥∙µ∂≤ (™-D1fÖ´¡¬Ø∞±≤≤ − ™-fÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ )                        (15) 
from equation (3), we know that 
                                             ™- = F™-D1 + FC*				'K		™-D1 = 1F ™- − C*                           (16) 
then equation	(15)	can be rewritten as 
                        æ-á = 1¥∙µ∂≤ [ 1√ ™- − C- fÖ´¡¬Ø∞±≤≤ − ™-fÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ ]  
                                  = 1¥∙µ∂≤ ™-f∞±≤≤ 1√ fÖ´¡¬ − fÖ´ − 1¥∙µ∂≤ C-fÖ´Ø∞±≤≤                         (17) 
For simplicity, assume C- is a martingale process with mean value of zero. then, 
                E(æ-á) = 1¥∙µ∂≤ ™-∆f∞±≤≤ 							where				E 1√ fÖ´¡¬ − fÖ´ = ∆         (18) 
Similarly, for the ith extrapolator, his demand change can be expressed as 
æ-ï,E = Ç-ï,E − Ç-D1ï,E = Væ-á + π(™-Ø1E + ä|ÑÖ<äÑÖ< − ™-E + ä|ÑÖ<äÑÖ< )	 
                    = 	V 1¥∙µ∂≤ (™-D1fÖ´¡¬Ø∞±≤≤ − ™-fÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ ) 		+ π ∫´≈¬∙∆∂´≈±´¨D∫´∙∆∂´¡¬≈±´¡¬¨ 		¥µ∂≤    (19) 
then its conditional expectation will be 
E(æ-á) = V 1ä ∙ ÑÖ< ∆™-fµ±≤< − π 1ä ∙ ÑÖ< ∆™- 
                                                    =	 1¥∙µ∂≤ ∆™-(Vf∞±≤≤ − π)                                         (20) 
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 For the whole market, trading volume equals the half of the sum of all investors’ 
absolute demand changes, such as 
                                                   &- = 1< (Ü«|æ*«| + Ü»,+ æ-ï,E©EH1 )                            (21) 
then  
                           »	(&-) = 1< [Üá » æ-á + Ü6 » æ-ï,E ]                             (22) 
From equation (18) and (19), we know  
                                       …ï	( ´ )…|∫´| > 0			and			 … ï( æÃ´,¨ )…|∫´| > 0	          (23) 
so, 
                                                                       … ´…|∫´| > 0                                           (24) 
It is easy to prove, when 		™- < 0, the trading volume also satisfy inequality (24). 
Therefore, the trading volume of the whole market increases as the magnitude of |™-| 
increases, just like what happens in the future market. In this situation, both the demand 
of extrapolators and fundamentalists change more greatly as |™-|  increases. But it 
should be noticed that, extrapolators not only trade with fundamentalist but may also 
trade with other extrapolators.   
4.3.2 Short-sale constraint  
In this situation, investors are facing short sale constraint. Even though in their belief, 
the risky asset is overpriced to a large extent which can ensure good profit from short-
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selling, they cannot short to arbitrage. Hence, the price is only determined by more 
optimistic investors. Therefore, every type of investors’ demand is determined by  
               Ç-á = e)Õ	[∏´®Ø¥µ∂≤∙∑D∏´¥∙µ∂≤ 	 ,0]                                                                       (25) 
               Ç-ï,E = e)Õ	[V ∏´®Ø¥µ∂≤∙∑D∏´¥∙µ∂≤ + π ∫´¨Ø¥µ∂≤∑¥µ∂≤ 	 ,0]                                             (26) 
To show how investors behave in this situation, we firstly introduce the definition of 
investors’ Acceptable Price (ℙ*+ ): for the ith extrapolator, at time t, his Acceptable 
Price is the price at which he will not change his demand if he can freely buy in or sell 
short. In other words, his Acceptable Price is the price when other investors hold the 
same belief with him, then the market is determined by his will. If the actual price is 
higher than his Acceptable Price, he will try to reduce his demand, and vice-verse. 
Then, for the fundamentalist, their Acceptable Price is just the fundamental value, 
ℙ*« = à*«. But for extrapolator, his Acceptable Price will be determined by: 
                                              V ∏´®Ø¥µ∂≤∙∑D∏´¥∙µ∂≤ + π ∫´¨Ø¥µ∂≤∑¥µ∂≤ = |                                   (27) 
then: 
                                               ℙ*»,+ = Và-á + π™-E                                            (28) 
    Equation (28) means, extrapolator’s Acceptable Price is just the weighted average 
of two signals he cares, the fundamental value and his irrational bias. Accordingly, his 
Acceptable Price is also log-normal distributed, and the mean value should be 
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                                           » ℙ*»,+ = Và-á + π™- ∗ fÖ´Ø∞±≤≤                        (29) 
Also from (25) and (26), we can figure when will investors quit the market. For the 
fundamentalists, as long as Ç-á ≤ 0,	they will keep their demand be 0 and stay away, at 
this time,   
             à- ≥ 7- − â − * − 1 äÑÖ<|				'K						à- ≥ à-á + äÑÖ< = ℙ*á + äÑÖ<|    (30)            
Similarly, for extrapolators, if Ç-ï,` ≤ 0, 
                              à- ≥ Và-á + π™-E + äÑÖ<|							'K					à- ≥ ℙ*»,+ + äÑÖ<|       (31)   
From equation (30) and (31), we can see if the actual price PO surpasses investor’s 
Acceptable Price ℙ*»,+ by äÑÖ<|, or, if investor’s Acceptable Price ℙ*»,+ is smaller than à- − 	γσ—<, he will quit the market. So, we can define the Threshold Price as          
                                                              à-∗ = à- − 	γσ—<|                                          (32) 
Whenever ℙ*»,+ ≤ à-∗, investor + will quit the market, leaving the market with more 
optimistic ones. But it should be noticed here that, for the same extrapolator who is 
more optimistic than other extrapolators in some period, may become pessimistic than 
his peers in the next period. This is because his random idiosyncratic bias will make 
him overestimate the news sometime, but underestimate it at other time. Isaac Newton’s 
failed speculation in the South Sea bubble is a good certification of extrapolators who 
are going in and out of the market. (Barberis et, al. 2016).   
Accordingly, the equilibrium price is determined by those investors who are more 
optimistic than others. To unify, we denote Üá = Ü~ , 	Üï,E = ÜE , Ç-á = Ç-~ , 	Ç-ï,E =
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Ç-E.			6∗is the subset of	+ ∈ 	 {0,1,2,3… , ì}, such that every trader in this set has positive 
demand for the risky asset. Likewise, define 6 ∈ 	 {1,2,3… , ì} to specify extrapolators 
who have positive demand. Then the equilibrium price will be resulted by 
                                                            ÜE ∙ Ç-EE∈©∗ = |	                                           (33) 
where 6∗  is the subset of 	+ ∈ 	 {0,1,2,3… , ì} , such that any trader in this set has 
positive demand for the risky asset. Then by simple calculation we can get, when 
fundamentalists are still in the market (à-á > à-∗),   
                                       à- = à-á + ß¨ß®Ø ß¨¨∈“ ∙ ™-E − 1D(ß®Ø ß¨¨∈“ )ß®Ø ß¨¨∈“ äÑÖ<|	             (34) 
Likewise, when fundamentalists left the market, 
                                     à- = à-á + ß¨ß¨¨∈“ ∙ ™-E − 1D ß¨¨∈“ß®Ø ß¨¨∈“ äÑÖ<|	                           (35) 
Combing (34) and (35), we can get,  
                                           à- = ß¨ ß¨¨∈“∗ ∙ ℙ*»,+ − 1D ß¨¨∈“∗ß¨¨∈“∗ äÑÖ<|	                           (36) 
Equation (36) shows the actual price is a little smaller than the weighted average 
value of the existing investors’ Acceptable Price. This devaluation can be regarded as 
the risk compensation asked by the existing investors because they have to absorb other 
investors’ shares who have already left the market. 
On basis of this, we can understand now how the trading volume changes during the 
bull market or during the bear market. We start with the bull market. 
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4.3.2.1 Trading volume in the bull market 
  Figure 4.1 illustrates how price evolves in this circumstance. Assume at time * = 0, ™~ = 0, à~ = à~á = ℙ0»,+ . At time * = 1, when a positive information innovation is 
released, the price rises because fundamentalists understand the positive news and try 
buy in more. Subsequently, the extrapolators who observe this positive price change 
will become optimistic about future returns. Then their enthusiasm pushes the price 
even higher (à1 > à1á). In this progress, fundamentalists reduce their demand while 
extrapolators increase their demand. But because the price is not too high (à1á > à1∗), 
fundamentalists still exist in the market.  
At the next time, * = 2 , with ™-  continues growing, extrapolators become more 
exited which eventually lead actual price be much bigger than the fundamental value. 
As shown in the second picture of Figure 4.1, in this situation, as à< > à<á + äÑÖ<|, 
fundamentalists have quit the market, leaving the market with only extrapolators. Then, 
the actual price is determined by the existing extrapolators’ expectations. But, because 
some extrapolators underestimate the new-innovated information (-E < -), they are 
pessimistic because their adjusted Acceptable Price is smaller than other extrapolators, 
and even smaller than the threshold value. As shown in this picture, for any extrapolator  
whose Acceptable Price is smaller than the Threshold Price à<∗ = à< − γσ—< (dash line), 
he will quit the market. The dash area denotes his possible Acceptable Price which is 
smaller than à-∗. Therefore, the actual price should be higher than the mean value of all 
extrapolator’s Acceptable Price (the dash blue line), or à< > »1 ℙ*»,+ . 
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Figure 4.1 Demonstration of price evolution in the bull market 
Horizontal axis in this figure indicates the price level while the curve shows Probability density function of extrapolator’s 
Acceptable Price ” Õ .   
Things are similar when the price continues to rise. Like shown in the third picture, ™- has grown much higher because of past cumulative price changes, the actual price 
surpasses the fundamental value to a larger extent, fundamentalists stay away from the 
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market. But as extrapolators are different with each other about the news, their 
Acceptable Prices are diffused as before. The actual price will be determined solely by 
those more optimistic extrapolators. As we have discussed above, the ith extrapolator 
may be the optimist at one period (in the blank area of Figure 4.1.b), but become 
pessimist in next period (drops into the shadow area of Figure 4.1.c), and vice versa. 
So, for the ith	extrapolator, his trading induced by the difference between Ç-ï,E  and Ç-D1ï,E  can be categorized into three classes:  
(1) He exists in the market in both periods. In this situation, his Acceptable Price is 
in the blank area for both period. His demand change just follows equation (19) and 
equation (20), as 
     ‘-E = æ-ï,E = Ç-ï,E − Ç-D1ï,E = Væ-á + π(∫´≈¬¨ Ø¥∑µ∂≤¥µ∂≤ − ∫´¨Ø¥∑µ∂≤¥µ∂≤ )	 
                   = 	V 1¥∙µ∂≤ (™-D1fÖ´¡¬Ø∞±≤≤ − ™-fÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ ) 		+ π ∫´≈¬∙∆∂´≈±´¨D∫´∙∆∂´¡¬≈±´¡¬¨ 		¥µ∂≤     (37) 
then its expected value will be 
E(‘-E ) = E(æ-ï,E) = V 1ä ∙ ÑÖ< ∆™-fµ±≤< − π 1ä ∙ ÑÖ< ∆™- 
                                                              =	 1¥∙µ∂≤ ∆™-(Vf∞±≤≤ − π)                                (38)   
Therefore, trading volume accounted by this extrapolator in situation is the absolute 
value of ‘-E . Simply 
                                                           …ï	 ‘´¨…|∫´| > 0                                                   (39) 
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(2) He exists in the market for only one periods, or his position is in the blank area for 
one period but is in the shadow area in the other.   
                                                 ’-E = Ç*»,+ = (V ∏´®Ø¥µ∂≤∙∑D∏´¥∙µ∂≤ + π ∫´¨Ø¥µ∂≤∑¥µ∂≤ )                          (40) 
As the fundamentalists have already left the market, then the equilibrium price now 
will follow equation (35). Substitute it into (40), we can get,   
                               ’-E = 1¥µ∂≤ (π™-E − Ü+Ü++∈6 ∙ ™*+) + 1 Ü++∈6 |       
                                    = 1¥µ∂≤ ™*(πf*+ − Ü+ Ü++∈6 ∙ f*+ ) + 1 Ü++∈6 |                                       (41) 
it can easily prove,   
                                                           … ï ’*+…|∫´| > 0                                            (42) 
(3) He doesn’t exist in the market for both periods (being in the shadow area for both 
periods) 
                                                                ℴ-E = 0                                                        (43) 
Therefore, the expected value of trading volume induced by this extrapolator will be  
              d-◊ = |‘-`|( ” Õÿ∏∗ )<Ÿ⁄ + 2|’-E | ∙ ” Õÿ∏∗ ” Õ∏∗~ Ÿ⁄   
                 +ℴ-E ” Õ∏∗~ ” Õ∏∗~ Ÿ⁄                                                                     (44) 
where ” Õ  is the probability density function of extrapolator’s Acceptable Price. As é-E  is independent identical distributed, we can assume ” Õ 	 being the same for 
different periods. Denote: 
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                    ∅1 = ( ” Õÿ∏∗ )< 
                   		∅< = 2 ∙ ” Õÿ∏∗ ∗ ” Õ∏∗~  
                    ∅> = 1 − ∅1 − ∅> = ” Õ∏∗~ ∙ ” Õ∏∗~                                             (45) 
Then  
                                  d-◊ = ∅1	|‘-E | + ∅<|’-E |                                                          (46) 
When fundamentalists leave the market, like what happens in Figure 4.1.b and 
Figure 4.1.c, the price will be solely determined by extrapolators, then ∅1,	∅< and ∅> 
are stable as their heterogeneous bias on news evolution is normal distributed by the 
same variance Ñè<  across time. Therefore,  
                                                         …‹›´…|∫´| > 0                                                       (47) 
Every extrapolator fits in one of above three types. Other extrapolator’s expected 
value of trading volume will be the same with d◊-, such that 
                                                        d-◊ = d-ﬁ														+ ≠ ‡                                         (49) 
Thus, when fundamentalists stay away from the market, trading volume of whole 
market will be  
                                    &- = 1< ÜE ∗ dE-E∈© = 1< d-◊ ÜEE∈©                                     (50) 
                                                    … ´…|∫´| > 0                                                             (51) 
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In a word, when ™- > 0 and fundamentalists quit the market, ∅1, ∅<, ∅> are stable. 
Then the trading volume will be positively correlated with	™-. 
4.3.2.2 Volatility during the bull market 
As we demonstrated in equation (36) that, during the bull market, the equilibrium 
price approximates the weighted average of existing extrapolators’ Acceptable Price, 
or those extrapolators’ expectation whose Acceptable Price lies in the blank area in 
Figure 4.1. Therefore, it is a little higher than the mean value of all extrapolators’ 
Acceptable Price (the blue dash line in Figure 4.1). More officially, it should be 
                                        à- = 	 ” Õ àÿ∏∗ Ÿ⁄ − 1D ß¨¨∈“ß¨¨∈“ äÑÖ<|                                 (52) 
It can be proved that the weighted average of existing extrapolators’ Acceptable Price 
is a constant ratio compared with fÕ⁄ ℙ*»,+ , assume  
                                      	 ” Õ àÿ∏∗ Ÿ⁄ ” Õ àÿ~ Ÿ⁄ = ·                                     (53) 
For the detail deduction, see Appendix 4.2. As we illustrated that, ” Õ , the 
probability density function of extrapolator’s Acceptable Price, is stable across the 
process. Substitute equation (29) and (53) into (52), we will get 
                           à- = ·(Và-á + π™- ∗ fÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ ) − 1D ß¨¨∈“ß¨¨∈“ äÑÖ<|                            (54) 
Then the return of this process at time t should be: 
                    C- = à- − à-D1 = ·V- + ·πfÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ (™-fÖ´ − ™-D1fÖ´¡¬)                   (55) 
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Simply, as in the second chapter, volatility at time t can be represented as: 
  »[&)K C-|‚-D1 ] = ·2V< »[&)K *|‚-D1 ] + (·πfÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ ™-)< »[&)K f*|‚-D1 ]	         
                                  +·2VπfÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ ™- »[„'d *, f*|‚-D1 ]                                  (56) 
   Equation (56) means, in the bull market, not only the trading volume increases with ™-, but also the volatility increases too. This conclusion coordinates with our finding in 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Specially, according to our theory, when the price has 
continually raised to a significant extent and the bubble occurs, the trading volume and 
volatility will be both unusually high than other periods. Therefore, our model is 
particularly helpful to understand the trading volume anomaly and the volatility 
anomaly of financial bubbles. 
4.3.2.3 Trading volume in the bear market 
During the bear market, things are different when ™- decreases from zero to negative. 
Similarly, we demonstrate this process with Figure 2. As shown in this figure, at the 
beginning * = 0, ™~ = 0, à~ = ℙ0á = ℙ0»,+ . Then, a negative information innovation 
shocks the market, the price drops immediately for the fundamentalists can correctly 
observe the fundamental value. The negative price change makes extrapolators be 
pessimistic about future returns, hence, their expected-price drops for their negative 
extrapolation belief. Like in Figure 2.a, the actual price drops from à~ to à1 while the 
fundamental price becomes à1á  from à~á . The overreaction is just caused from the 
pessimistic extrapolators.    
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Figure 4.2 Demonstration of price evolution in the bear market 
Horizontal axis in this figure indicates the price level while the curve shows Probability density function of extrapolator’s 
Acceptable Price ” Õ .   
    As in the bull market, extrapolators hold heterogeneous belief on the risky asset’s 
price, because their bias on the information innovation. Then, at time * = 1, there are 
already some pessimists whose Acceptable Price is lower than the threshold price. For 
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those who are too pessimistic (ℙ1»,+ < à1∗), they have already quit the market. Then, the 
actual price is also determined by more optimistic ones.    
At the next time, as prices drops, extrapolators become more pessimistic. Much more 
of them quit the market as their Acceptable Price is under the threshold price à∗. The 
shadow area in Figure 1.b become bigger than in Figure 1.a, indicating more 
extrapolators stay out of the market. As this process continues, ™- decreases and the 
shadow area grow bigger and bigger, more and more extrapolators quit the market. 
Eventually, there are only few extrapolators stay in the market, as in Figure 4.c.     
Like in the bull market, for one extrapolator, his trading activity can also be 
categorized into three classes, stays in both period, stay only in one period and stay 
away in both period. The trading volume in three situations can also be expressed as: 
‘-E = æ-ï,E = Ç-ï,E − Ç-D1ï,E = Væ-á + π(™-Ø1E + ä|ÑÖ<äÑÖ< − ™-E + ä|ÑÖ<äÑÖ< )	 
      = 	V 1¥∙µ∂≤ (™-D1fDÖ´¡¬Ø∞±≤≤ − ™-fDÖ´Ø∞±≤≤ ) 		+ π ∫´≈¬∙∆¡∂´≈±´¨D∫´∙∆¡∂´¡¬≈±´¡¬¨ 		¥µ∂≤           (57) 
Assume E 1√ fDÖ´¡¬ − fDÖ´ = ∇, then the expectation of (51) will be 
»‘-E = » æ-ï,E = V 1ä ∙ ÑÖ< ∇™-fµ±≤< − π 1ä ∙ ÑÖ< ∇™- 
                                                       =	 1¥∙µ∂≤ ∇™-(Vf∞±≤≤ − π)                                       (58)   
Simply,  
                                                          … ï‘´¨…|∫´| > 0	                                            (59) 
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Likewise, for the second situation,  
                                ’-E = 1¥µ∂≤ ™-(πfDÖ´¨ − ß¨ß¨¨∈“ ∙ fDÖ´¨) + 1 ß¨¨∈“ |                           (60) 
and 
                                                … ï ’*+…|∫´| > 0                                                                (61) 
For the third class, when he quit the market for both period, 
                                                         ℴ-E = 0                                                           (62) 
Therefore, the expected value of trading volume by extrapolator in the bear market 
can also be expressed as 
              d-◊ = |‘-`|( ” Õÿ∏∗ )<Ÿ⁄ + 2|’-E | ∙ ” Õÿ∏∗ ” Õ∏∗~ Ÿ⁄   
                    +ℴ-E ” Õ∏∗~ ” Õ∏∗~ Ÿ⁄                                                   
                     = ∅1	|‘-E | + ∅<|’-E |                                                                           (63)   
 But as we shown in Figure 4, the probability of investors stay in the market (the 
blank area) reduces as |™-| increases. Or, both ∅1and ∅<  reduces as |™-| increases. 
Therefore,  
                      …‹›´…|∫´| < 0			Âℎfì	 …|‘´¨|…|∫´| − ∅¬…|∫´| and  …|G´¨|…|∫´|− ∅≤…|∫´|                       (64) 
Which indicates, as long as the increasing speed of extrapolators’ demand change is 
smaller than the speed of they leaving the market, the trading volume will reduce |™-| 
increases. 
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The most significant difference between the bull market and the bear market is the 
probability of extrapolators who trade in the market. In the bull market, most of the 
extrapolators insist in the market for the whole process. As the difference between 
extrapolators grows rapidly when their extrapolation belief increases, the trading 
volume of the whole market rises accordingly. But in the bear market, when 
extrapolators are more pessimistic than fundamentalists, more and more of they will 
quit the market. When the market is full of more identical fundamentalists, little trading 
volume happens. On the contrary, as we illustrated above, in the future, no extrapolator 
quits the market even in the bear market.  The trading volume will consequently 
increase as their difference grows with a growing |™-|. 
In a word, our model which emphasize the heterogeneity among extrapolators not 
only can explain the relation between individuals’ extrapolation belief in the future 
market, but can also explain their relation in the markets with strict short-sale constraint.  
4.4 Simulation of the bubble 
As been demonstrated in sector 4.3, our model can help to understand the two most 
distinguish feature of financial bubbles, high trading volume and the high volatility. We 
now use simulation to illustrate this.  
In section 4.3.2, we prove that, when short-sale constraint exists, the price evolution 
should follow equation (36). Therefore, we firstly simulate this equation to see what 
will happen to the price, volatility and trading volume according to our model. Then, 
we observe the demand and the Acceptable Price evolution process of every investor to 
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see if our analysis method in section 4.3.2.1 can also explain the trading volume of our 
simulation.  
4.4.1 Simulation of the basic model 
Table 4.2: Numerical benchmark parameters for bubble simulation 
6 100 Number of Extrapolators F 0.8 Memory effect  0 0.2 Extrapolation coefficient  Üá 30% Proportion of Fundamentalists  
Üï,E 0.7% Proportion of Fundamentalists  
ä 0. 1 Coefficient of absolute risk aversion  
 ÑÁ 1.5 Volatility of high frequency information innovations 
 ÑË  0.2 Volatility of Extrapolators’ idiosyncratic bias 
D  50 Initial expected dividend  
N 60 Number of Period 
Figure 4.3 shows one possible simulated result of equation (36) with parameters set 
according to Table 4.2.  In this simulation, there are 100 different types of extrapolators 
who are different from each other in evaluating information innovations. While the 
volatility of the information is 1.5, we assume the variation of their bias on the 
innovation to a very small value (only 0.2), to show that even a slight difference 
between extrapolators can generate interesting results. Simulated price, trading volume, 
volatility as well as extrapolator’s extrapolation belief |Èr| are displayed in Figure 4.3, 
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from which we can see the simulation based on our model can realistically mimic the 
bubble’s generation, as well the high volume and high volatility during this process.   
    As shown in Figure 4.3.a, during the first 10 periods, there is no news announced 
to the public (- = 0), price rises by a fixed value every time. This is the compensation 
risk as we demonstrated in Chapter 2.  Since * = 11, the market starts to be affected 
by cash-flow news (information innovations). Initially, the fundamental value (red line 
in Figure 4.3.a) is driven to fall. The actual price (black line in Figure 4.3.a) drops as 
well.  Fortunately, this trend doesn’t persist as most following news become positive 
which makes the fundamental value to rise. The actual price rises too. Then, after a 
short period, the actual price starts to transcend the fundamental value (the black line 
begins to suppose the red one) until a very distinguished bubble arises. As shown in the 
price picture, the peak of the actual price is about 180 while the fundamental value is 
only about 100, indicating the asset is about 80% overvalued. This bubble doesn’t last 
long until it bursts. Eventually, the actual price converges to the fundamental value by 
a short time. Moreover, we also plot the price with the green line when extrapolators 
are homogenous with each other in Figure 4.3. a. Our simulation result clearly shows 
that the bubble will grow much bigger when extrapolators are heterogeneous. This is 
consistent with other papers’ result that with short constraint and heterogonous 
investors, the asset is easily overpriced (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2004, Miller 1977, 
Harrison and Kreps 1978). 
During this process, the trading volume and volatility also increase intensively. For 
simplicity, following Grange and Sin (1999), Masset (2011), Frank and Westerhoff 
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(2016) and other researchers, we use the absolute daily returns |C-| as the measurement 
of volatility which we plot in Figure 4.3.b. Combining Figure 4.3.c which displays 
extrapolators’ extrapolation belief, we can clearly see the volatility is positively 
correlated with |Èr|.  As we demonstrated in the second chapter, our model based on 
extrapolation bias and confirmation bias can explain the positive relation between 
extrapolation belief and volatility as well. Volatility, in our model rises as the 
expectation of extrapolators is not only determined by their extrapolation belief, but 
also is affected by the information innovations. The same volatility in the information 
innovation will be fundamentally amplified by extrapolator’s extrapolation belief in the 
bubble period. 
Besides volatility, the volume also grows rapidly as the bubble grows. As shown by 
Figure 4.3.d, the turnover rate is promoted to about 90% at the top of the bubble, which 
means almost all the shares are handed over from one group of people to another just 
in one trading period.  To explain why trading volume increases into such amount, we 
plot every trader’s changing demand in Figure 4.4.  
Firstly, from Figure 4.4 we can understand why does the bubble generate. As shown 
in this figure, during the initial stage (* = 1… ,10), extrapolators and fundamentalists 
just hold their shares, and no trading happens. Then, when the negative news arrives 
which leads the price to fall, extrapolators start to sell their shares to the fundamentalist 
as their extrapolation belief makes them be pessimistic about future. During this stage, 
fundamentalist’s demand (the dotted line) increases, and most of the extrapolators 
choose to reduce their demand (the colored solid line).  But when the actual price starts 
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to exceed the fundamental value, extrapolators gradually increase their demand as they 
become enthusiasm about future returns while the demand of fundamentalists in this 
process drop quickly to zero. With more positive news comes and extrapolators become 
more excited about future, the overvaluation grows so big that a distinguished bubble 
generates.  
Figure 4.4 also explains why the trading volume increases even after the 
fundamentalist quit the market. As can be seen in this picture, the fluctuation of share 
demands (solid lines) of extrapolators grows much stronger during the bubble period.  
One extrapolator’s demand being zero in one period may become very large in the next 
period, or it can decrease from a large value to zero just in one period. This rapidly 
changing just reveals the fact that some extrapolators who quit the market in some 
periods of the bubble (his Acceptable Price is smaller than the threshold value), will 
come back and bet with others again (his Acceptable Price is now higher than the 
threshold value), as Newton did in the South Sea bubble. On the other hand, solid 
colored lines in Figure 4.3.c, which portray extrapolator’s demand, disperse with each 
other as the bubble grows. Considering every extrapolator’s demand is set to be the 
same value initially, this proves the fact that, as the bubble grows, the difference among 
extrapolators, induced by the same level of bias at the beginning, can grow so huge now. 
And this huge difference makes them to changes their demand rapidly, and lead the 
volume to grow bigger and bigger. Therefore, this picture also illustrates why the 
trading volume is positively correlated with investors extrapolation belief |Èr|. 
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In a word, this simulation build on our new model can generate a more realistic 
bubble as during this process trading volume and volatility both increase enormously, 
which makes our new model more convincing.    
4.4.2 Simulated Acceptable Price of different investors 
We now use the simulated Acceptable Price and its histogram during this process to 
show our trading volume analysis method of section 4.3.2 also fits our simulation.  
Figure 4.5 compares ten extrapolators’ Acceptable Prices (solid colored lines) with 
the Threshold value (blue dotted line) during the bubble period (from	* = 15 to * =45).  From this picture we can see, for one particular extrapolator, (take the pink line 
for example), his Acceptable Price fluctuates around the Threshold value. As we 
illustrated above, he only stays in the market when his Acceptable Price is bigger than 
the Threshold value. So, these fluctuating lines reveal the fact that, when some 
extrapolators return the market after they left before, other extrapolators who was in the 
market may choose to escape. This also proves our classification of extrapolator’s 
trading behavior, that during two adjacent periods, he may stay in the market for both 
periods, stay in the market for only one period or stay out the market for both periods. 
Meanwhile, this picture shows, as the bubble grows, the Acceptable Prices of 
extrapolators diffuse because of their idiosyncratic bias on information, just as revealed 
in Figure 4.4.  
 Figure 4.6 continues to compare histogram of extrapolators’ Acceptable Price in 
different periods. At the early stages (t=14), fundamentalist exists in the market since 
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their Acceptable Price (the fundamental value, green line in this picture) is bigger than 
the threshold value (blue line). Meanwhile, the Acceptable Prices of extrapolators 
diffuse because of their idiosyncratic bias on information. At this time, some 
extrapolators have already left the market as their Acceptable Price is smaller than the 
threshold value.  In the middle stages (t=27 or t=34), fundamentalist has already quit 
the market. But things are similar for extrapolative investors—there are always some 
extrapolators who are more pessimistic than their peers and staying away from the 
market. By rough comparison, we can see, the proportion of extrapolator who is staying 
in the market are similar in these periods, just as we assumed in Section 4.3. 
Therefore, Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 demonstrate what happens to extrapolators in 
our simulation is very similar to what we show in Figure 4.1, indicating our theory in 
Section 4.3 is a realistic and persuasive method to explain trading volumes in the bubble 
period.  
In short, by numerical simulation, we prove our new model can generate a very 
realistic bubble which displays high trading volume and the high volatility 
simultaneously. Therefore, our new model can improve our understanding of financial 
bubbles. We also show our method in section 4.3.2 is a proper way to analyze the 
changing of trading volume and its relation with extrapolation belief. 
4.6 Conclusion 
To answer our empirical test finding in Chapter 3 that trading volume can be impacted 
by individuals’ extrapolation belief, we modify our extrapolative model in Chapter 2 
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with heterogeneous extrapolators. In this new model extrapolators are facing 
idiosyncratic bias when evaluating the information innovations. Consequently, their 
heterogeneity grows as their idiosyncratic bias about the information is amplified by 
their extrapolation belief. We prove that, in the future market and in the rising stock 
market, the trading volume grows as the magnitude of individuals’ extrapolation belief 
grows. On the contrary, in the declining stock market, extrapolators gradually quit the 
market as 	|™-|  increases, the market is left will only fundamentalists who are 
homogenous with each other, the trading volume reduces accordingly. 
Moreover, using simulation, we show that our model can effectively explain the most 
two important features of financial bubbles: the high trading volume, and the high 
volatility. The bubble occurs in response to positive news and extrapolators’ irrational 
behave, a phenomenon Kindleberger (1978) called displacement. Volatility rises 
because extrapolator’s expectation is becoming more volatile, trading volume increases 
because extrapolators become more heterogeneous with their peers. 
Although our model is built on individuals’ extrapolation bias and their confirmation 
bias, we are not suggesting other behavioristic biases, overconfidence bias, for example, 
are not important. Actually, extrapolators in our model are also “overconfidence”. They 
are too “confident” about their extrapolation belief and their biased information, which 
leads them to commit unwise trading decisions.  Otherwise, they would pay more 
attention to the market performance and check the credibility of their “private 
information”. We do suggest that, individual investors, as an irrational group, is too 
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complex to be simply understood by one or two behavioristic bias. It is more reasonable 
to understand them from multiple aspects. 
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Appendix 4.1 
Table 4.1: Selected models of bubbles 
  Generation of bubbles 
Excess 
Volume 
Positive 
Relation 
between 
price and 
Volume 
Excess 
Volatility 
Positive Relation 
between 
extrapolation 
belief and 
Volatility 
Rational 
model       
asymmetrically 
information  
Allen, Morris, and 
Postlewaite (1993) 
     
Herding DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2008) 
     
Limited liability Shiller (2002)      
Limited liability Allen and Gale (2000)      
Behavior 
model       
Overconfidence Daniel, Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam (1998) 
     
Biased  
self-attribution  
Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998)  
     
Extrapolation Hong and Stein (1999)      
Extrapolation DeLong and others (1990) 
     
Overconfidence Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) 
     
Extrapolation Baberis, Shleifer (2016) 
     
This table summarizes several models which try to explain bubbles.  “” means the fact which the model can explain 
while “” means the aspect the model failed to cover.     
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a: Simulated Price Process   
The black overlaid line displays the actual price while the red line plots the fundamental value. The green line shows the actual 
price when extrapolators are homogenous. 
 
b: Simulated volatility 
Volatility is measure by absolute return. 
 
 
 
 
 
c: The changing |Èr| 
Extrapolation Belief Index (Èr) is displayed in this picture with green line, while its absolute value (|Èr|) is shown by black line. 
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d: Simulated trading volume 
Trading volume is displayed with black line in this picture. 
Figure 4.3 Simulation result of a financial bubble 
We present a simulated financial bubble according to equation (36). Parameter values are set according to Table 4.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 The changing demand of investors 
This picture illustrates every investor’s changing demand during this process with the dot line representing fundamental investor’s 
demand and colored solid lines showing every extrapolators’ demand. 
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Figure 4.5 Evolution of extrapolators’ Acceptable Price 
10 extrapolators’ Acceptable Prices, represented by colored dotted line, are plotted with the threshold value which is plotted by the 
blue dotted line. 
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Figure 4.6 Histogram of extrapolators’ Acceptable Price 
This picture illustrates histograms of extrapolators’ Acceptable Price when t equals 14, 27 and 34 respectively. The red line shows 
the actual price while the blue dotted line represents the threshold value. The fundamental value is plotted by green dotted line. 
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Appendix 4.2 
Recall 
                                                     ℙ*»,+ = Và-á + π™-E                                      (a) 
and during the bull market 
                                                  ™-E = ™- ∙ fÖ´¨							when					™- ≥ 0                             (b) 
Then we can get 
                                                      ℙ*»,+ = Và-á + π™- ∙ fÖ´Øè´¨		                        (d) 
As extrapolators only put minimal weight on the fundamental signal, we assume V =0. then  
                                                  Ÿ ℙ*»,+ = π™- ∙ fÖ´Ÿ(é-E)                                  (e) 
Substitute it into (52)  
       ” Õ àÿ∏∗ Ÿ⁄ = ” Õ ℙ*»,+ÿ∏∗ Ÿ(ℙ*»,+) = π™-fÖ´ ”Í(Õ)fè´¨ÿ∆±∗´ Ÿé-E        (f) 
where fè∗´∗ = ∏´∗DÎ∏´®Ï∫´∆∂´  , and ”Í(Õ) is the probability density function for logarithm 
distribution fè´¨. Similarly,  
                                             ” Õ àÿ~ Ÿ⁄ = π™-fÖ´ ”Í(Õ)fè´¨ÿ~ Ÿé-E                     (g) 
then we can get:  
                                            
Ì Ó ∏Ô∗ ÒWÌ Ó ∏ÔÚ ÒW = ”′(Õ)fé*+Ôfé*∗ Ÿé*+”′(Õ)fé*+Ô0 Ÿé*+                                              (h) 
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which means the ratio of the actual price (calculated by the mean value of existing 
extrapolators’ Acceptable Price) to the mean value of all extrapolators’ Acceptable 
Price is not correlated with the price level ( ™-  or à- ), and just correlated with the 
proportion of existing extrapolators.  And as we assume this proportion is stable during 
the bull market, we can get  
                                    
Ì Ó ∏Ô∗ ÒWÌ Ó ∏ÔÚ ÒW = ”′(Õ)fé*+Ôfé*∗ Ÿé*+”′(Õ)fé*+Ô0 Ÿé*+ = ·                                           (i) 
which is fixed across the whole process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
